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Abstract 
    The British Intervention in South Russia 1918-1920 
 Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, a three-year civil war 
broke out in Russia. As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the 
conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a significant effect 
on the course of the war. Without this intervention on the White side, the superiority 
of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly 
overwhelmed their opponents. 
 The aim of this dissertation is to explain the nature and role of the 
British intervention on the southern, and most decisive, front of the Civil War.  The 
political decision making in London is studied as a background, but the focus of the 
dissertation is on the actual implementation of the British policy in Russia. The 
British military mission arrived in South Russia in late 1918, and started to provide 
General Denikin’s White army with ample supplies. General Denikin would have not 
been able to build his army of more than 200,000 men or to make his operation 
against Moscow without the British matériel. The British mission also organized the 
training and equipping of the Russian troops with British weapons. This made the 
material aid much more effective. Many of the British instructors took part in fighting 
the Bolsheviks despite the orders of their government.  
 The study is based on primary sources produced by British departments 
of state and members of the British mission and military units in South Russia.  
Primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of several key 
figures of the White movement and official records of the Armed Forces of South 
Russia are also used to give a balanced picture of the course of events.  
 It is possible to draw some general conclusions from the White 
movement and reasons for their defeat from the study of the British intervention. In 
purely material terms the British aid placed Denikin’s army in a far more favourable 
position than the Bolsheviks in 1919, but other military defects in the White army 
were numerous. The White commanders were unimaginative, their military thinking 
was obsolete, and they were incapable of organizing the logistics of their army. There 
were also fundamental defects in the morale of the White troops. In addition to all 
political mistakes of Denikin’s movement and a general inability to adjust to the 
complex situation in Revolutionary Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military 
defeat.  In South Russia the Whites were defeated not because of the lack of British 
aid, but rather in spite of it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Perspective 
 Soon after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 a three-year civil 
war broke out in Russia. The initial phase of the war lasted for one year, 
and it was distinguished by rapidly shifting front lines and sporadic 
engagements by small units. In this ‘Railway War’ trainloads of 
Bolshevik revolutionaries travelled long distances from the industrial 
cities to root out centres of opposition in the periphery of the vast 
country. It began in the winter of 1917-18 with the formation of the anti-
Bolshevik Volunteer Army by Generals Alekseev and Kornilov in the 
Don Cossack region, thus creating the southern front of the war. Half a 
year later this was followed by the revolt of the Czechoslovak Legion on 
the mid-Volga and Siberia, which assisted the formation of two anti-
Bolshevik governments, each with its own army, the Komuch in Samara 
and the Siberian Government in Omsk. The Red Army of Lenin’s 
Bolshevik government was properly formed to replace the irregular Red 
Guard partisan units only at the end of this phase in the fall of 1918.  
 The second and decisive stage of the Civil War lasted from 
March to December 1919. First, the White armies of Admiral Kolchak in 
Siberia and General Denikin in South Russia advanced resolutely 
toward Moscow. In the North-west General Iudenich attacked Petrograd.  
 As in many other civil wars, foreign powers intervened in the 
conflict. Britain played a leading role in this intervention and had a 
significant effect on the course of the war. Without this foreign 
intervention on the White side, the superiority of numbers in manpower 
and weaponry of the Bolsheviks would have quickly overwhelmed their 
opponents. The whole picture of the Civil War would obviously have 
been different in that the large-scale field operations between the Whites 
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and the Reds would not have taken place. Neither of the two most 
important White commanders, Kolchak nor Denikin, would have been 
able to build up their armies and to launch their offensives without 
Allied war supplies in 1919. On the other hand, the major armament 
production areas and depots ‒ Petrograd, Tula and Tsaritsyn ‒ were 
supplying the growing Red Army.
1
 Indeed the war would have been 
more or less confined to the Bolsheviks fighting against bands of 
peasant guerrillas, as was the case in the vast Russian countryside 
nominally under Bolshevik control. 
 Allied aid received by the anti-Bolshevik forces in South 
Russia was predominantly British, given that the French intervention in 
the Ukraine and Southwest Russia had ceased in April 1919 following 
humiliating evacuations in Odessa and the Crimea. The British 
Government sent a military mission to General Denikin immediately 
after the armistice as the route via the Dardanelles to the Black Sea was 
opened up. The Allies had originally decided to concentrate their 
support on Kolchak’s army in Siberia. But during the spring and summer 
of 1919, Kolchak suffered several defeats and began his retreat to the 
east. In South Russia, meanwhile, Denikin’s army was conquering city 
after city from the Reds and advancing fast towards Moscow. After 
reconsiderations in London, Denikin was indeed recognized as the only 
White commander with realistic capabilities and resources to defeat the 
Bolsheviks. British military aid therefore, was mostly assigned to his 
army. 
                                            
1
 Kolchak’s army was totally dependent on British arms and munitions which started 
to flow to Vladivostok soon after the Armistice, as there were no armament plants in 
Siberia. Smele, Civil War in Siberia, pp. 668-9. Denikin’s situation was equally 
problematic. In the beginning of 1919 both Volunteer and Don Armies had run out of 
meagre supplies mainly captured from the Bolsheviks. See Kenez, Civil War in South 
Russia II pp. 22-4, and Brinkley, The Volunteer Army and the Allied intervention, pp. 
216-21.   
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 The final decisive battles of the Russian Civil war were fought 
on the Southern Front. In the end, General Denikin’s army, the Armed 
Forces of South Russia, became the most powerful of the White armies, 
and the Bolsheviks’ most dangerous enemy. Denikin started his 
offensive in late spring 1919 with a series of brilliant victories. During 
the summer, the Bolsheviks were on the defensive along the whole 
Southern Front, and eventually most of the Red Army was concentrated 
against Denikin’s army. By autumn 1919, Denikin’s offensive 
threatened Moscow, the heart of the Bolshevik state. It was only after 
months of heavy fighting that the Bolsheviks were able to stop and 
ultimately defeat Denikin. The White cause was already lost on the other 
fronts. Thus, the Bolsheviks had practically crushed the White 
movement by the spring of 1920.  
 In the final stage of the Civil War, the remnants of Denikin’s 
forces managed, with British help, to fortify themselves on the Crimean 
Peninsula. This last White army commanded by General Wrangel held 
on for another six months, while the Reds were engaged in the war with 
Poland. As soon as it was over, the vastly superior Red Army invaded 
the Crimea. In November 1920, the Allied navies evacuated what was 
left of the White army to Constantinople and, as a military struggle 
between the Whites and the Bolsheviks, the Russian Civil War was 
over. 
 The following pages will endeavour to describe the British role 
in the course of these events. The political decision-making in London is 
studied as a background of the British actions in South Russia, 
concentrating on the role of the War Office and the General Staff as the 
authors of the British interventionist policy. One of the themes going 
through the whole of this study is indeed how the intervention policies 
in South Russia and elsewhere were conducted in many cases rather 
independently of official British Foreign policy. The focus of the study, 
however, is on the actual implementation of the British policy in South 
Russia. It will describe in detail what kind of matériel the British aid 
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consisted of and how the British Mission worked in South Russia not 
only supplying and training the White forces, but also actively taking 
part in the fighting against the Bolsheviks. The central question I am 
hoping to answer is the eventual effect and importance of the British aid 
to Denikin and thus the importance of the British role in the course of 
the whole Civil War. The study will also provide a ‘British view’ on the 
White movement and on the nature of the Civil War in the South more 
generally. This picture based on the sources produced by British 
Military and political representatives in Russia appears in many cases 
very different from the traditional interpretations in the ample White 
émigré literature or, on the other hand, in the Western or in the Soviet 
historiography. It also provides some alternative explanations for the 
White defeat. Most importantly I endeavour to dispute the traditionally 
acclaimed superiority in military competence of the Whites over the 
Reds. 
 
2. Previous Research 
 The numerous existing studies on the Russian Civil War and 
the Allied intervention have given fairly limited space to the British 
activities in South Russia and in the Caucasus. No wide-scale research 
based on British archival sources exists. Most of the studies on the 
intervention concentrate on general political lines, ‘high politics’, and, 
moreover, they examine events in Northern Russia and Siberia. This 
shortcoming of earlier research forms the basis of this study. 
 Richard H. Ullman's classic study Anglo-Soviet Relations 
1917-1921, is a case in point. The first of the three volumes, 
Intervention and War, was written before the British National Archives 
(previously the Public Records Office) opened the material concerning 
the intervention. The latter parts are mainly based on War Cabinet 
papers, which are also supported by private papers and memoirs of some 
members of the Cabinet (Churchill's papers are actually missing, as they 
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were not public at the time). Ullman’s work is an excellent survey of the 
official British Russian policy, but it is somewhat weaker in analysing 
the execution of the Cabinet policies on the field. It concentrates mainly 
on the events in Siberia and especially on the North Russian theatre of 
war. An obvious reason for the latter was the active role of the British 
troops in fighting the Bolsheviks at the Archangel-Murmansk front. The 
use of conscripted British soldiers in North Russia also caused a great 
deal of publicity in Britain during the operations and was actually the 
main reason for opposing the whole intervention. However, despite the 
battles the British fought and the casualties they took, North Russia was 
always a side-show of the Civil War and the two British brigades there 
never posed a real threat to the Bolsheviks. On the contrary, the decisive 
battles of the Russian Civil War were fought on the southern front, 
where the British aid to the Whites had a much more important role in 
the course of war. 
 Ullman crystallised the "official Western version" of the 
British intervention in his books.
2
 They were written during some of the 
hottest years of the Cold War, partly in response to the accusations of 
Soviet historians, who described the intervention as the first move of 
Capitalistic Western aggression against the Soviet state. Ullman 
formulated a comprehensive explanation of the British intervention in 
Russia. He claimed that there was no consistent British policy to 
overthrow the Bolshevik regime. The basic aim of the British policy was 
to weaken Russia, and thus to prevent the re-emergence of the 19th-
Century rivalry between the empires. This was implemented by 
supporting the detachment of the Border States from Russia. On the 
other hand, Ullman describes the accidental and ineffective nature of the 
intervention to support the Whites as piecemeal operations with limited 
                                            
2
 Ullman’s arguments are referred and repeated in many more recently published 
books such as Clifford Kinvig’s Churchill’s Crusade (2006) and Miles Hudson’s 
Allied Intervention in Russia 1918-1920 (2004). 
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objectives.
3
 I will point out in this dissertation, however, that the War 
Office and its Secretary of State, Winston Churchill, certainly had a 
policy to counter Bolshevism and this plan was determinedly carried 
out, especially in South Russia. Moreover, what really made a difference 
as far as the war between the Whites and the Reds in Russia is 
concerned, were the hundreds of thousands of guns and millions of 
cartridges that the Whites received from Britain. 
 Another product of the Cold War era is George A. Brinkley’s 
The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia 1917-1921. 
Brinkley has used extensively material produced by the Whites, but the 
British archival sources are missing completely, as the book was written 
some years before the archives opened.
4
 This has biased the analysis to 
some extent, and the bitter opinion of the Whites can be observed in the 
description of ‘the muddled and inadequate’ action of the Allies. 
Brinkley also states how the Allies missed a genuine opportunity ‘to 
reintegrate Russia in the community of the States with undoubtedly 
beneficial results both for herself and her neighbours’, and to crush the 
violent dictatorship of the undemocratic Leninist offshoot of Marxism.
5
   
 Evan Mawdsley develops the theme regarding the marginal 
importance of the intervention further in his book, The Russian Civil 
War. This otherwise excellent overall study of the Civil War clearly 
understates the importance of Allied support to the Whites. Mawdsley 
argues that the most important intervention was not made by the Allies, 
but by the Central Powers in 1918. He also claims that the British aid 
arrived too late to have an effect on Denikin's early campaign in 
                                            
3
Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations II, pp. 347-64. 
4
 Brinkley, Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention, pp. 398-434. Brinkley’s study 
covers an immense amount of White material from the Columbia University Russian 
Archives and the Hoover Institution, but his only British sources appear to be the 
rather selective Documents on British Foreign Policy1919-1939, Hansard 
Parliamentary Debates and some published parliamentary papers. 
5
 Ibid. pp. 275-83. 
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securing his position on Kuban and the Don, although it was of some 
importance in autumn 1919.
6
 This argument is not based on original 
research. In March 1919 Denikin's army was utterly exhausted. 
Moreover, it was certainly the British matériel and moral support that 
made the successful operations of May and June 1919 possible. 
 Richard Pipes’s last volume of his trilogy on the Russian 
Revolution
7
, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, has provided some 
addition to the discussion on the intervention. Pipes clearly states the 
importance of the British intervention in several stages of the Civil War. 
Interestingly, he also discusses the effect of the allied plans and 
intervention − whether imagined or real − on Bolshevik actions. 
However, the two relevant chapters of Pipes' book are mere general 
analysis of the civil war and there is no detailed study of British actions 
in South Russia. He also maintains the idea of Allied intervention’s 
ineptitude, and how the Allies left the Whites ‘in the lurch’ in the 
decisive moment, as one reason for the White defeat.
8
 
  Still today the most important Western study of the Civil War 
in the South is Peter Kenez’s two-volume research, The Civil War in 
South Russia. It is also the most thorough study of any area under White 
rule during the Civil War. Kenez has based his research on a vast 
amount of White primary sources. The Red primary sources are absent 
due to the obvious difficulties in accessing the Soviet archives during 
the 1970s. However, British primary sources are also totally missing, 
though accessible from 1968 and 1972. Kenez's interpretation of British 
intervention and relations to Whites and Transcaucasian states is based 
                                            
6
 Mawdsley, The Russian Civil War, pp. 283-4. Mawdsley maintains this argument 
and develops it further in his article The Civil War: Military Campaigns in the 
Critical Companion to the Russian Revolution 1914-1921, p 99. 
7
 The former volumes being Russia under the Old Regime and The Russian 
Revolution, 1899-1919. 
8
 Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime, pp. 128-33. Pipes derives his 
interpretation apparently from the various memoirs of the White generals. 
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on earlier studies, memoirs and printed documents.
9
 Perhaps due to a 
lack of sources, or indeed because of their one-sidedness, Kenez does 
not consider the British intervention as having played an important part 
in the events in South Russia. He mentions the matériel the Whites 
received and briefly describes the British role in the White-Georgian 
conflict. There is, however, no analysis of the work the British mission 
did for Denikin's Army, or of the growing influence of the British staff 
officers in Denikin's headquarters in the later stages of the campaign. 
 The research on the Allied intervention did not end with the 
Cold War. Several interesting studies considering especially the United 
States’ intervention have been published.10 Far less, however, had been 
written about the much more important British role in the Civil War. 
Jonathan D. Smele’s book Civil War in Siberia provides probably the 
most important academic contribution in the discussion. Although the 
study focuses on Kolchak’s government and its policies, Smele 
demonstrates clearly the influence of the British officials, in particular 
General Knox, on the Russian political and especially military decision-
making in the various stages of the Civil War. Smele’s wider source 
base proves conclusively the role of General Knox and his officers to be 
much more important than described in Ullman’s study.11 Michael 
Kettle’s massive Russia and the Allies 1917-1920 also stresses the 
importance of the British role in the Civil War, but as a general history 
                                            
9
 Kenez uses extensively Denikin's memoirs, Ocherki russkoi smuty, Brinkley's 
Volunteer Army and the Allies and interestingly some Soviet publications of 
documents such as Krasnyi Arkhiv. 
10
 Most important of these is David S. Foglesong’s America’s Secret War against 
Bolshevism: US intervention in the Russian Civil War. Several books based on 
personal recollections of American soldiers who served in Russia have also been 
published eg. R. L. Willet’s Russian Sideshow: America’s Undeclared War. 
11
 Smele, Civil War in Siberia, pp.87-95 and 669-72. 
   
 
17 
of the Allied intervention does not include a detailed analysis of the 
events in South Russia and also has a somewhat selective source base.
12
  
 Two more recent studies on the topic are Miles Hudson’s 
Intervention in Russia 1918-1920, A Cautionary Tale (2004) and  
Clifford Kinvig’s Churchill’s Crusade; The British Invasion of Russia 
1918-1920 (2006). Hudson’s book describes British activities mostly on 
the basis of a fairly small number of personal recollections of British 
servicemen. The whole intervention is concluded as a tragic failure and 
as a warning example of which modern decision-makers should learn. 
Kinvig’s study concentrates interestingly on Churchill’s central role in 
the British policies, but when describing the actual intervention the 
study focuses largely − and understandably − on the British active 
military operations in the North Russia. The book is based partly on 
rather limited research on British governmental records and, in addition, 
published and unpublished memoirs of British servicemen. No Russian 
sources or literature have been, however, used, and the book does not 
attempt draw more general conclusions on the British role in the Russian 
Civil War. Both Kinvig’s and Hudson’s book have the problem of 
relying and building their arguments perhaps too much on limited 
amount of memoirs of individual British officers and not using other 
sources to verify them. 
 The Civil War was one of the most studied topics in Soviet 
historiography. This research began during the war itself, and following 
the Bolshevik victory the Soviet Government founded a special 
committee to research and to preserve the legacy of the Revolution and 
the Civil War. The problematic "official" picture of the war, already 
mentioned, developed from the theoretical writings of the Bolshevik 
leaders. To Lenin, for example, the term ‘civil war’ meant the global 
class conflict between the Bolsheviks acting as the vanguard of the 
                                            
12
 Kettle’s three volumes of Russia and the Allies only cover the period from March 
1917 to July 1919, Kettle has used mainly ‘high level’ documents of the Cabinet, 
Foreign and War Offices. 
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World’s proletariat and the international bourgeoisie. The military 
struggle was only one dimension of this ‘class war’. The battles of the 
Civil War in Russia were basically described as the heroic survival story 
of the working classes of Russia, and more generally, as the first victory 
of socialism over capitalism and the beginning of the world revolution. 
There were also strong moralistic undertones of the triumph of the 
"good" Bolsheviks against the "bad" Whites and their imperialistic 
allies.  
 The first two official histories, Kakurin's Kak srazhalas' 
revoliutsiia and Bubnov's (ed.) Grazhdanskaia voina are, however, good 
studies of campaigns of the Red Army and they succeed in avoiding 
strong political interpretations. These books are somewhat weak in 
describing their enemies, both the Whites and the Allies, but still 
represent reasonably honest attempts to analyse the war. Later studies, 
especially those written under Stalin’s regime, are unfortunately, more 
or less biased by Soviet and even nationalistic propaganda. The worst 
example is probably the Istoriia RKP (b). Kratkii kurs, 1938, which 
defined the Civil War in strong nationalistic terms merely as a series of 
campaigns of the Russian workers and peasants against the Entente. 
Thus the Civil War was not considered as an internal conflict but rather 
as the Russians fighting a defensive war against the Western 
Imperialists. After Stalin's death the history of the Civil War was also 
partly rewritten, but until the very end of the regime, Soviet histories 
remained firmly in the Marxist-Leninist traditions. The last wide-scale 
Soviet study Grazhdanskaia voina, by Azovtzev et al., still contains the 
classical picture of the imperialistic intervention of the Allies. 
 The break-up of the Soviet system provoked renewed 
discussion about the Civil War. The Whites, for example, started to 
receive considerable attention. Denikin's Ocherki russkoi smuty ‒ 
naturally banned during the Soviet regime ‒ was published first in the 
journal Voprosy istorii in 1990-94 and a few years later as a five-volume 
book. New editions of many other émigré memoirs and histories have 
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also been published. The two most important of these are perhaps the 
1998 reprint of the five volume Beloe Delo, which consist of memoirs of 
the most important White commanders and V. A. Blagov’s and S. A. 
Sapozhnikov’s multivolume compilation of memoirs and White unit 
histories Beloe dvizhenie, published 2001-2006. Most relevant of the 
volumes in the latter is Pokhod na Moskvu (2004). 
 However, the situation of Russian historiography of the Civil 
war is no less complicated at the moment than it was in Soviet times. In 
the 1990’s some historians from nationalistic circles have reversed the 
whole picture: the Whites became the saviours of Holy Russia, and the 
Bolsheviks have become state terrorists. The question of the Russian 
Empire and the independence of the Border States is also a highly 
politicised topic. After all, the new research possibilities and the opening 
of the archives have also produced good studies with a new level of 
objectivity and without commitment to politics, but these have so far 
considered the Civil War only on its North-Eastern and Northern Fronts. 
There has been no wide scale research of the British intervention in 
Russia either. 
 
3. Sources  
 This study is based mainly on primary sources produced by 
British departments of the state and members of the British missions and 
separate units of the services in South Russia and Transcaucasia. First, 
these include official documents such as memoranda, orders and 
operational and intelligence reports, which are mainly housed in the 
British National Archives, London. A considerable portion of this 
material, especially the papers of the military missions
13
, has not been 
                                            
13
 The war diary of the British military mission to Denikin is located in the National 
Archives in the War Office collection WO 95 and the RAF mission in Air Ministry’s 
AIR 1.  
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used in research before. The personal archives of Winston Churchill and 
Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson
14
 contain similarly mostly unused 
material as far as the intervention is considered. Papers of these key 
figures provide an invaluable contribution to this study, clarifying the 
crucial role of the War Office in the decision-making process. 
Churchill’s extensive personal collection of reports and telegraphs from 
Russia also contains several interesting documents, which cannot be 
found in the official records in the National Archives.
15
  
 The personal collections of British servicemen who served in 
Russia during the civil war are of equal importance. I have been most 
fortunate to locate over fifty of these collections. They contain diaries, 
letters and unpublished memoirs, including descriptions of events not 
mentioned in official documents. Among these personal papers there are 
also copies of interesting official documents that otherwise may have 
been destroyed. The main archives for these collections are the 
Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum in London and the 
large private archive, Peter Liddle's 1914-18 Personal Experience 
Archive located at Leeds University which also contains several 
interviews with soldiers who served in Russia during the intervention.  
 These papers and recollections of British servicemen provide 
a fascinating insight into events in South Russia describing, for example, 
the relations between the British and the Whites. The perspective of 
these accounts of individual officers and NCOs is naturally subjective 
but it is possible to draw more general conclusions by using them 
together with official mission reports. This comparison with other type 
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sources also makes it possible to verify the information of individual 
personal accounts.
16
 
 The personal collections together with military mission war 
diaries and intelligence reports provide also more accurate and less 
biased information than memoirs published even decades after the actual 
events which are so often used in research on the intervention. A good 
example is Marion Aten’s Last Train over Rostov Bridge (1961). This 
‘first hand account’ has been used as a source on the RAF’s 47th 
Squadron’s activities in Russia, for example, in Ullman’s Anglo-Soviet 
Relations II and Wrangel’s Russia’s White Crusader, and even more 
recently in the collection of documents Rostov in the Civil War.
17
 Aten’s 
book proved, however, highly unreliable when compared to official 
documents of the RAF in the National Archives. Aten gives a vivid 
description of the battle of Tsaritsyn in June - July 1919 and even falsely 
claims the first air victory of the Squadron during the same battle. In fact 
Aten did not arrive in Russia until the end of August and joined the ‘B’ 
Flight of the Squadron in September. A somewhat similar case is 
Williamson’s Farewell to the Don (1971). There are considerable 
differences between these published memoirs and Brigadier 
Williamson’s original diary and letters preserved in the Imperial War 
Museum.   
 It has been possible to gather new knowledge about the topic 
through these sources. The story these papers tell about the intervention 
is very different from the original plans of the War Cabinet or its 
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statements to Parliament. Furthermore, the information in monthly 
operational and intelligence reports written by the commanding officers 
of units to the chiefs of military missions often differs greatly from the 
final reports of missions to the War Cabinet, which are commonly used 
in research. 
 To keep a balanced perspective and to create a more objective 
picture of the British policies and actions it is also important to study 
sources from the Russian side. The most important collections of 
primary sources from the Whites, including the personal collections of 
several key figures of the White movement and also most of the 
remaining official records of the Armed Forces of South Russia, are 
located at the Hoover Institution in Stanford. In addition to these, there 
are a number of published memoirs of the Whites, which often contain 
valuable printed documentary material.  
 I have considered a large-scale study of primary sources from 
the Bolshevik side unnecessary within the scope of this study, as it 
concentrates primarily on the relations between Britain and the Whites 
of South Russia, and only secondarily on British-Soviet relations. 
Moreover, both studies written on British-Soviet relations and published 
collections of documents are voluminous.
18
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4. Periodization and Definitions 
 When did the British commitment in South Russia actually 
start and end? To be exact, the first British Military Mission arrived at 
General Denikin’s headquarters in Kuban in late November 1918 and 
the British Mission attached to General Wrangel’s army in the Crimea 
was evacuated in June 1920. The present study is indeed focused on this 
period. I shall, however, describe to some extent also the history of 
British-Russian relations, especially during the last stages of the Great 
War and during the Russian Revolution as the necessary background 
and explanation for the British policy and its implementation in South 
Russia. 
 I am using throughout the study the general term South 
Russia, to define the area of the south-western part of the old Russian 
Empire. This may be considered somewhat misleading and incorrect 
geographically, since the area stretching from the Romanian border to 
the Volga also covers parts of the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The reason 
for this is simply that both the British and the Russians used the term 
South Russia or Iuga Rossiia during the period concerned in the study. 
 ‘White’ (belye) is used to describe the various conservative, 
officer-dominated anti-Bolshevik armies of the Civil War, such as the 
Volunteer Army of South Russia, Kolchak’s Siberian Army and 
Iudenich’s North-western Army. This term was first used by the 
Bolsheviks to discredit their opponents referring to the standard of the 
Bourbons and the French monarchists. It was however soon accepted by 
these anti-Bolsheviks themselves, and also the Allies used it. I refer to 
Lenin’s party as the ‘Bolsheviks’ throughout the study despite the fact 
that they changed their name officially to the All Russian Communist 
Party in early 1918. The term ‘Bolshevik’ was kept in use during the 
Civil War and even later by their enemies and by themselves too.  
 Names of the cities mentioned in the study have changed 
several times during the history. I use the version which was in general 
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use during the Civil War and the more modern versions are shown in 
brackets, for example Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar). 
 
 5. Dates and Transliteration 
All dates in the study are given according to the Gregorian, or Western 
calendar, unless otherwise indicated. In the transliteration of the Cyrillic 
names and words, I have generally followed the Library of Congress 
system. The only exceptions are names which have widely used Western 
versions, for example, Kerensky instead of Kerenskii and Wrangel 
instead of Vrangel´.  
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1.  THE GEOPOLITICAL AREA OF SOUTH RUSSIA 
AND THE CAUCASUS 
 
1.1. The Rivalry of the Empires 
 The great Anglo-Russian antagonism was one of the 
dominant features of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
international politics. During the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century Britain and Russia became the two most formidable powers in 
the whole of Eurasia. The aggressive and expansive empire- building of 
these countries in Asia caused their relationship to develop into one of 
mutual mistrust and hostility. The British considered Russia as a threat 
to India. On the other hand, in St. Petersburg the vital interests of the 
Russian Empire were recognized to be at stake on the Black Sea coast 
and in the Caucasus because of the British actions. Tension between the 
two empires erupted only once into open war in the form of the Crimean 
War. ‘The Great Game’, as contemporaries called it, was essentially a 
competition for influence and control over the decaying Ottoman and 
Persian Empires. 
 Towards the end of the eighteenth century, as the British were 
securing their control over India, Russia gained a permanent foothold in 
the Black Sea area as a result of several victorious wars against the 
Ottoman Empire. In the treaties of 1774 and 1791 the fertile steppelands 
from the Dniestre to the Kuban rivers were ceded to Russia, and, more 
importantly, a sea route was opened up for Russian ships to the Black 
Sea and further through the Straits to the Mediterranean. Russian forces 
had also crossed the Caucasus mountain range and come in contact with 
the Christian nation of the Georgians. Georgia was at first declared a 
Russian protectorate, but later, in 1801, annexed to Russia. Russian 
armies now had a permanent base on the southern side of the Caucasus 
Mountains, but the Ottoman and the Persian Empires had lost their 
secure northern border. 
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 Russia's misfortunes in the war against Napoleon I 
encouraged the Turks and the Persians to attack the Russian army in 
order to drive it back over the Caucasus Mountains. The Russians had to 
fight hard for their position. The situation worsened as the Moslem 
mountain peoples revolted in the Russian rear. However, in the long run 
the obsolete Ottoman and Persian armies were defeated. Russia was now 
the definite ruler of the Caucasus area. Several more wars were fought 
between Russia and the Ottomans and every time more territory was 
annexed to the Russian Empire. The final borderlines with Persia and 
Turkey were drawn in the treaties of Adrianople (1829) and San 
Stephano (1878).
19
 
 The growing Russian influence in the Black Sea and over the 
Ottoman Empire alarmed the British. The situation developed into the 
"Eastern Question" as the British, and later the Austrians and the French, 
started to increase their own influence over the Turks to counter the 
Russian actions. The British usually supported the Ottoman Empire in 
her disputes with Russia. The conflict escalated into an open war as the 
Turks, counting on Western help, attacked Russia in 1853. Soon, after 
the Ottoman army had suffered a series of defeats, the British and the 
French joined the war. The British and French fleets sailed to the Black 
Sea and landed their armies on the Crimean peninsula where the major 
land battles were also fought, and so this war of 1854-1856 came to be 
known as the Crimean War. The war was a consequence of 
misjudgements and overreaching policies (rather than not of strategic 
planning) from both the British and the Russians.
20
 A very similar 
situation, ‘the Eastern Crisis’, developed as the Turks and the Russians 
went to war in 1877, and again the British assumed the Russians to be 
occupying Constantinople and considered intervening by sending the 
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navy to the Straits. This time war was, however, prevented by last 
moment negotiations. 
 Despite the most pessimistic Western calculations Russian 
policy did not aim at destroying the Ottoman Empire, but to preserve it 
under predominantly Russian influence. The focal point of the Russian 
policy towards the Ottomans was the question of the Straits. The 
Bosphorus and Dardanelles were of vital strategic and economic interest 
for Russia. At first this ‘Gateway to Russia’ was seen as a passage for 
hostile forces into vulnerable southern coast of Russia, as was clearly 
demonstrated in the Crimean War. Later, as South Russia and the 
Caucasus region were developing into economically invaluable areas, 
the Straits became an important export route to Russian agricultural and 
industrial products. By the turn of the century nearly half of all Russian 
exports were shipped through the Straits and their blockade would have 
had catastrophic consequences for the entire Russian economy. On the 
Transcaucasian border, the Russians remained purely defensive towards 
the Ottoman Empire after the treaty of 1878, and were mostly occupied 
in the internal security problems of the Caucasus and in furtherance of 
the Russian influence over northern Persia.
21
 
 The Anglo-Russian dispute over the Straits was closely 
connected to the question of India. The conquest of Transcaucasia had 
brought Russian armies to the Persian border and after the conquest in 
Central Asia the Russians had also arrived at the Afghanistan border. 
However, it is obvious, notwithstanding some fantastic plans and 
speeches of Russian ministers that Russia never really intended to 
invade India. The cornerstone of Russian eastern policy was the Straits, 
but by using the threat of invading India the Russians hoped to eliminate 
or at least reduce the British influence in the Near East. Meanwhile, the 
basis of British policy toward Russia was to safeguard India and 
communications to the eastern parts of the Empire (the Suez Canal and 
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the Persian Gulf). Keeping Russia employed in the Near East was 
thought to more or less inhibit her actions in Central Asia.
22
 
 The Anglo-Russian disputes in the Near East and Asia were 
not settled until Germany started to threaten equally the interests of both 
Empires. The German naval programme and the establishment of bases 
as far away as China alarmed the British. Moreover, Germany began to 
increase her influence over the Ottoman Empire economically and by 
modernizing and arming the Ottoman Army. In addition to the German 
threat, Russia had already allied with France, and the British saw the 
danger of having to fight against at least two major powers 
simultaneously. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 formally buried 
the hundred year-long rivalry. Persia was divided into spheres of 
influence and thus the Caucasian border was secured. Afghanistan and 
Tibet were defined as buffer zones for the further defence of India.
23
 
 Only ten years later the situation changed dramatically as a 
consequence of the Russian Revolution and Russia’s defeat in the World 
War. The armies of the Central Powers invaded the southern areas of the 
Russian Empire. The British policies needed to be completely revised. 
However, the reflections of the ‘Great Game’ were not without influence 
in the British-Russian, whether White or Soviet, relations regarding 
South Russia and the Caucasus. 
 
  1.2. The Strategic Periphery 
 On the eve of the Russian capitulation, 23 December 1917, a 
‘Convention between France and England on the subject of activity in 
southern Russia’ was signed. This agreement divided the southern part 
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of Russia into zones of influence. France was assigned Bessarabia, the 
Ukraine and the Crimea. The British zone was to be the Cossack 
Territories and the Caucasus area.
24
 This south-eastern part of the 
Russian Empire, which was soon to be the stage for British intervention, 
had not only strategic but also great economic importance. 
 Topographically, the British ‘zone of influence’ can be 
divided into three different parts. The northmost part of the zone was the 
Don Cossack Territory (Oblast' voiska donskogo)
25
 situated around the 
Don River between the Ukraine and the Volga area. The Don territory 
was the ancient south-eastern borderland of Russia and a buffer zone 
against the Moslem peoples. The Don Cossack Host was originally 
founded to defend the border. The Cossacks were still the most 
prominent feature of the region though accounting for less than half of 
the total population at the beginning of the twentieth-century.  
 The Don Cossacks were ethnic Russians but they clearly 
distinguished themselves from the non-Cossack population. Although 
working the land as farmers they considered themselves essentially as 
warriors serving the Tsar in their own regionally organized regiments. 
The Don Territory provided the Imperial Army with a total of sixty 
cavalry regiments at the beginning of the First World War.
26
 According 
to a peculiar feudal system, the military service conferred the land on the 
Cossacks, and they had a distinctive "autonomous" representative 
administration of the Cossack Host, which had, however, been gradually 
integrated into Russia’s governing system. Most of the non-Cossack 
population in the Don territory was Russian or Ukrainian peasants. They 
lacked the privileges and culture of the Cossacks and were administered 
in a similar way to the people in other provinces of Russia.  
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 The Don Territory was rich farming land and about three-
quarters of its population were committed to agriculture. In addition, 
there were several large urban and industrial areas. Rostov on Don was 
one of the largest cities in Russia and a very important industrial and 
commercial centre. Two other important industrial centres were the 
towns of Taganrog and Azov. Moreover, the eastern part of the Donbass 
region with important coal, iron and manganese ore mines belonged 
administratively to the Don territory, too. Thus, the Don Territory 
formed a curious combination of the Cossacks and peasants with their 
traditional views of life on the one hand, and on the other, a part of the 
most modern industrialized Russia. 
 Further to the south, across the Manych river began the 
Russian Governor-Generalship of Caucasus (Kavkaz), which consisted 
of two main regions: the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. The North 
Caucasus (Severnyi Kavkaz) on the northern side of the Caucasus 
mountain range was divided administratively into the province 
(guberniia) of Chernomore and the territories (oblasti) of Kuban, Terek 
and Daghestan. These areas were also populated by the Cossacks having 
their own hosts of Kuban and Terek and Russian peasant immigrants; 
both were settled in the region to guarantee the Russian conquests. In 
addition, there were a number of different native peoples living in the 
mountainous regions of the provinces, mainly in eastern Terek and 
Daghestan. 
 Most of the population of the North Caucasus was employed 
in agriculture, the Kuban being one of the richest grain-producing 
regions of Russia. However, the economic character of the region 
changed considerably when rich oil wells were founded in the Groznyi 
area at the turn of the century. The Groznyi oilfield soon developed into 
the second largest oil centre of Russia with an annual production of 1.2 
million tons, which was actually more than could be transported by rail 
to the harbours of Novorossiisk, Rostov or Petrovsk. Like the larger part 
of industry in Russia, the North Caucasian oil production was financed 
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by foreign capital. After the year 1910 the oil production in Groznyi and 
Maikop fields was in the hands of British companies.
27
 
 To the south side of the mountains lies Transcaucasia 
(Zakavkaz). This land mass was divided by the Tsarist government into 
the provinces of Suchum, Kutais, Batum, Kars, Tiflis, Elizavetpol and 
Baku. The main nationalities of Transcaucasia later to form their own 
states were the Armenians, the Georgians and the Azerbaijanis. 
 Unlike the Don Territory, the Caucasus had only a relatively 
short history as a part of the Russian Empire. During the 19th century 
Russia had gradually conquered the region, which had been under 
Ottoman and Persian domination for centuries. The new Russian rule 
over the Transcaucasian peoples was often even more heavy-handed. 
However, economic integration into the Russian Empire, which started 
gradually after the conquest, spelt a considerable development in the 
region. Agricultural products unique to the area found huge new 
markets. Increasing demand made it possible to specialize in certain 
products like wheat, tea and cotton. In the last decades of the 19th 
century the difficult transport conditions of Transcaucasia improved 
dramatically with the construction of railway across the Isthmus from 
Poti via Tiflis to Baku. The original reason for building the railway was 
naturally military-strategic, but the effect on economic development was 
also enormous. Finally, the area was connected to the main Russian 
railway system when the line from Rostov on Don to Baku was opened 
in the year 1900.
28
 
 Transcaucasia had been famous for its natural resources for 
centuries. A considerable mining industry developed in Tiflis and Batum 
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at the turn of the century with manganese and copper as the main 
products. Most important of all, however, was oil. The first oil wells 
were drilled near Baku in 1869. In 1890 the Baku oilfields produced 
more oil than all the fields in the United States. Eventually, however, 
Baku lost out in the competition for world markets. Obsolete 
technology, stringent taxation and, probably most importantly, labour 
unrest during the revolutions suppressed production drastically. 
However, Baku remained the richest single oilfield in the world and was 
invaluable for the entire Russian economy. During the last years before 
the First World War most of the eight million tons of oil produced in 
Baku was consumed in Russia and only 15% was pumped through the 
pipeline to Batum and exported to Europe and the Middle East.
29
 
 Local Armenian and Azerbaijani entrepreneurs had started the 
development of the oil industry under the protection of the Russian 
government, but soon after the government abolished the state 
monopoly foreign capital started to flow to the Baku oilfields. As a 
precondition to further development of the industry, the flow of foreign 
capital caused the ultimate control of the oil industry to fall into foreign 
hands. Finally, as in the North Caucasus the British had the largest 
investments in the Baku fields. In 1914  42.4 per cent of the oil was 
pumped and refined by British companies.
30
 
 The exploitation of natural resources turned the Caucasus 
from just another hostile borderland inhabited by constantly rebelling 
natives to one of the key areas of the Russian economy. In the turmoil, 
which followed the collapse of the Russian Empire, there were many 
takers for these riches. 
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1.3. The Problem of Nationalities 
 One of most difficult problems the British were to face during 
their intervention was the conflict between the numerous nationalities 
populating South Russia and especially the Caucasus. There is probably 
no territory of equal size anywhere in the world with a comparable 
diversity of languages and races. The integration of these areas into the 
Russian Empire had certainly not been complete, and as the decaying 
central government began to lose its control, strong nationalistic 
movements started to press for independence from Russia. 
 It is a paradox that during the first hundred years of Russian 
rule the efforts of tsarist governors to Russify Transcaucasia did not 
result in the assimilation of the local people; it resulted instead in the 
creation of nationalities. This was especially the case in Georgia. The 
centralized Russian administration actually reunited the divided and 
defeated Georgians, first politically and then economically. The national 
formation of the Georgians, as an ancient kingdom, had traditionally 
been shaped by the contacts and confrontations with other nationalities. 
In the nineteenth century, in addition to the Russian rulers, it was the 
wealthy bourgeoisie of Armenians that worked as a stimulant to 
Georgian self-definition. The economic status of the Georgians was 
gradually pushed down and they were also almost totally without 
political power. The traditional Georgian leaders, the gentry, failed to 
exercise leadership in the new situation, and their backward-looking 
nostalgic nationalism found little response among westernized Georgian 
liberals or among more radical elements attracted by populist and 
Marxist revolutionary programs in the context of the ‘all-Russian’ 
movement against autocracy. Eventually, it was the Marxists, developed 
into Mensheviks, who became the leaders of the Georgian movement of 
national liberation at the turn of the century. Marxism provided the 
Georgians with an ideology focused on the economic situation and at the 
same time aimed against their ethnic enemies, the Russian autocracy and 
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the Armenian bourgeoisie.
31
 However the Georgian Mensheviks 
remained politically within the sphere of the all-Russian movement, and 
after the collapse of the autocratic state in 1917, their goal was not at 
first independent nationhood, but for Georgia to become an autonomous 
part of a future Russian Federal Republic. Only later, after the 
Bolsheviks had seized power in the central Russia, did the Georgian 
government declare independence. 
 In contrast to Marxist hegemony over the Georgian national 
movement, the Armenians were torn between a socialist intelligentsia in 
the Russian Caucasus, a purely nationalistic element of the Ottoman 
Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and the bourgeoisie, who were 
unwilling to become involved in any kind of nationalistic struggle. The 
Dashnaktsutiun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, was an attempt 
to unite the Armenian nation. The most important point in the party’s 
programme was the liberation of the Armenians first from the Ottoman 
rule and eventually also from Russian rule. This, it was hoped, would be 
assisted by the European Powers and by the International and Russian 
revolutionary movements. The Dashnaktsutiun soon developed into a 
conspiratorial and para-military movement, taking actions both in 
Turkey and in Russia. Consequently, the Ottoman government replied 
harshly starting the massacres of the Armenians, which developed into a 
genocide during the World War.
32
 The Armenian national movement 
formed on the basis of the fight for survival against the Ottomans and 
this was closely connected to their conflict with the Transcaucasian 
Turkish people of the Azerbaijanis. 
 The national identity of the largest of the three 
Transcaucasian peoples, the Azerbaijanis, developed partly along similar 
lines to their neighbours. Particularist tendencies were weakened by the 
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Russian administration in rural areas and the industrial centre of Baku 
brought rapid economic development to the area. In addition, the 
national development had an important Islamic element and was related 
to the Pan-Turkish movement. As in Georgia there was a conflict 
between the dominant Armenian bourgeoisie and the native middle-class 
and rural population. This tension developed, partly because of the 
aggressive politics of the Dashnaktsutiun, to large-scale inter-communal 
violence during the revolutionary years of 1905 and 1906. The blows 
suffered at the hands of the armed bands of Armenians finally persuaded 
the Azerbaijanis organize politically. The development began among the 
intelligentsia in the urban centres like Baku. The Marxist movement 
never gained mass support among the Moslems and the most important 
Azerbaizhani party, Musavat, soon adopted clearly Nationalistic and 
Pan-Islamistic lines. Pan-Turkism, however, lost its attractiveness soon 
after the beginning of the World War as the disasters suffered by the 
Ottoman army revealed the weakness of Turkey. Azerbaizhan Moslems 
remained fairly loyal to the Russian state until the end of the war and, 
like the Georgians, only began making progress towards independence 
after the revolutions of 1917.
33
 
 The North Caucasian peoples had no clearly defined political 
orientation despite the fact that they were far less assimilated and more 
dissatisfied with Russian rule than the peoples of Transcaucasia. The 
mountains of the Caucasus had been conquered by Russia in one of the 
bloodiest campaigns of its history. The deep-rooted hatred towards the 
Russians was not, however, sufficient to produce a common national 
movement. The numerous nationalities had no ethnic unity or cultural 
community, and they even feuded among themselves. The Kabardians, 
the former rulers of the North Caucasus, were still the richest people in 
the area owning more land than the Cossacks. The Ossetians on the 
other hand were mostly Christians and had a sizeable intelligentsia. The 
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real problem of the region was the Chechens and the Ingushi, who were 
warlike peoples expelled from valleys to live in poverty in the 
mountains. They were only waiting for the day when they might get 
revenge and regain their lost lands. The native resistance against the 
Russians, and indeed against some peoples like the Kabardians, was 
fused by religious fanaticism. The mountain tribes led by religious 
leaders, the imams, had vague goal of establishing a theocratic Muslim 
state.
34
 
 The situation in the North Caucasus also differed from the 
one in Transcaucasia, in that a large Russian population had immigrated 
there according to the imperialistic policies. The Russian population of 
the Terek oblast', about half of the entire population, was divided into 
two groups: the Terek Cossacks and the inogorodnye who were peasants 
who had  immigrated to the area during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century or workers in the new oil industry in Groznyi and 
Maikop. The Cossacks and the inogorodnye did not get along well and 
the situation developed into a three-cornered struggle between two 
groups of Russians and the mountain peoples. A very complex situation 
developed immediately after the collapse of the Russian central 
government as the Cossacks supported the White counter-
revolutionaries, the inogorodnye co-operated with the Bolsheviks and 
the natives fought against Russians and each other in temporary 
alliances with the Azerbaijanis, the Georgians and the Bolsheviks.
35
 
 In the Don Cossack Territory, though populated mainly by 
Russians, the situation was not clear either. The conflict between the 
Cossacks and the inogorodnye was fundamentally a social one. 
However, the Cossacks had developed a vague nationalistic ideology, 
which was a form of local patriotism based on the idea of the Cossacks' 
ethnic and cultural superiority over the Russian peasants and the 
                                            
34
Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, pp. 94-7. 
35
Ibid. 
   
 
37 
glorious past of the free Cossacks. In addition to local conflict with the 
inogorodnye, Cossack "Nationalism" which developed later into 
separatism from the Russian Central Government was to cause serious 
problems within the White movement. 
 After the revolutions of 1917 attempts at co-operation were 
made between the different nationalities in South Russia and the 
Caucasus. The main parties of the three Transcaucasian nations founded 
a federal parliament and government, the Transcaucasian Commissariat. 
However, the Commissariat broke up after only few months, and 
relations between the Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaizhanis 
developed into an open conflict. Similarly, the various Cossack hosts 
attempted to work together against the Bolsheviks. The ataman of the 
Don, Petr Krasnov, even hatched plans for a Cossack state including the 
Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan Hosts. These plans were never 
fulfilled because of the fierce resistance offered by the Denikin’s White 
government.
36
 
 The problematic relations between the nationalities were to be 
one of the fundamental elements of the Civil War and the incompetence 
and unwillingness of both the various nationalities and the Whites to 
solve the situation was to have serious consequences partially causing 
their defeat in the war against the Bolsheviks. It was also one of the 
problems the British had to tackle during the intervention. 
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2. THE GREAT WAR AND THE REVOLUTION 
 
2.1. The Collapse of the Eastern Front 
 The March Revolution of 1917 and the collapse of the 
Russian army changed the nature of the alliance between the Western 
powers and Russia. Russia had constituted a main pillar in the entente 
strategy, but now she was threatening to jeopardize the whole Allied 
campaign against the Central Powers. This change of status immediately 
affected British policies. The British government was well aware of the 
diminishing fighting capabilities of the Russian Army under the 
Provisional Government and began to modify its strategy accordingly. 
The British considered, however, the continued presence of Russia in 
the war ‒ tying down still dozens of German divisions ‒ as most 
important. The prospect of Germany concentrating all her forces on the 
Western Front was too dreadful to contemplate. The British had 
exhausted themselves in ceaseless offensives from Arras to 
Passchendaele throughout the year 1917, and the French Army was in 
need of recuperation after the unsuccessful Nivelle offensive which had 
led to mutinies. Though the United States had entered the war in April 
1917, the effect of her entry would not become apparent until well into 
1918. As the Russian Provisional government appeared incapable of  
fulfilling its task in the command of the army the British gradually 
turned their attention to right-wing forces willing, and perhaps more 
capable, of reviving the army and so continuing the war. Finally, the 
Bolshevik coup d’état in November and their declaration to end the 
alliance and to seek peace with the Central Powers caused the British 
government to take the first steps towards intervention. 
 The British attitude towards the March revolution and the 
abdication of the Tsar was largely neutral. In effect, the British 
ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had advised the Tsar about the acute 
need for reform. What mattered was the impact of the political changes 
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inside Russia on its war effort. The War Cabinet quickly recognized the 
new Russian Provisional Government that had confirmed its allegiance 
to the entente. The British and their French allies were, however, well 
aware that the Provisional Government that had been formed by the 
Duma, the Stavka (the Supreme Headquarters) generals and the 
industrialists did not rule Russia alone but in reality shared the power 
with a system of Soviets that had come into existence throughout the 
country. The Soviets’ revolutionary influence was especially strong in 
the army; in many units soldiers formed, for example, committees that 
held meetings on strategy and on whether to obey their officers’ orders. 
All this made the Allies very pessimistic about the promises of 
improvements in the Russian armed forces made by the Provisional 
Government.
37
  
 Britain had been supporting the Russian army with a vast 
amount of war supplies and monetary loans since the beginning of the 
war. The use of supplies had, however, been entirely unsatisfactory. 
Indeed, the reorganization of supply had already been discussed earlier 
in 1917 in the Petrograd conference. Brigadier F.C. Poole (who was 
later to play a prominent role in the intervention as the head of British 
missions first in North and later in South Russia), was appointed as the 
head of the British mission to organize the distribution of matériel. Late 
in March 1917, an inter-departmental committee, Milner’s committee, 
was set up in London to co-operate with Poole in Petrograd. In addition 
to its original task, Milner’s committee held most of the discussions 
which prepared the Cabinet decisions on Russian policy up until the 
Armistice, November 1918. The deepening decay of the Russian army 
made the sending of valuable war material very dubious. However, aid 
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was continued, albeit in limited amounts, until late autumn 1917 to 
encourage the Russians to keep fighting.
38
 
 The much-awaited Russian summer offensive proved to be a 
deadly blow to the Russian army. The initial successes, indeed 
unexpected in Britain, spurred the War Cabinet temporarily to 
reconsider its policy and to increase the supply back to its pre-
revolutionary level. But soon the offensive turned into an uncontrolled 
retreat as the Germans counterattacked the dispirited Russian troops. 
When the scale of disaster became visible, the attitudes of both the 
Cabinet and the British military representatives in Russia hardened once 
again. General Barter, the British attaché in the Stavka, informed the 
Russian Commander in Chief, General Alekseev that the continuation of 
Allied support was totally dependent on reinstitution of firm discipline 
in the Russian army.
39
 
 In this difficult situation, the Provisional Government, headed 
since June 1917 by Aleksandr Kerensky, appointed General Lavr 
Kornilov as the new Commander-in-Chief in an attempt to restore the 
army’s morale. Kornilov had made himself famous by using drastic 
measures to contain revolution in his own troops on the south-eastern 
front. The British representatives enthusiastically welcomed the 
appointment. After a few meetings with the new commander, General 
Barter reported him as being ”the only hope” of saving the Russian 
Army.
40
 Barter urged the British government to inform Kerensky of its 
approval for Kornilov’s policy ‒ restoring the death penalty and 
abolishing the soldier’s committees.41 The Cabinet was careful not to 
interfere officially in the policy of the Provisional Government, but 
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instructed Buchanan to speak to Kerensky about conceding Kornilov’s 
demands if he felt it would improve the situation.
42
 Eventually, 
Buchanan, though obviously also sympathetic to Kornilov, did not 
believe in the success of a coup d’état the General was rumoured to be 
planning, and did not want to encourage such action by providing 
diplomatic support from the British Government. 
 No doubt, the situation was perceived differently in 
revolutionary Petrograd and at the Stavka in Mogilev, which was 
surrounded by troops loyal to Kornilov. After the Moscow State 
Conference, where Kornilov made a speech declaring his demands to the 
Provisional government, General Barter was even more convinced of his 
importance to the Allied cause. Barter suggested some high British 
decorations for Kornilov as recognition of his policy and to counter 
Buchanan’s views reported, ‘I am afraid that the Ambassador does not 
realize that the situation can only be saved by vigorous measures.’43 But 
Kornilov was not to receive political support from the British 
government until it was too late. Relations between Kerensky and 
Kornilov continued to worsen, and on 9 September 1917 after being 
dismissed from his post, Kornilov started his abortive march towards 
Petrograd. Alarmed by the news, the Cabinet, on Buchanan’s lines, 
decided to appeal to Kerensky to come to an understanding with 
Kornilov.
44
  By this time Kornilov’s advance had already failed as the 
soldiers had ceased to obey his orders. 
 The Allied involvement in the Kornilov Affair has been 
amply discussed in earlier scholarship. The general line of Western 
historiography has been to admit sympathies, but to deny any actual 
support for Kornilov by the Allies. Kerensky, for his part, made strong 
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accusations that the whole ‘counter-revolutionary’ movement led by 
Kornilov had been financed by British agents. Indeed, Soviet 
historiography put forward a similar picture.
45
 These ‘conspiratorial’ 
interpretations are not supported by any documentation. The only actual 
evidence presented about the British role is General Barter’s reports to 
his superiors. Barter’s actions probably encouraged Kornilov to make 
his final move.  
 What has remained undiscussed, however, is the connection 
between the mysterious Mr. Alad’in and the British government. Alad’in 
was one of the background figures in the Kornilov movement and later 
worked under General Denikin’s regime. The strong influence of this 
journalist and former member of the Duma on Kornilov has been clearly 
admitted by historians. Alad’in had spent several years attached to the 
British Expeditionary Force on the Western front. On 12 July 1917, the 
British attaché in Petrograd, General Knox, was informed about 
Alad’in’s return to Russia. His record was said to have been ‘rather 
satisfactory’, and Knox was advised to co-operate with him.46 Whether 
Mr. Alad’in was on the payroll of the British intelligence and what his 
actual mission was remains uncertain ‒ that is to say, as long as the 
archives of the British Secret Service of this period remain inaccessible. 
Alad’in may have been paid for information, but that he had been paid 
for organizing a coup d’état is unlikely. 
 The consequences of the infamous Kornilov Affair were far 
more dramatic than the affair itself. It was a disaster for the move 
towards democratic society in Russia as the gap between the military 
and the democratic political parties deepened. The forces opposing the 
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Bolsheviks were not able to form a unified front. On the other hand, the 
popular view of Kornilov’s coup as evidence of a ‘counter-revolutionary 
conspiracy’ provided the Bolsheviks with useful propaganda for their 
‘pre-emptive’ seizure of power in November 1917. Kornilov’s failure to 
restore the moral of the Russian army was also a disaster for the Allied 
war effort. The behaviour of the troops during the attempted coup 
proved that there was no hope of restoring discipline in the army. The 
British assistant military attaché, Colonel Blair, reported that Russia 
could offer no further assistance to the Allies, and would probably seek 
peace in a few months time. He was also aware of the increasing power 
of the Bolsheviks, whom he declared the only winners of the ‘Affair’.47 
The British had lost their faith in Kerensky and seemed actually to share 
the view of Kornilov’s supporters that a Bolshevik coup was preferable. 
The Bolsheviks were not believed to stay in power for long, and once 
they were defeated, socialism would be entirely discredited. Thus, the 
way would be cleared for a strong military government, which would 
restore order in Russia and make possible its continued presence in the 
war.
48
 
 During the actual Bolshevik take-over, the Allied 
representatives in Russia, though negative in their attitudes towards the 
Bolsheviks, remained neutral as they had been during the March 
revolution. The new government was not recognized by any of the 
Allied powers, but they wanted to avoid open conflict with the 
Bolsheviks. At first, the Bolshevik regime was not expected to last long. 
And later, after Kerensky had been clearly defeated, the Allied 
governments hoped that the Bolsheviks would eventually be persuaded 
to remain in the alliance, either by Allied pressure or as a result of 
unfavourable conditions in the peace negotiations with the Central 
Powers. The Russians were not expected to play an active part in the war 
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anymore, and Germany had actually started to transfer her troops to the 
Western Front already in August 1917.  But what the Allies were afraid 
of was the growing influence of the Germans in Russia. It was feared 
that the Germans would nullify the Allied blockade and eventually turn 
the war in their favour by exploiting the vast resources of Russia ‒ 
minerals, cereals and oil.
49
 In addition to the obvious interest in keeping 
Russia on their side, the Allies had important financial and economic 
interests in the country. Pre-war and war credits had cost Britain, France 
and lately the United States considerable sums, all of which would 
possibly be lost if an open conflict occurred between the Allies and 
Bolshevik Russia. Thus, for the next three months contact was 
maintained with the new regime, but at the same time the Allies began to 
support forces opposing the Bolsheviks in hopes that somehow a 
Russian ally would emerge. 
 
2.2. Disintegration of the Russian Empire 
 The Russian Empire, a vast conglomeration of nationalities, 
had already begun to fall apart during the period of the Provisional 
Government. With the disappearance of the strong central government, 
personified by the Tsar, the subordinate nationalities like the Ukrainians, 
the Cossacks and the Caucasian Nationalities had begun to demand their 
rights in the form of political and cultural autonomy within the new 
‘democratic state’. The emergence of Bolshevik power only 
strengthened the determination of the peripheral nationalities to govern 
themselves. The reason for this was not simply the propagandist 
Bolshevik declaration of national self-determination but to prevent the 
anarchy in central Russia from spreading to relatively stable 
borderlands. The national governments soon proved to be formed on a 
predominantly non-Bolshevik basis. In South Russia the interests of the 
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new governments and the Bolsheviks immediately conflicted and, 
consequently, these areas provided the base for the formation of anti-
Bolshevik movements whom the Allies began to support. The break-up 
of the Empire into national governments also coincided with the Central 
Powers’ attack following the unsuccessful peace negotiations with the 
Bolsheviks.  
 In the Ukraine Kerensky had recognized the Rada as an 
autonomous government in September 1917. Following the Bolshevik 
coup, the Rada no longer recognized the new Soviet government of 
Petrograd as the authority over the Ukraine, but instead declared the 
independent Ukrainian People’s Republic on 20 November 1917. 
However, the Bolsheviks could not see how Russia would survive 
without Ukrainian grain and raw materials. In addition they were aware 
of Rada’s plans for seeking Germany’s assistance. An ultimatum was 
sent to the Rada accusing the Ukrainians of being counter-
revolutionaries on 4 December 1917 and invasion followed a few days 
later. After a six weeks’ struggle, Bolshevik troops conquered Kiev only 
to be thrown out by the Germans next month.  
 To the southeast, the Cossacks had established their 
provisional autonomous governments, by electing representative 
assemblies (Krug in the Don and Rada in the Kuban), and by electing 
military executive leaders, the atamans.  Despite the formal recognition 
between the Cossack governments and the Provisional government, 
relations had been deteriorating during the summer of 1917. The Don 
Ataman, Kaledin, was denounced by Kerensky as a counter-
revolutionary plotter and a secret ally of Kornilov. The Cossack leaders 
had not originally been planning official secession from Russia, but the 
growing anarchy throughout Russia and the power struggle with the 
Soviet elements within their own territories prompted them to take more 
drastic measures. On 16 October 1917, Cossack representatives of the 
Don, Kuban, Terek, Astrakhan, Ural and Daghestan formed the ‘South-
eastern Union’. In the treaty establishing the union the voiskos 
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guaranteed each others independence in internal affairs, set the 
establishment of a Russian federal democratic republic as their goal and 
pledged themselves to a mutual struggle against the Bolsheviks. It was 
no accident that General Alekseev chose the Don as a base for his 
Volunteer Army. The Don was a ‘natural’ choice for generals like 
Alekseev and Kornilov as a platform for the reintegration of Russia. 
They still seemed to believe to some extent in the myth of Cossacks as 
the defenders of the traditional values of the Holy Russia and were 
ignorant and unaware of the effects of the Revolution and local 
sentiments of the Cossacks. For the White generals, the Cossacks were 
still loyal and ethnically trustworthy Russians, unlike the nationalistic 
Finns or Georgians, and thus the most reliable of the new 
governments.
50
 
 An attempt was also made to unite the numerous nationalities 
of the Northern Caucasus into a ‘Union of Mountain Peoples’, largely 
under Moslem clerical and secular leaders. After the Bolshevik coup an 
affiliation with the South-eastern Union was negotiated, but these efforts 
failed because of tribal feuds and traditional hostility towards the 
Cossacks.  Bolshevik influence was also growing, especially in the areas 
of the oil industry. Strong revolutionary committees were installed in 
Vladikavkaz and Petrovsk and, as a result, the conservative Moslem 
movement was confined mainly to mountainous central Daghestan.
51
  
 Further south, in Transcaucasia, a Diet of Armenian, 
Georgian and Tatar peoples assembled in Tiflis at the end of August, 
1917, and in September it declared the Transcaucasian Federal Republic, 
though technically the republic remained as an integral part of Russia. 
However, the three parties could agree upon no common policy: the 
Georgians stood for complete independence from Russia; the Armenians 
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preferred an autonomous Transcaucasian federation, considering 
Russian protection against Turkey invaluable; and the Tatar population, 
with no strong national traditions, looked towards a union with Turkey. 
Although deeply divided, the Transcaucasian Federation proved highly 
resistant to the Bolsheviks. The Russian soldiers of the fast 
disintegrating Army of the Caucasus, although largely pro-Bolshevik, 
were mainly interested in returning to their distant homes, not in making 
revolution in Transcaucasia.  
 The disintegration of the Russian empire was further 
accelerated by the actions of the Central Powers. The famous Decree of 
Peace had been a vital element in the success of the Bolsheviks’ struggle 
for power, but it proved to be much harder to secure and to keep the 
promised peace. The armistice was signed on 16 December 1917, and 
the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk started. The Bolshevik emissaries 
countered the harsh German demands with propaganda hoping to spread 
the revolution into the German Army. The results of this ‘no war, no 
peace policy’ were, however, disastrous for Russia as the Central 
Powers resumed the state of war in February 1918. German and Austrian 
troops advanced virtually unopposed deep into Russian territory. Only a 
few weeks later, on 3 March 1918, the Bolsheviks were pressed to sign a 
treaty with even harsher terms. Poland and the Baltic provinces were 
ceded to Germany. Russian forces were to be pulled out from Finland, 
Ukraine, and Transcaucasia, giving these areas the possibility of 
independence from Russia. This meant, in effect, that these states were 
to be annexed to the Central Powers or at least made their satellite states. 
Russia also had to demobilize her army and refrain from any agitation or 
propaganda.  
 Historian Evan Mawdsley has described the Central Power’s 
invasion of February 1918, as ‘the most important intervention’ of the 
Civil War.
52
 Whether its effects are comparable to the Allied 
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intervention that followed it or not, the invasion certainly had most 
dramatic results in the developments in South Russia and Transcaucasia. 
Most of the Ukraine was soon in German hands and a puppet regime led 
by the pro-German Hetman Skoropadskii was established in Kiev. The 
German and Austrian armies occupied the Crimean peninsula and 
Donetz Basin, advancing as far as Rostov on the Don during the summer 
of 1918. In Transcaucasia, Turkey began a rapid advance first taking 
back areas lost to Russia during the war and thereafter entering 
Armenia.  
 The ethnic minorities and, in the case of the Cossacks, 
cultural minorities, were to be a significant factor in the Civil War. The 
Border States and smaller nationalities added one more participant to the 
war. At first these areas, free of the Bolsheviks, provided a potential 
location for the Whites to organize their forces. But finally the mutual 
incompetence and unwillingness to accommodate their policies, and to 
unify all anti-Bolshevik forces was an important factor in the final defeat 
of not just the Whites but in terminating most of the national 
independence in the Border States. 
 
2.3. First Moves towards the Intervention 
The Allies were deeply concerned with the Bolshevik policies and the 
German success prompted them to seek contact with the enemies of the 
Bolshevik regime. The attention of British military representatives in 
Russia turned towards South-east Russia. On the Don Ataman Kaledin 
had been organizing ‘the Cossack Republic’, independently of Russian 
central government, since the summer of 1917. Under the protection of 
the Cossacks, General Alekseev had also established his organization to 
revive the Russian army around a core of volunteer officers. British 
military agents were also sent to the Caucasus to investigate the 
possibilities of supporting local governments against the imminent 
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Turkish threat. As the front lines of the Civil War started to emerge, the 
conflict between the Allies and the Bolsheviks became evident. 
 The British government formulated its Russian policy in the 
Cabinet’s discussions in early December 1917. It was decided to support 
‘any responsible body in Russia willing to oppose the Maximalist 
movement (i.e. the Bolsheviks)’, and ‘within reason to give money 
freely to such bodies as were prepared to help the Allied cause’.  Later, 
the War Office was rather vaguely instructed to use any sum of money 
necessary to maintain resistance to the Central Powers in South-east 
Russia.
53
 British military representatives in Russia began to pursue these 
instructions with some haste. Captain Noel was sent to the Don to 
negotiate with Kaledin. The British military attaché in Romania, General 
Ballard, was authorized to promise financial support of ten million 
pounds to Kaledin. In the Caucasus, General Shore was instructed to 
assist Armenians and Georgians to purchase arms. The General Staff 
also started to send British officers to the Caucasus to assist in 
organizing local forces.
54
 These instructions were the first step in the 
policy leading to a full-scale intervention. Operations were, however, 
supposed to be extremely confidential, since the Cabinet was trying to 
avoid open conflict with the Bolsheviks.  
 The first reports from South Russia that reached London were 
not encouraging. Earlier information of a well-trained force of 250,000 
men on the Don proved entirely false. These estimations were based on 
the stories of the Russian emissaries who regularly called at the British 
Embassy in Petrograd. British military agent, Colonel Jack, reported 
after his visit to Novocherkassk that Cossacks were tired of fighting and 
their regiments were disorganized. The younger Cossacks returning 
from the front, the frontoviki, were especially reluctant to take orders 
                                            
53
 War Cabinet, 3 & 14 December 1917, CAB 23/9, NA. 
54
 ‘Organization of military forces in South Russia’, Memorandum by General 
Staff,21 Dec 1917, CAB 24/3068 GT, NA. 
   
 
50 
from their atamans. Kaledin had his hands full in keeping order and 
fighting the Bolsheviks in the Don Region, and no action outside the 
Voisko could be expected in the near future. Jack had also interviewed 
General Alekseev, who admitted openly the tremendous problems the 
Volunteer movement was facing. Recruiting was going slowly, and men 
who joined were mainly officers or cadets from military colleges, the 
total strength of the corps being only 2,500 men. The organization also 
lacked money and supplies. But the British did not see the situation 
equally as hopeless, as the Bolsheviks were estimated to be not much 
stronger. Complete chaos reigned in central and southern Russia and the 
Bolsheviks were unable to prevent the free movement of their 
opponents, still less to organize sufficient troops to attack the Don. At 
the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918 there were no battles - only 
skirmishes.
55
 Thus, plans to help the anti-Bolshevik organizations were 
continued.   
 In the meantime, the French government had started its own 
operations in Russia mainly to support the Romanian Army that was 
being pushed towards the Ukraine by the German and Austrian armies. 
To coordinate the present Allied policy a secret Anglo-French 
conference was called in Paris. The Conference was concluded with the 
‘Anglo-French Convention’ on 23 December 1917, in which southern 
Russia was divided into ‘spheres of activity’ between the British and the 
French.
56
 The British zone was to include the Cossack territory, and the 
French zone Bessarabia, the Ukraine and the Crimea. It was stated that 
the convention was directed ultimately against the Central Powers; 
direct clashes with the Bolsheviks were to be avoided. It was also 
decided to support, but not to recognise the governments of Finland, the 
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Baltic Countries, the Ukraine, the Cossacks or Transcaucasia, which 
were all seeking sovereignty from Russia.
57
  
 Most Western historians have described the convention that 
was to define the sphere of operation of the Allies during the Civil War 
as an ‘ad hoc wartime arrangement’. The Soviet historians considered 
the treaty simply as an imperialistic plan to divide Russia.
58
 Both 
explanations are simplifications. The convention was indeed 
reconfirmed a year later in London and the French really operated on 
their zone according to this ‘international’ agreement and denied 
forcibly Denikin’s claims to the Crimea or the Ukraine. 
 British intelligence officers, led by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Keyes, began to execute the War Cabinet’s instructions in Petrograd. 
They worked out, in co-operation with the Russian banker Mr 
Jaroszynski, an elaborate scheme to finance the anti-Bolshevik forces 
within the British ‘sphere of activity’. It was designed to counteract the 
influence of German finance within Russia by bringing Russian banks 
under British control.  Under the scheme the British government was to 
give Mr. Jaroszynski a loan of six million pounds (200 million roubles) 
to purchase a majority of securities in five Russian banks. Mr. 
Jaroszynski was also supposed to set up ‘a Cossack Bank’ in South 
Russia, which could issue banknotes, and thus provide funding to the 
Don Cossacks and the Volunteer Army. The wild plan proceeded, after 
the approval of the Cabinet’s Russian Committee, and initially 185,000 
pounds were credited to the bank account of British agent Hugh Leech, 
from where the sum was drafted by Jaroszynski’s agents.59 
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 But the British were too late. Only minor sums were delivered 
successfully to the South. As the couriers, with the main delivery of 15 
million roubles, were on their way to the Don at the beginning of 
February 1918, Kaledin’s government lived its last days. Several 
Cossack regiments had mutinied and opened the front to the Bolshevik 
army. Novocherkassk was surrounded and Kaledin shot himself. The 
small Volunteer army of Alekseev and Kornilov had to fight its way out 
to the Kuban. In this situation the bank scheme was postponed.
60
 The 
British had ultimately failed to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in 
South Russia at this early stage of the Civil War. These secret financial 
operations did not, however, remain unnoticed by the Bolsheviks and 
the White movement was closely associated with ‘Imperialists’ money’ 
right from the outset.  
 The ‘Bank Scheme’ was not the only operation directed 
against the Bolsheviks by the British. The Secret Service, led in Moscow 
by Commander Boyce, had built, in co-operation with the Allies and 
anti-Bolshevik parties, especially the Kadets, a large network of agents 
and couriers throughout the country. The British and Allied agents 
started to blow up ammunition dumps, railways and bridges before the 
advancing German and Austrian Armies as early as in the spring 1918. 
In Novorossiisk, the harbour in which most of the British aid was later 
to be shipped, Allied agents bribed the local soviet and paid the 
Bolshevik sailors to scuttle their ships before the Germans arrived. 
These vessels included two dreadnoughts, six destroyers, and some 
thirty transport and cargo steamers.
61
 The activities of Allied agents, 
however, started to turn more openly against the Bolsheviks during the 
summer 1918. In August, the Cheka exposed the infamous ‘Lockhart 
Plot’, and the British consul and other Allied diplomats were arrested 
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and accused of planning to overthrow Lenin’s government. The Allied 
governments strictly denied this.  
 Gordon Brook-Shepherd’s study The Iron Maze contains 
interesting new information about the affair.
62
 There was indeed an 
Allied plot against the Bolsheviks. A British agent Sidney Reilly had 
masterminded it. Lenin’s Praetorians, the Lettish regiment, were to be 
paid to turn against the Bolsheviks, to murder Lenin and Trotsky and 
seize power in Moscow. All this, as Brook-Shepherd argues was, after 
all, a very clever Cheka deception. The Cheka was vaguely aware of 
Allied plans and lured the Reilly and his companions to believe that the 
Letts might be interested in changing sides. A high-ranking Lettish 
officer was sent to meet the Allied representatives, and Reilly indeed 
handed him a large sum to buy off the Lettish troops. The Cheka was, as 
a result, able to gather information on the Allied intelligence networks 
and arrest many of the agents. Despite the fact that the ‘Lockhart Plot’ 
never materialized, it is another clear example of the shift in the Allied 
policy against the Bolsheviks already in the beginning of the year 1918.  
 Meanwhile, the situation in the South had become most 
critical. The Ukraine and the northern coast of the Black Sea were in 
German hands and Turkish forces were rapidly advancing in the 
Caucasus. As noted, the British had already started to work out their 
plan to counter the invasion by the Central Powers in January 1918. It 
was, however, extremely difficult to execute the operation. The small 
British Military Agency at Tiflis, under Colonel Pike, gave financial 
assistance to organize units of Armenian and Georgian volunteers to 
restore the Caucasian front. He was able to raise considerable sums of 
money with the help of the British business establishment in the 
Caucasus. Pike provided the Transcaucasian Commissariat with over 
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five million roubles, and even sent an officer with 150,000 roubles to 
support Kornilov in the Kuban. Newly formed, mainly Armenian units 
were not, however, able to halt the Turkish onslaught. In this difficult 
situation, the Georgian government opted for German help and soon 
German troops were landed at Poti and they occupied strategic points of 
the country. The British mission had to be moved to Vladikavkaz in 
Daghestan, where Col. Pike continued his activities by remaining in 
contact with Kornilov and rallying the Terek Cossacks against the 
Bolsheviks. Colonel Pike was eventually killed by a stray bullet in an 
unsuccessful attempt of the Terek Cossacks to take Vladikavkaz in July 
1918. The rest of the ‘Caucasus Agency’ was arrested by the Bolsheviks 
and transported to Moscow. 
63
 
 A larger British mission, named ‘Dunsterforce’ after its 
commander General Dunsterville, was on its way from Baghdad to the 
Caucasus. The original intention had been to send a mission of 200 
British officers and 200 NCOs to organize and lead the new 
Transcaucasian force.
64
  Dunsterforce arrived, however, too late to 
proceed with this plan. In June 1918 the Turks were already approaching 
their main goal Baku and its oilfields.  The British decided to attempt to 
halt the Turks before they reached Baku. The city was governed by ‘the 
Baku Commune’ and was at least in theory under the authority of the 
Bolshevik central government. However, the Socialist-Revolutionary 
and Dashnak elements of the ‘Commune’ were willing to co-operate 
with the British, despite the furious protest by the Bolsheviks, who were 
obeying orders from Moscow. Encouraged by Dunsterville’s promises, 
and on the other hand, anti-Bolshevik statements, the SR’s and the 
Dashnaks eventually forced the Bolsheviks commissars out of the 
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government. The new government ‘the Centro-Caspian Dictatorship’ 
issued an open appeal for British troops to defend the city.
65
 
 The forward party of the Dunsterforce was landed in Baku on 
4 August 1918. The situation was, however, desperate. The British, 
comprising altogether only about 1,300 men, were absurdly 
outnumbered by Nuri Pasha’s army of 15,000 men and 32 guns. General 
Dunsterville had initially hoped that the arrival of Allied support would 
have raised the morale of local Russo-Armenian troops, but the first 
Turkish attacks revealed their minimal fighting qualities. The two 
British battalions held on with some Armenian troops for six weeks. 
Under severe pressure from a second major Turkish attack, and after the 
British had suffered 20 per cent casualties Dunsterville decided to 
evacuate Baku on 14 September 1918.
66
 Prolonged resistance would 
have only resulted in the total annihilation of the British units. Finally, 
the Central Powers were not halted in South Russia by the British 
operation, but by their defeat in Europe and in the Middle East.  For the 
Bolsheviks the brief British occupation of Baku was yet another piece of 
evidence of Allied hostility and imperialistic plans. 
 During the spring and summer of 1918, relations between the 
Allies and the Bolsheviks gradually deteriorated. The Allied activities 
were at first directed more clearly against the Central Powers and then 
increasingly after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and its supplement in 
August 1918 against the Bolsheviks, who were in many cases 
considered allies of the Central Powers. In addition to British operations 
in South Russia and the Caucasus, British troops were landed in 
Murmansk, North Russia, to protect the enormous stores of matériel in 
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the harbour threatened by the German operations in the Baltic and 
Finland. It was also feared that the Germans would establish a 
submarine base on the Arctic coast (Pechenga Fiord) from which they 
could attack Atlantic shipping. Another landing operation was 
conducted in Vladivostok, Siberia. The Allied troops acted at first in co-
operation with local soviets in both North Russia and in Siberia, but 
during the summer the situation worsened into an open conflict. The 
British landing and capture of Archangel on 6 August 1919, with an 
organized rising against local Bolshevik authorities, was already a direct 
attack against the Soviet regime. Just as the war was about to end in 
Europe, Allied forces found themselves engaged in active military 
operations in several parts of the former Russian Empire.  
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3. BRITAIN AND THE RUSSIAN QUESTION AFTER 
THE ARMISTICE 
 
3.1. The Lines of Policy 
 The British War Cabinet met to discuss the situation in Russia 
soon after the armistice was concluded with Germany in November 
1918. The sudden and unexpected collapse of Germany and the 
termination of the war had fundamentally changed the basis of British 
policy towards Russia. The presence of British troops in North Russia 
and Siberia and the support offered to various White groups in other 
parts of the country could no longer be explained as a part of the 
struggle against the Central Powers. Moreover, even the unofficial 
diplomatic relations with Lenin’s Bolshevik government had broken 
down due to the ‘Lockhart plot’ and other incidents in August-
September 1918. The British were in a de facto if not declared state of 
war with the Bolsheviks. The members of the Cabinet were also 
seriously concerned with the spread of Bolshevism and the Bolshevik 
revolution in particular to Central Europe and Asia. The Bolshevik 
pronouncements about reaching the end of ‘the bloody history of bloody 
imperialism’, and how the workers of the World would crush the class 
enemies and ‘the Anglo-French and American imperialist sharks’, did 
not go unnoticed in Britain.
67
 
 The attitude of the leading British politicians and of most of 
their Allied colleagues towards Bolshevism was rather sentimental and 
utterly negative. The ideology that appeared to be aimed at destroying 
the fundamental values of Christian civilization was considered 
repulsive. Some of the ministers also drew frightening scenarios of the 
alliance between a defeated Germany and the Bolsheviks. It was a 
generally held opinion that Germany would take advantage of the 
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chaotic situation in Russia and thus reverse her defeat in the war. It was 
not uncommon in Britain to consider the whole idea of Bolshevism as 
simply a hideous German plot to use a few Russian anarchistic maniacs 
to undermine the Allied war effort. This ‘German connection’ of the 
Bolsheviks was used as an argument in the British policy towards 
Russia time and time again during the intervention period. 
 In a memorandum presented to the Cabinet, the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, General Sir Henry Wilson, pointed out three 
different lines of policy which the Allies could apply in the current 
situation in Russia. First, all troops could be withdrawn from Russia, 
leaving the country surrounded by a belt of buffer nations or a ‘cordon 
sanitaire’.  As far as the General Staff was concerned this was not, 
however, feasible as the military initiative in this plainly defensive 
scheme would be left almost completely with the Bolsheviks. 
Consequently, the buffer states would have to live in a constant state of 
alert and would certainly not be able to counter the Bolshevik menace 
without considerable assistance from the Allied troops. The British 
Army had no such troops available, and General Wilson did not believe 
that the other Allies had them either. The second option was to conquer 
the Bolsheviks by means of a massive military intervention. This 
strategy would also counter any possible German plans effectively. The 
Russians would also thank the Allies for their freedom, and turn their 
backs on the Germans. A lack of resources meant that this option, 
however, was even more unrealistic. General Wilson could thus suggest 
the Cabinet follow only a third line of policy. According to this, the 
Allies would continue to support the loyal forces (i.e. the Whites) with 
military supplies, but the Allied troops would be withdrawn from Russia 
as soon as the local anti-Bolshevik forces were in a position to take over. 
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Wilson finished his memorandum by stressing that it was, after all, a 
Russian task ‒ not one of the Allies ‒ to overthrow the Bolsheviks.68   
 The members of the Cabinet were in broad agreement with 
Wilson’s memorandum. It was indeed impossible to launch an anti-
Bolshevik crusade. The nation would certainly not approve of another 
large-scale war and a highly-indebted British economy could clearly not 
afford it either. The interests of the British Empire demanded, however, 
immediate action, even though there was no immediate agreement 
within the Cabinet as to what this action would be. The Foreign 
Secretary, Arthur Balfour pointed out that Britain should support all 
Border States in their attempts to gain independence from Russia. The 
Prime Minister Lloyd George concurred with Balfour. Both the 
Secretary of State for War, Alfred Milner, and Lord Cecil, Parliamentary 
Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, on the other hand, drew attention 
to the southern borderlands of Russia. A Bolshevik invasion of 
Transcaucasia and further to Persia would spell a serious threat to 
India.
69
 
 The War Cabinet’s decision eventually took the form of a 
compromise between Wilson’s memorandum and the different views of 
the ministers. It was decided to maintain the British troops in both North 
Russia and in Siberia. The planned withdrawal of the ‘Czech Legion’ 
would also be postponed. The Baltic States would be supported against 
possible Bolshevik aggression by supplies of arms. The Cabinet 
instructed the General Staff to send immediately a mission to South 
Russia to establish contact with General Denikin and organize military 
aid for his army. In addition, it was decided to take over the strategic 
Transcaucasian railway line connecting the Black and Caspian seas.
70
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As such this decision was a continuation of the Allied Russian policy 
conducted after the Bolshevik coup and the Peace of Brest Litovsk, with 
the British supporting any ‘loyal’ government or military force in the 
area of the former Russian Empire. This time the definition of ‘loyal to 
the Allied cause’ had already evolved rather clearly from anti-German to 
anti-Bolshevik. 
 The Admiralty and the War Office were quick to implement 
the Cabinet’s decisions. At the end of November 1918 a fleet of cruisers 
was sailing to the Baltic and arms were shipped to the local 
governments. Two full divisions were ordered to Transcaucasia by the 
end of the year. Major-General Thompson’s force arrived from North 
Persia and occupied the Baku oilfields in Azerbaizhan by 17
 
November. 
 Six weeks later, 27 December, General Forestier-Walker’s troops, 
detached from the Salonika Army, landed at the Black Sea port of 
Batum. Forestier-Walker set up his headquarters in Georgian capital 
Tiflis and his division occupied several strategic points along the 
Transcaucasian railway. These two divisions, altogether nearly 40,000 
men, were the largest of all British Army contingents in Russia. Soon 
both Azerbaizhan and Georgia were rather firmly under British control. 
The British operation also effectively inhibited any Bolshevik schemes 
in Transcaucasia and partially hastened the disintegration of the 11
th
 and 
12
th
 Red Armies in the North Caucasus in January 1919 by seriously 
affecting the morale of the Bolshevik soldiers. 
 The military mission to General Denikin’s Army arrived in 
the Kuban in late November and started to investigate the situation. The 
British intervention in the South began in accordance with the Anglo-
French convention on the spheres of influence that had been drawn up 
the previous year. The French began their own operations by landing 
troops in the Ukraine and Crimea at the end of December. 
 And so it was that the British Army and the Royal Navy 
became gradually more deeply enmeshed in the Russian Civil War. The 
Cabinet’s decisions that had brought about this were not based on a 
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policy with a clearly-defined goal. As Richard Ullman has pointed out, 
these initial post-Armistice decisions were completely lacking in any 
overriding principle, but the Cabinet simply authorized a series of 
piecemeal operations in several parts of the former Russian Empire.
71
 
Britain could not commit her forces to an all-out campaign to conquer 
the Bolsheviks, but neither were the Cabinet to accept the Bolsheviks as 
the new rulers of Russia either. British post-Armistice Russian policy 
appears to be an attempt at steering a middle course between these two 
lines. Cabinet’s decisions also contained a serious contradiction: Britain 
began to support the Border States seeking independence from Russia 
and on the other hand the Whites such as Kolchak and Denikin, who 
were fundamentally against ‘dismembering’ the Russian Empire. 
 The reasons for the clear lack of coherence in British policy 
during the whole period of the intervention seem to lay both in the 
complicated and very fluid political situation on the one hand and the 
wartime system of political decision-making on the other. During 1918, 
the War Cabinet had naturally been concentrating on winning the war on 
the Western Front. Similarly, after the Armistice, it was preoccupied 
with both a resolution of the peace with Germany and reconstructing the 
strained economy of the country and the acute crisis that was developing 
in Ireland. During the World War there had been attempts to improve 
the effectiveness of the political decision-making. The peace-time 
system had not met the demands of the rapid shifts in wartime 
circumstances. The Cabinet of fifteen to twenty members had normally 
fashioned a policy after lengthy consultations and compromises, and this 
had often to be approved at the House of Commons. When Lloyd 
George became the Prime Minister in 1916, he concentrated the 
decision-making process upon a small group of senior officials from the 
most important departments of the states and representatives of the 
Army and the Navy. In this War Cabinet the prime minister held the 
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decisive role. The War Cabinet and in its extended form the Imperial 
War Cabinet, including representatives from the Dominions, held rather 
sovereign political powers during the last year of the war and made 
decisions in even the most important questions with minimal 
parliamentary control.
72
 The War Cabinet continued to operate until the 
autumn of 1919. The wartime process of decision-making thus had a 
crucial role in the politics of intervention.  
 Wartime conditions had, on the other hand, relegated much of 
the decision-making normally requiring Cabinet’s or Parliament’s 
approval to the heads of the departments of state. For example, the 
Secretary of State for War, together with the Chief of General Staff, was 
responsible for the planning and the actual conduct of the military 
operations within the general policy laid out by the War Cabinet. The 
World War had strengthened immensely the position of the War Office 
because of the obvious importance of the Army in the Continental War, 
whereas the role of the Foreign Office as the designer of British foreign 
policy had greatly diminished during the war. In the case of the British 
intervention in Russia, the War Cabinet’s vague and partially 
contradictory decisions indeed resulted in the relegation of the decision-
making to the War Office and the War Cabinet did not directly authorize 
many of the actual military operations conducted in Russia.
73
 
 
3.2. Lloyd George and the Prinkipo Proposal 
 The Prime Minister David Lloyd George became increasingly 
concerned with a situation where Britain was gradually committing her 
forces more and more deeply to the struggle against the Bolshevik 
government. He compared the Russian question to the French 
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Revolution and the then British policy. The involvement in the French 
revolutionary wars had not led to the desired results but only to a 
lengthy, bloody and expensive war. Lloyd George also pointed out how 
the foreign intervention on the side of one participant of the conflict had 
only served to encourage French patriotism. There was a real prospect 
that that would happen in Russia as well, with British intervention 
merely increasing the popular support of the Bolsheviks. Lloyd George 
appears to have believed that the question of popular support was to be 
crucial in the whole outcome of the Civil War.
74
 
 Lloyd George was also rather anxious because of the growing 
anti-interventionist sentiments in Britain. The Labour and even some of 
the Liberal papers criticized the Cabinet for its Russian policy 
mentioning in particular the difficult conditions of the British soldiers in 
Northern Russia.
75
 The Labour party, which had resigned from Lloyd 
George’s wartime Coalition government, together with the trade unions, 
began its the ‘Hands off Russia’ campaign demanding an end to the 
intervention and rights for the Russian people to decide their own future. 
The Cabinet was accused of unnecessary hostility towards Lenin’s 
government suggesting that its policy could only lead to a new 
continental war. The general election was to be held in December 1918 
and the Labour movement was now using the Russian question against 
Lloyd George’s Coalition. The Labour Party had benefited immensely 
from the Representation of the People Act of June 1918, which 
increased the electorate considerably in the lower social classes 
improving the party’s chance of electoral success. Yet despite all the 
fears of the Coalition politicians, Labour did not win a crushing victory 
in the general election of 1918. It became, however, with its 59 seats 
together with the minority wing of the Liberals, a source of loud 
opposition in the House of Commons, which Lloyd George certainly had 
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to take account of in his cabinet’s policy. In addition to a pure contest of 
political power, the Conservative politicians seem to have been seriously 
concerned about the ‘Bolshevisation’ of the British Labour Party and the 
trade unions. 
76
 
 At a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet Sir Robert Borden, 
Canadian Prime Minister, made a suggestion relating to the Russian 
question that immediately caught Lloyd George’s attention. As an 
alternative to the intervention, which Borden firmly opposed, all the 
participants in the Civil War, including the Bolsheviks, would be invited 
to Paris for a conference with the Allies. On the last day of the year 1918 
the Cabinet approved Lloyd George’s proposal for the Russian peace 
negotiations. The decision was opposed only by Winston Churchill 
(Churchill was still the Minister of Munitions and became the Secretary 
of State for War only in January 1919). Churchill argued strongly for 
collective Allied intervention to remove the Bolshevik regime. He did 
not receive, however, any support for his argument from his colleagues 
at the War Office, Admiralty or Foreign Office who all sided with the 
Prime Minister.
77
 This Cabinet meeting was the first instance of the 
struggle between Lloyd George and Churchill that was to characterize 
British policy towards Russia throughout the following year. And, as in 
this case, it was usually the Prime Minister’s ‒ not Churchill’s ‒ point of 
view that was formulated as a final decision of the Cabinet. 
 Lloyd George always argued firmly against sending British 
troops to Russia. Intervention could only be accepted in the form of the 
material aid to the Border States and to some extent to the Whites. Lloyd 
George remained lukewarm towards the White cause during the whole 
period of the Russian Civil War. The Whites aimed at restoring a strong 
and united Russia, and Lloyd George regarded a weak Russia, even 
ruled by the Bolsheviks, as better for British interests. He also 
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questioned strongly the blockade of the Soviet territory. That would only 
bring misery to the Russian people, as the Bolsheviks would requisition 
the already meagre foodstuffs. The blockade would also be harmful to 
British trade as the huge Russian markets would be lost to British 
companies. Overall the Prime Minister thought that finding a positive 
solution to the Russian question would only be possible through Allied 
co-operation:  British policy should be based on the decisions of the 
Paris Peace conference.
78
 
 The Allied leaders met in the Paris Peace conference in 
January 1919 and Lloyd George made his proposal to invite delegates 
from the various Russian factions to the conference.  The President of 
the United States, Woodrow Wilson, an ardent opponent of the military 
intervention, supported him. The French and the Italians, however, 
resisted furiously. Representatives of various anti-Bolshevik groups and 
the Border States were already in Paris, but the Bolsheviks, the enemies 
of the Allied nations, would not be allowed there as they would only 
spread propaganda and chaos. The result of these conflicting views was 
a compromise, as the French and Italian prime ministers admitted the 
necessity of including the Bolsheviks whom Lloyd George had declared 
as de facto rulers of Russia, in the negotiations. The meeting would not 
take place, however, in Paris but in the resort islands of Prinkipo near 
Constantinople. President Wilson drafted the final invitation, which was 
broadcast to Russia by radio. All organized groups exercising political 
or military power within the boundaries of the former Russian empire 
were invited to Prinkipo for negotiations on 15th February 1919, 
provided they cease all military operations.
79
 
 The Prinkipo conference never took place. Only the Baltic 
States and the Bolsheviks accepted the invitation, although the 
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intentions of the Bolsheviks with respect to peace with the Whites seem 
to have been rather dubious. The Whites, who were now coming 
together into one, albeit rather heterogeneous, movement under Admiral 
Kolchak firmly rejected any negotiations and considered armistice with 
the Bolsheviks impossible. The invitation caused outrage among the 
British representatives in Russia who generally condemned the proposal 
as a tacit recognition of the Bolshevik government and regarded it as 
undermining the White struggle they were supposed to be supporting. 
And Churchill, who had now assumed his post as the War Secretary was 
furious when he received news about the invitation. In a contretemps 
with the Prime Minister Churchill exclaimed that ‘one might as well 
legalize sodomy as recognize the Bolsheviks’.80 Lloyd George’s attempt 
to solve the Russian question by negotiation rather than intervention had 
proved a complete failure this time. It would take more than a year ‒ and 
the factual defeat of the anti-Bolsheviks before the British would enter 
into negotiations with the Soviet government. 
 
3.3. Churchill’s Crusade 
 From January 1919 onwards Churchill’s work at the War 
Office was dominated by the Civil War in Russia, and by organizing the 
British assistance to the Whites. He had been an ardent critic of 
communism since the turn of the century. The Bolshevik coup in Russia 
and especially the introduction of the ‘Red terror’ during summer 1918 
convinced him of the true nature of this ideology. Consequently, 
Churchill described the Bolshevism as ‘not a political thought but a 
disease’, but fortunately it seemed to represent only a fraction of the 
Russian people.
81
 Perhaps most strongly and persistently of the British 
politicians he maintained the argument that the Bolshevik regime was 
                                            
80
 Gilbert, World in Torment, p. 235.  
81
 House of Commons, 29.5.1919, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 114, cols. 
1526-7. 
   
 
67 
German in origin and clearly considered the Brest-Litovsk Peace as an 
instance of treachery.  Such was Churchill’s enthusiasm for the anti-
Bolshevik cause that the whole British intervention came to be 
personified in him. The operations in Russia were described in the Press 
as ‘Mr Churchill’s private war’ and militant anti-Bolshevism was even 
christened as ‘Churchillianism’ in the House of Commons.82  It should 
be pointed out, however, that British policy towards the Bolsheviks and 
the origins of the intervention on the side of the Whites had evolved 
without Churchill’s participation during the year 1918.  
 By the time Churchill had assumed his post as the Secretary 
of  State for War and become member of the War Cabinet, British troops 
were already committed in the various parts of the former Russian 
Empire as well as engaged in battles against the Bolsheviks. In this 
situation, assuming responsibility for the operations of the Army, he 
demanded a clear Russian policy from the Cabinet. Britain should either 
pull out or take determined actions to support the anti-Bolshevik forces. 
He pointed out that the procrastination of the British government rapidly 
worsened the situation both in respect of the Allied forces in Russia and 
of the whole Russian population suffering under the Bolshevik terror. 
The conditions of the British forces were especially alarming in the 
North Russia. The troops were badly equipped for the harsh winter and 
the Bolsheviks had recently started an offensive to oust the Allies from 
Archangel and Murmansk. The situation in Siberia and in South Russia 
was not much better; the White armies of Admiral Kolchak and General 
Denikin would not be able to continue their struggle for long without 
prominent support from the Allies. 
 Churchill presented to the Cabinet his own proposal for 
British policy towards Russia. As secretary of the state responsible for 
the demobilization he was well aware of the unrest of the troops. There 
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had already been several mutinies and the prospect of prolonged service 
in Russia was reported to be especially unpopular. Accordingly, he was 
not suggesting sending a large British conscript army to quench 
Bolshevism in Russia ‒ quite the opposite. He wanted to evacuate from 
both North Russia and Siberia, the troops which had been sent there 
during the war against Germany, as soon as weather conditions allowed. 
Churchill had not, however, given up the idea of crushing Bolshevism, 
although this was not to be done directly by the divisions of the British 
Army. His main point was that the war would be fought by newly-
formed Russian armies, which would be trained by the British in modern 
warfare and equipped with modern weapons. The British government 
would supply these armies with ample matériel and small units of 
British volunteers and advisers would support them. The aid would be 
concentrated in Siberia as well as in South Russia, which Churchill 
considered the decisive fronts of the war.
83
 
 This proposal and Churchill’s other frequent demands for the 
decisive policy were countered again and again by Lloyd George’s 
arguments in February-March 1919. The War Cabinet failed to reach 
any decision on the Russian policy as the Prime Minister stated every 
time that the Russian question could not be resolved by the Cabinet but 
needed an inter-Allied policy formulated by the Paris Peace Conference. 
He also seems to have still vainly hoped that his Prinkipo policy would 
bear some fruit. Churchill accused Lloyd George of not being seriously 
concerned with the Russian situation and the consequences of a possible 
Bolshevik victory. Lloyd George in turn dismissed Churchill’s demands 
as jingoism and perhaps as the beginning of an adventure similar to the 
Dardannelles disaster, for which Churchill was held responsible.
84
 On 
the other hand, there might be some truth in Churchill’s accusations that 
the Prime Minister was not really committed in solving the Russian 
                                            
83
 War Cabinet no 531, 12.2.1919, CAB 23/9, NA. 
84
 The argument between Churchill and Lloyd George on the Russian question is well 
described in Gilbert’s World in Torment, pp. 257-63. 
   
 
69 
question. His counter-arguments were not always based on solid facts. 
Lloyd George admitted that ‘the reports from Russia were very 
confusing’, and once, during a speech in the Commons he described the 
aid given to Generals Kolchak, Denikin and Kharkoff.
85
 At the War 
Office his ‘expertise’ was naturally ridiculed, as Kolchak was an admiral 
and Lloyd George seemed to have confused the Ukrainian city of 
Kharkoff (Kharkov) with the pro-German ex-Ataman of the Don, 
General Krasnov, who had certainly not received any aid from the 
British. 
 Churchill also tried hard to find allies for his intervention 
policy in the Paris Peace conference. It proved, however, to be no easier 
to find a common policy within the Allied camp in the event of 
intervention in the Russian civil war than over the question of the peace 
in Europe. The victorious Allies had enormous problems with the 
questions relating to Central Europe and the pacification of the Central 
powers. Churchill suggested a special military council be formed to deal 
with Russia, but the representatives of France and the United States did 
not consider this necessary. France was already taking steps, despite 
Prime Minister Clemenceau’s ardent anti-Bolshevik speeches, to 
withdraw her troops from active intervention in the Ukraine and 
reformulate her strategy as a cordon sanitaire. The French plan was to 
build a buffer zone of independent pro-Allied ‒ or preferably pro-French 
‒ states to contain the spread of Bolshevism. Poland would be the most 
important of these states, and a strong Poland was also hoped to counter 
effectively the threat of Germany to France.
86
 The United States was 
gradually returning to its pre-war isolationist policy, and also began to 
withdraw its troops from Russia. Idealistically, President Wilson was 
firmly against any kind of involvement in the Russian situation. Japan 
had her own schemes in Russia, but these could be described more as 
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outright imperialism than attempts to find a positive solution to the civil 
war. The other Allies were highly suspicious of the Japanese actions in 
Siberia.
87
  
 Churchill became utterly frustrated with the lack of a clear 
Cabinet policy on the Russian question. There seemed to be no support 
for his views in the Cabinet either, the main obstacle being the all-
powerful Prime Minister. As a result, he began to pursue his own line of 
Russian policy independently of the War office. The Bolsheviks were to 
be defeated by supplying the White Armies with matériel and supporting 
them directly with units of volunteers and military advisers. The 
Cabinet’s vague decisions from the year 1918 to support any anti-
Bolshevik force in Russia could already be interpreted as authorizing his 
plans for massive material aid to Kolchak and Denikin, and in the case 
of sending volunteers to Russia he could extract authorization from the 
Cabinet on the grounds of the ‘utmost military urgency’. When the 
Prime Minister enquired of Churchill the costs of possible aid to the 
Whites in February, the operation was already well under way. In the 
Prinkipo case he hurried to confirm for the White representatives in 
London that the War Office would continue to provide the White armies 
with all necessary supplies, if this was not explicitly ruled out by the 
Cabinet.
88
 As the following chapters will show, it was the War Office 
that orchestrated the British Russian policy that was actually executed in 
the field during 1919 and early 1920. Such a state of affairs reveals the 
glaring discrepancy between official foreign policy and the 
contingencies of military strategy. 
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4. THE BEGINNING OF THE INTERVENTION 
 
4.1. The Arrival of the British and the Establishment of the Armed 
Forces of South Russia 
 The British government made the first official contact with 
General Denikin as a small mission commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Blackwood arrived at the Volunteer headquarters in Ekaterinodar 
(renamed Krasnodar in the 1920s) on 25 November 1918. Blackwood’s 
task was to gather intelligence in preparation for future British 
operations in support of the Whites. Colonel Blackwood and his small 
entourage received a jubilant reception from the Russians. Between 
lavish official lunches and dinners Blackwood also interviewed Denikin 
and his Chief of Staff General I.P. Romanovskii. Their message was 
clear: despite any temporary difficulties the Whites were determined to 
crush the Bolsheviks, and with military aid from the Allies victory was 
assured. 
 The Volunteer generals also considered it vital to concentrate 
the command of the several White forces of South Russia in the hands of 
one general ‒ Denikin. Denikin had assumed command of the Volunteer 
Army after the death of Kornilov. He was also held to be the most 
favourable choice for HM Government as he had always been faithful to 
the Allied cause and had never liaised with the Germans, unlike, for 
example, General Krasnov, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks. The 
generals informed Blackwood that the White troops would not be able to 
continue active operations against the Bolsheviks without immediate 
help from the Allies. Moreover, a much larger army was needed for the 
offensive against Moscow and the total annihilation of the Bolshevik 
regime. Naturally, arming and equipping this mass army depended 
solely on the Allied aid. Denikin stated that the Russians would 
definitely conduct the actual fighting, but the Allies should send only 18 
infantry divisions and four cavalry divisions to protect their rear areas 
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and lines of communication.
89
 Denikin’s request for an Allied force 
larger than any of the participant armies during the Civil War sounds 
absurd. It appears that it was a strategy of the White generals to request 
an enormous number of allied troops in the hope of receiving at least a 
few divisions. According to similar logic, Denikin and Romanovskii 
hugely overestimated the future nominal strength of the White Army. 
This was definitely not so much a mistake or unrealistic thinking, but a 
means to secure plentiful supplies for the White troops. 
 Colonel Blackwood composed a detailed report of his visit to 
the General Staff, and General Wilson also circulated it in the Cabinet. 
In the conclusion of this report Blackwood, made his suggestion for 
British policy in South Russia. First, he identified the Volunteer Army 
as clearly the most important of the White forces and recommended that 
for Denikin be granted support in unifying the command of the separate 
Cossack armies in his control. Secondly, considerable aid in arms and 
other military supplies should be sent to stabilize the critical situation. 
However, Blackwood was against sending British fighting units to 
South Russia, a point he had also made clear to the Russians. Instead, a 
permanent military mission should be sent to organize and supervise the 
effective distribution of aid. Thirdly, the Allies should send a political 
mission to South Russia to mediate between the various anti-Bolshevik 
groups ‒ the Volunteers, the Cossacks and the Caucasian nations. 
Blackwood strongly advised moreover that economic aid be organized 
to support the White struggle. The Colonel ended his report by boldly 
advising HM Government to draw up a clear and determined line of 
policy, and whatever this line was to be, the policy should be logically 
executed on the field and the Russians should be informed of the 
policy.
90
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 Colonel Blackwood boarded the same Royal Navy destroyer 
that brought Major-General F.C. Poole, the actual commander of the 
British Military Mission to Novorossiisk on 3 December 1918. The War 
Office had chosen Poole for this post because of his supposed 
knowledge of Russian affairs. He had already been, however, removed 
from the command of the Allied forces in North Russia because of his 
‘abrasive colonial-style behaviour’ towards the local Russian 
Government.
91
  In South Russia, Poole’s task was restricted to reporting 
on the nature and quantities of supplies the Whites should be provided 
with. General Poole was, in fact, instructed not to make any definite and 
detailed promises of aid to the Russians.
92
 
 The Russians were openly flattered as the British Mission ‒ 
led by a general ‒ arrived. Parades were organized to celebrate Poole’s 
arrival and crowds lined the streets of Novorossiisk and Ekaterinodar 
waving little paper Union Jacks and shouting ‘Welcome, our dear 
Allies!’. The gloomy atmosphere in South Russia had suddenly been 
transformed into one of optimism. Soldiers and civilians alike expected 
Poole’s Mission soon to be followed by British Army regiments 
marching along the streets of their cities. Everyone believed that the 
Civil War could not last long now as the army that had recently defeated 
the mighty Germans would have no trouble at all defeating the 
Bolshevik riff-raff.
93
 On the other side of the frontline the Bolshevik 
units were shocked of the arrival of the British and started to send 
alarming reports to their headquarters and to Moscow. The Bolshevik 
soldiers expected Poole’s mission to be followed by British tanks and 
infantry and desperately demanded for reinforcements.
94
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 General Poole, for his part, was greatly impressed by his 
visits to Denikin’s headquarters and some of the Volunteer units. Like 
Colonel Blackwood a few weeks before, he was convinced about the 
leading role of the Volunteer Army in the White movement. Poole was 
also enlightened by the heroic history of the Volunteer Army. The 
British general was clearly touched by gallant stories from the struggle 
against the Bolsheviks such as the ‘Ice March’, when the few thousand 
Volunteers had marched across the frozen Kuban steppe in spring 1918 
suffering immensely but winning incredible victories. He was not to be 
the last British officer to be enchanted by the romantic elements of the 
White cause. This heroic struggle seemed to offer a return from the 
industrialised butchery of the Western Front to the old world of cavalry 
charges and personal courage of manly men. 
 General Poole hurried to report to London: the British 
Government should start a large-scale support operation immediately. A 
large consignment of arms and ammunitions, together with aeroplanes 
and tanks should be sent to South Russia. Poole also asked for one 
infantry and one cavalry brigade to be sent to support the Volunteer 
Army and a smaller unit to the Don Army. He explained that these 
troops would only protect Denikin’s bases and lines of communication 
and they would not take part in active operations against the 
Bolsheviks.
95
 Poole’s request for two British brigades, despite all of his 
original instructions, is understandable, as considerably larger units had 
already been sent to Transcaucasia.    
 The arrival of General Poole and his Mission to Ekaterinodar 
increased considerably the Volunteer Army’s prestige amongst the anti-
Bolshevik forces and played an important role in unifying the separate 
White armies under Denikin’s command. General Poole openly 
expressed the Allied support for Denikin in the power struggle between 
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the Volunteers and the Don Cossacks. He suggested directly that the 
Allies could remove Ataman Krasnov from the Don by force if Denikin 
so wished.
96
 And when Poole visited the Don Army headquarters he 
acted forcefully. He warned Krasnov that ‘Great Britain would not give 
one stitch of clothing or one round of ammunition unless he 
acknowledged the unity of command’.97 On the other hand, according to 
Krasnov, Poole offered immediate help to the Cossacks if he submitted 
the command of his forces to Denikin. Poole even promised not only 
material aid but that Britain would immediately send one battalion to the 
Don Front and later one brigade.
98
  
 The Cossacks were in no position to resist. Following the 
German withdrawal, the Bolsheviks had won several important victories 
on the Don Front and in the beginning of January 1919 they were 
threatening to overrun the whole voisko. The Don could not survive 
without Volunteer and Allied help. An agreement, in which the 
operational command of the Don Army was submitted to the Armed 
Forces of South Russia, was signed on 8 January 1919. In addition to 
Allied pressure, opposition against Krasnov was increasing on the Don 
and he was soon forced to resign and later expelled from South Russia. 
Openly pro-Allied General Bokaievski was elected as a new Ataman in 
February 1919.
99
  The Bolsheviks were also well informed of these 
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events and were convinced of the increasing British influence in the 
White forces in South Russia.
100
 
 The War Office was not satisfied with Poole’s conduct in 
South Russia even though he had successfully supported Denikin in 
unifying the command of the White armies.  He was, again, removed 
from his post after only eight weeks of service. The official reason given 
for this was acting against instructions; Poole had indeed promised both 
Denikin and Krasnov that British troops would eventually be sent to 
South Russia. Poole was called home on 31 January 1919.
101
  Perhaps 
the War Office was not convinced by Poole’s over-optimistic reporting 
either. His reports appear to be based solely on information given by 
Denikin’s staff, not on objective observation, and thus, obviously biased 
in favour of the Whites. When the reports were compared with other 
intelligence from Russia they were found to overestimate grossly the 
strength of Denikin’s forces. According to Poole, Denikin had 130,000 
men in arms in January 1919 and ‘he would raise this number to 200,000 
- 250,000 soon’.102 On the other hand, a French report forwarded to the 
War Office estimated the real strength of Denikin to only  ‘50,000 
casually dressed men armed with 83 guns of which only half were 
usable’.103 Poole was possibly considered too close to the White Cause; 
as he was, after all, expected to act as a representative of the British 
government in Russia. 
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4.2. The Start of Military Aid to Denikin 
Despite the Cabinet’s inability to reach agreement and define Russian 
policy, Churchill’s War Office did not remain inactive. Churchill 
instructed the General Staff to plan and launch the operation on the basis 
of the Cabinet’s general decision of November 1918 to support Denikin. 
It was decided in the beginning of January, on the basis of the 
information provided by Colonel Blackwood, to organize shipping of 
matériel for an army of 100,000 men at once. Only ten days later the 
General Staff diverted shipments of 50 aeroplanes and twelve tanks 
originally destined for Admiral Kolchak’s Army in Siberia to Denikin. 
Furthermore, a group of officers from the Royal Tank Corps was sent to 
South Russia to gather information and plan the future use of tanks. The 
Air Ministry ‒ also led by Churchill ‒ drafted its own plan of sending a 
mission of 90 men and 100 planes, fully supplied with arms, spares, and 
fuel to South Russia.
104
 
 Only a few weeks later, and without consulting the Cabinet, 
Churchill instructed the General Staff to increase the amount of supplies 
to Denikin’s Army to be sufficient for an army of 250,000 men. 
Ammunitions destined for South Russia also included 25,000 poison gas 
shells. Churchill had described mustard gas as ‘ideal weapon against our 
beastly enemy’, and yet those were instructed to be used only if the 
Bolsheviks started gas warfare. All the matériel was to be collected from 
the enormous stores accumulated in Salonika, Alexandria and other 
harbours in the Mediterranean. The supplies would then be shipped 
through the Dardannelles to Novorossiisk on the north-east shore of the 
Black Sea. Only the tanks and a certain number of the aeroplanes were 
to be sent directly from Britain.
105
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 The General Staff ‒ again without any authorization from the 
Cabinet ‒ instructed General Milne, the commander of the British forces 
on the Black Sea, to establish a permanent military mission to operate 
with Denikin’s newly formed Armed Forces of South Russia ‒ ‘The 
British Military Mission, South Russia’. Lieutenant-General Briggs was 
appointed as the new commander of the mission and he arrived in 
Ekaterinodar at the beginning of February. Briggs had vague personal 
instructions to liaise between Denikin and the War Office via General 
Milne in Constantinople. (Direct wireless communication from 
Novorossiisk to London was not established until August 1919 and 
before that all messages had to be sent first to Constantinople and 
forwarded to London.) According to original General Staff instructions, 
the task of the Mission was to report on the military situation in South 
Russia, to investigate the needs of Denikin’s Army, to supervise the 
distribution of the matériel and to start training Russians in the use of 
British weapons. The Military Mission did not have any formal power 
over political questions, but was instructed to act only on orders from 
the War Office.
106
 This was to cause serious confusion right from the 
beginning, as instructions from London were often too vague or too late 
in the fluid political situation in Russia. 
 Cavalry general Sir Charles Briggs was a curious choice as 
the commander of the Mission. He had never visited Russia before and 
did not know the language. Briggs had been commanding the 16th Army 
Corps at Salonika (later renamed as the British Salonika Army), and he 
was astonished to receive the order to sail to Russia. The reason for his 
appointment was probably the fact that a senior general was needed and 
Briggs was simply available at Salonika when the hostilities against 
Central Powers had ended. Briggs later admitted that he had known next 
to nothing about the situation in Russia. The destroyer carrying Briggs 
anchored briefly at Constantinople and the general was handed a bunch 
                                            
106
 War Diary, General Staff, 5.2. 1919, WO 95/4958, NA. 
   
 
79 
of reports, which he studied during the 36-hour trip over the Black Sea 
to Novorossiisk.
107
  
 The task that was waiting for Briggs was overwhelming and 
Military Mission’s resources were very limited. The Mission did not 
arrive to start its work in South Russia as a complete and organized unit. 
 Its members, the 500 officers and NCOs, were ordered to Russia from 
different units mainly from Constantinople and Salonika on a very 
haphazard basis, and they started to arrive in Novorossiisk in little 
groups in February. Needless to say, these men were in most cases even 
less prepared for their future tasks than their commander. General 
Briggs soon found the mission far too small and, in addition many of the 
men were unsuitable for the task. To be able to work properly the 
Mission needed larger and better qualified staff.
108
  
 In London, Churchill and his staff worked hard to resolve the 
situation. On 4 March he was finally able to extract a relatively 
favourable decision from the Cabinet in relation to the situation in 
Russia. According to Churchill’s suggestions, it was decided to evacuate 
the troops from North Russia before the next winter ‒ although first 
strengthening the expeditionary force with two 4,000-strong brigades in 
order to ‘enable a safe evacuation’. The two divisions from Caucasus, 
again in accord with Churchill’s policy, would also be withdrawn.  The 
main point was, however, that the support given in arms and munitions 
to Denikin and Kolchak would continue. And, moreover, the strength of 
the Military Mission in South Russia would be increased to 2,000. All 
these officers and other ranks should be volunteers, and the Prime 
Minister also wanted to point out that they were not allowed to take part 
in any fighting. How this would be possible in frontline conditions was 
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not discussed in the Cabinet meeting.
109
 Churchill now had Cabinet’s 
authorization to continue his war against Bolshevism. 
 The promise of the arrival of more officers and men helped 
considerably Briggs’s task in organizing the Mission when the supplies 
began to flow into Novorossiisk harbour in March 1919. The Mission 
established its headquarters in the vicinity of Denikin’s HQ in 
Ekaterinodar (moved closer to the front to Taganrog in August 1919). A 
supply base was founded in Novorossiisk as a central unit to organize 
the distribution of supplies. When a sufficient number of British officers 
and NCOs had arrived they were dispersed in the various units of the 
AFSR. For each of the three White armies, the Volunteer Army, the Don 
Army and the Army of the Caucasus, a British Liaison Group was 
established. Later, when the Whites had conquered the southern 
Ukraine, a fourth liaison group was founded in Odessa. These groups 
were miniature military missions in themselves consisting of an HQ and 
a number of officers from various services responsible for instructing 
the Russians in the use of British arms and equipment.
110
  
 
4.3. Political Difficulties 
 The British Military Mission began its work in most trying of 
political circumstances. No sooner had the Whites cleared the Northern 
Caucasus of the Bolsheviks than they ended up in confrontation with 
Azerbaizhan, Georgia and the various small nationalities of the 
Caucasus. The governments of the Caucasus states were openly hostile 
towards the Whites and saw them even as a more immediate threat to 
their independence than the Bolsheviks. On the other hand, Denikin’s 
regime, pursuing the policy of ‘the Holy and Undivided Russia’, did not 
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recognize the sovereignty of these states and considered the Georgian 
Menshevik dominated government in particular as not very different 
from the Bolsheviks. The conflict developed into clashes between the 
White and Georgian troops. In the west, Denikin’s forces faced another 
problem, the French, who were pursuing their own intervention policy. 
The French government had landed troops in the Ukraine and the 
Crimea in order to supervise the withdrawal of German and Austrian 
forces and to fill the power vacuum left by the Central Powers.  This was 
not, however, the help Denikin had expected from the Allies, as the 
French started to negotiate with Petliura’s Directorate about the 
independence of the Ukraine and even prevented the Volunteers from 
operating in their area of occupation. The British Mission had to adopt 
the role of the mediator in both of these conflicts ─ a thankless task 
hardly suited to a group of officers who were assigned to assist the 
White troops in their fight against the Bolsheviks. 
 The first meeting with General Briggs and Denikin was not a 
good one. Briggs conveyed to the White commander the ultimatum of 
HM Government to cease the hostilities with the Georgians and rather 
turn his attention to the Bolsheviks. Otherwise the military aid to him 
would have to be reconsidered. Denikin was incensed with rage: ‘I am a 
Russian and I will help Russians and Armenians against these savage 
Georgians, who are acting like Bolsheviks, killing and looting. I will not 
listen to the orders of an alien government, but I have issued orders, and 
they will be carried out to kick these Barbarians over the frontier. If HM 
Government will withdraw her assistance we will carry out on our own 
resources.’  Furious Denikin continued by asking what were the British 
and French ‘zones of influence’ he had learned about? What were the 
English actually doing in the Caucasus as no one had invited them 
there? Were they perhaps after the oil like the Germans? Denikin also 
accused the Allies of seizing the stores of the Imperial Russian Army in 
the Caucasus and Romania and handing these supplies (sufficient for 
three armies) to the Georgians and the Romanians. General Briggs was 
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not briefed or authorized to respond to these arguments and reported 
feeling more ‘like prisoner at the Bar than head of a mission’.111 
 Briggs has, after all, described Denikin as a strong, 
determined patriot who would ‘stand no nonsense from anyone’, and as, 
a clear-headed man.
112
 Denikin must have understood the cold facts and 
thus ordered to halt the operations against the Georgians ─ at least 
temporarily to secure invaluable British support. On the other hand, the 
British used considerable pressure on the Georgian and Azerbaizhani 
governments. The line of demarcation that was finally agreed with the 
Caucasus states and Denikin was rather favourable to the Whites, giving 
them full access to the oilfields of Groznyi and Maikop and the Petrovsk 
harbour (now Machak Kala) on the Caspian Sea. Relations between the 
Transcaucasian states and the Whites remained tense, however, until the 
very defeat of the Whites. Georgia and Azerbaizhan supported rather 
openly the Green partisan groups and the revolts of the mountain tribes 
of the Chechen and the Ingushi in the White rear, which weakened the 
Whites considerably at critical moments.
113
 The somewhat contradictory 
situation, where Britain was supporting both the Whites and the 
Transcaucasian states put a considerable strain on the Mission. 
 Equally complicated was the situation in the Ukraine. Hetman 
Skoropadskii’s puppet regime had been toppled almost as soon as the 
Germans started to withdraw their troops from the Ukraine. Simon 
Petliura’s Directorate that was fighting the Bolsheviks in the North but 
was equally hostile towards the Whites now at least nominally ruled the 
country. When the French landed their first troops in Odessa in 
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December 1918 this happened in fact in co-operation with a small 
Volunteer Army unit, which had remained in the city. The Volunteers 
were able, with the help of French naval gunfire, to clear Odessa from 
the Petliurists. However, the troubles started as the French government 
considered Denikin to be an obvious threat to its plans for an 
independent Ukraine and began to restrict the activities of the Whites, 
and on the other hand, started to negotiate with Petliura. The Volunteer 
Army had in the area only 5,000 troops, but the French banned 
mobilisation in the area as well as bringing more troops from the Kuban. 
The Volunteers were not allowed to move the large stores of military 
supplies in Nikolaev either.
114
 On the other hand, the French did not 
bring to the Ukraine more than 12,000 troops. All this happened while 
the Bolsheviks advanced southwards chasing the crumbling armies of 
the Directorate. 
 The British Military Mission in Ekaterinodar and also the 
Foreign Office representatives in Odessa supported Denikin in the 
Ukrainian question. General Briggs fully understood Denikin’s irritation 
about the French activities and also saw how dangerous the situation in 
the Ukraine was. Alarming reports from South Russia led the Foreign 
Office to instruct Lord Derby, the ambassador in Paris to ask the French 
Government not to jeopardise the anti-Bolshevik struggle by abusing the 
Volunteer Army and negotiating with the Petliurists.
115
  
 The situation in the Ukraine deteriorated fast. The French 
troops fought extremely badly in the first confrontation in the middle of 
March with Ataman Grigoriev’s partisans, who were at the time allies of 
the Bolsheviks. The important towns of Kherson and Nikolaev fell into 
Bolshevik hands after a brief resistance ‒ and with them the supplies 
denied from the Volunteers. The French troops were completely 
demoralized as they withdrew to Odessa. The commander of the French 
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forces made public announcements that the city would not be 
surrendered to the Bolsheviks. However, the decision to evacuate had 
already been made. The French troops were hastily evacuated from 
Odessa on 4 April leaving most of the Russian population to its own 
devices. A British general described the whole French intervention as ‘a 
colossal blunder’, which climaxed in the Odessa debacle.116 The 
catastrophe was repeated in the Crimea when the French Navy supposed 
to defend Sevastopol mutinied and the city had to be evacuated. The 
ships of the Russian Black Sea Navy, which the French had also denied 
to Denikin, were sunk in the harbour. Most of the Ukraine and the 
Crimea was now in Bolshevik hands, and the Allies’ prestige in Russia 
had suffered deplorably in Russia.  
 The task of being a British ad hoc ambassador in South 
Russia was far too demanding for General Briggs. He was a cavalry 
officer, not a diplomat. These difficult political duties ‒ that should not 
have been his responsibility in the first place ‒ seriously hampered his 
concentration on his primary task: organizing military support to 
Denikin. The War Office decided to replace him with Major-General 
H.C. Holman, who had more experience in quartermaster duties. 
Holman had served as the Quartermaster-general of the VI Army on the 
Western Front. Despite Denikin’s protests over British policies, General 
Briggs had, however, earned Denikin’s personal respect. The events of 
the last day of Briggs’ service in South Russia, 12 June 1919, illustrate 
well the contradictory situation. A great dinner party was organized in 
his honour and the Russian generals praised the work Briggs had done 
for the White Army in their speeches. However, when Briggs left the 
party he was handed Denikin’s government’s official protest to HM 
Government for recognizing the independence of Finland.
117
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5.   DENIKIN’S WAR 
 
      5.1. The March to Moscow 
 In the spring of 1919 the Whites took the initiative in the 
southern front of the Civil War. The Bolsheviks had transported troops 
from the south to the Siberian Front to halt Kolchak’s renewed offensive 
in March. Kolchak’s advance had been repulsed but his forces had not 
been defeated and they were still tying down several Red Armies. The 
situation in the Ukraine was also extremely difficult for the Bolsheviks. 
Several groups of peasant partisans were harassing their rear areas and 
entire demoralized Red units were joining the bands of peasant atamans 
Grigoriev and Makhno. 
 The Volunteer Army had stabilized the front in the Donbass 
area in April. The Volunteers were now commanded by General Mai-
Maevskii as Denikin had taken overall command of the AFSR in 
January 1919. Mai-Maevskii, despite his reputation of being a drunkard 
and womanizer, has been described as one of Denikin’s ablest 
commanders.
118
 The White histories point to Mai-Maevskii’s clever use 
of the railway network to move units of the Volunteer army from one 
crisis point to another. Thus, he was able first to repel the Red attacks 
and then to break through their lines in May, despite the fact that his 
army of only 12,000 men was fighting an enemy twice as strong. In June 
Mai-Maevskii continued his advance into the Ukraine.
119
 The British 
sources partly dispel the legend of White victory in the Donbass. British 
observers, attached to Mai-Maevskii’s units reported that the region was 
actually freed with very little fighting as the Bolsheviks retired without 
offering much resistance.
120
 The speedy advance of the Volunteers 
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seems to be as much a result of demoralization of the Red troops 
harassed by the Ukrainian peasants as of Mai-Maevskii’s brilliant 
tactics.  
 Mai-Maevskii’s success, however, also eased pressure on the 
Don Front. The new ataman, General Bokaevskii, with his commander 
in chief, General Sidorin, had reorganized the Don Army and started to 
clear up the voisko. This was greatly helped by the risings in the 
northern stanitsas (Cossack settlements). The poorer Cossacks of the 
North had earlier rebelled against the Novocherkassk government and 
opened the front to the Bolsheviks. But now, after a brief but extremely 
harsh period of Red rule, they were ready to rejoin the Don Army. 
Bogaevskii’s Army rapidly doubled its strength and had liberated the 
whole voisko by June. 
 In the east the Caucasian Army, commanded by General 
Wrangel and mainly consisting of Kuban Cossacks, started to advance 
towards Tsaritsyn (later renamed Stalingrad and again Volgograd). 
Wrangel’s cavalry dispersed the 10th Red Army in the battle of Manych 
River in May. Three weeks later his army had marched 300 kilometres 
and was at the gates of Tsaritsyn. The exhausted Caucasian Army was, 
however, stopped by the strong Red defence. Wrangel had to wait until 
the Ekaterinodar-Tsaritsyn railway was repaired and more troops and 
heavy weapons could be sent to support the attack. With the aid of a 
Volunteer infantry division and British tanks and aeroplanes, Wrangel 
was finally able to conquer the city.
121
 The battle of Tsaritsyn was 
perhaps the biggest White victory in the Civil War. Tsaritsyn was one of 
the most important Russian industrial cities and it was also a gate along 
the Volga to central Russia. Also the amount of booty was enormous, 
although the numbers given by Wrangel appear somewhat exaggerated; 
two armoured trains, over a hundred locomotives, 10,000 railway cars, 
of which over 2,000 were laden with munitions, 70 field guns and 300 
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machine guns. In addition, Wrangel claims that his army captured 
40,000 Red soldiers.
122
 The battle of Tsaritsyn was no doubt a great 
personal victory for General Wrangel, whose credibility strengthened 
considerably within the White Army. 
 Denikin arrived in Tsaritsyn to celebrate the victory. 
Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav and Tsaritsyn were now in White hands and the 
Don voisko was also freed from the Bolsheviks. The next target would 
be Moscow, whose capture was for the Whites a symbol of the ultimate 
Bolshevik defeat. Denikin declared in the famous ‘Moscow Directive’ 
his plan for the White strategy on 3 May.
123
 The three main armies of the 
AFSR would advance along the main approaches to Moscow. The 
Volunteer Army in the west would attack along the main Kursk-Orel-
Tula-Moscow railway and would also advance simultaneously to Kiev 
thus conquering the Ukraine. Secondly, the Don Army would advance 
along the Voronez-Riazan railway-line and its western parallel line. 
Thirdly, Wrangel would attack with his Caucasian Army along the main 
line through the Volga area to Nizhnyi-Novgorod and then turn west 
towards Moscow. 
 The plan appeared very simple and Denikin had become very 
optimistic during the victorious months of May and June. However, not 
all of the White generals shared Denikin’s enthusiasm. In addition to the 
Red Army, simply the vast distances were against the Whites. Mai-
Maevskii’s and Sidorin’s armies were supposed to advance from 400 to 
500 kilometres and Wrangel over 700 km. The battle strength of 
Denikin’s army hardly exceeded 100,000 men at the time and the long 
front was already thinly manned. In addition, the troops were tired after 
the two months of continuous fighting. The Whites had conquered 
enormous areas, but the governance of these lands had not been 
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organized. Peasant partisans who had speeded up the White advance by 
harassing the Bolsheviks now turned their attention towards the 
‘counter-revolutionaries’, especially in the Ukraine, which was 
considered the main route to Moscow and victory.
124
 
 Denikin’s loudest critic was Wrangel. He described Denikin’s 
plan later as ‘the death sentence of the Armed Forces of the South 
Russia’. He argued that the advance should not be started before the rear 
had been organized and, moreover, the whole Army should be 
concentrated on a single spearhead instead of three separate forces.
125
 
Wrangel was not satisfied with Denikin’s leadership. He started to 
criticize his Commander-in-Chief publicly, which seriously undermined 
the cohesion of the White movement. 
 The Moscow Directive and Denikin’s strategy were also 
discussed and commented on in the British Mission. Many of the British 
officers agreed with Wrangel’s criticism. For them too, Denikin’s plan 
appeared to ignore a very fundamental principle of warfare taught in 
every military academy ‒ the concentration of force at a critical time and 
place. Especially the more junior of the officers greatly admired the 
dashing cavalry commander, and some even argued that Wrangel should 
be appointed Commander-in Chief instead of Denikin. Moreover, the 
British clearly saw ‒ because of the main task of their mission ‒ the 
disorganization of the rear and, hence, the problems of supply as a fatal 
weakness in Denikin’s plan. As the troops would advance towards 
Moscow the distance to the base area at the Black Sea coast would 
become too long. The supply system of the White army was not in a 
position to handle the situation. General Holman warned Denikin about 
the dangers of his plan and advised him to reconsider. On the other 
hand, Holman understood Denikin’s decision ‒ there simply was no time 
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for reorganization. The Red Army was growing stronger and stronger 
every day. In addition, Denikin did not dare to concentrate all the troops 
on the western sector and thus leave Don and Volga fronts open to 
Bolshevik attacks.
126
  
 Despite all the criticism Denikin’s march to Moscow started 
successfully. The Volunteer Army, supported by the ships of the Royal 
Navy, advanced along the Black Sea coast conquering the Crimea and 
Odessa. In the central Ukraine, Poltava and finally Kiev were taken in 
the end of August. This, of course, was an important victory to the 
Whites, but on the other hand, the troops were now dispersed along an 
even longer front and more and more units were needed to suppress 
Makhno’s and other partisan bands. On the Volga Front, Wrangel took 
Kamyshin and advanced towards Saratov. His cavalry patrols even 
contacted Kolchak’s Ural Cossacks, but a proper liaison with the 
Siberian White army was never achieved as the Admiral was rapidly 
retreating to the east. It was only on the central part of the front that the 
Whites were not achieving any notable success. The Don Cossacks, as 
Denikin had expected, were not willing to move outside their voisko. 
 
5.2. The Nature of  Warfare 
 The officers of the British Mission observed meticulously the 
operations of both the White and the Red armies. It was soon found out 
that the operational reports of the Whites could not always be trusted. 
The Russian tradition of deceiving one’s superiors with favourably false 
and exaggerated reporting flourished in Denikin’s Army causing serious 
problems as the commanders did not have a realistic picture of the state 
of affairs at the front. This was admitted even by General Lukomskii, 
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Denikin’s chief of staff.127 The British Mission started to gather 
intelligence independently for its own use and also for the reports that 
were sent to London. In addition to the senior officers’ official visits to 
the front, British advisers who were attached to White units sent regular 
intelligence reports to the Mission HQ. The results were often rather 
controversial and the picture of the Russian Civil War appears 
somewhat different from the one described in either the White memoirs 
or the Soviet histories.  
 The battles fought between the Whites and Reds in South 
Russia were very different from the war at the Western Front, where 
many of the British officers had served. The British Army had painfully 
learned its lessons during the costly battles of 1914-17. During these 
long years the operational and tactical thinking of the Army had evolved 
immensely. With the sophisticated amalgamation of the fire-power of 
infantry, artillery and air arms the British had succeeded in breaking the 
stalemate of the trench warfare and changing to offensive ‘war of 
movement’ in late summer 1918. This ‘Battle of One Hundred Days’ 
had eventually led to the capitulation of the German Army.
128
 The 
Russian Army had been, however, less successful in developing its 
doctrine during the World War. Throughout the war the Russian 
offensives had followed a notorious pattern: after a massive, but 
ineffective, artillery barrage the massed infantry formations had marched 
towards the enemy lines only to be annihilated by enemy artillery and 
machine gun fire. Even if the infantry managed to break into enemy 
positions, it was soon beaten back by counterattacks. The only 
exemption was perhaps General Brusilov’s successful advance against 
the Austrians in summer 1916, which, however, did not lead to anything 
as the other Russian commanders failed in their operations. The 
conservative White generals appeared to have been unable to learn much 
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from the defeats of the war. Being used to the ‘slogging matches’ of the 
Eastern Front they were baffled when forced to fight the altogether more 
fluid battles of the Civil War, and tried stubbornly to return to the old 
methods of the Imperial Army. 
 The White operations followed a fixed pattern during the 
rapid advance of Denikin’s Army in the late spring and summer of 1919. 
The theatre of operations consisted mostly of vast open rolling plains 
with no built roads, but with freedom of movement, interrupted only by 
rivers and marshes. The problem of supply, however, usually confined 
big operations to the vicinity of the railways. A typical White attack of 
this period commenced rapidly. The cavalry operated on the flanks and 
the armoured trains reconnoitred and engaged the enemy. The infantry 
followed in light peasant carts, droshkies, which also carried machine 
guns. When the enemy was sighted the cavalry and the carts containing 
the infantry moved against them at a gallop. The artillery often had 
enormous difficulties to follow the advance and, thus, the attacks were 
supported by very light covering fire. The Red troops usually dispersed 
in an equally speedy retreat, avoiding contact, and the White advance 
continued. This procedure was later also adapted by the Reds.
129
 
Denikin’s army covered great distances daily. But, as the troop 
movements were concentrated on the railways, the frontlines defining 
huge conquered areas existed only on the maps of the White 
headquarters. In fact, cavalry patrols of both sides and bands of peasant 
partisans moved rather freely between the railways. 
 Machine guns and modern artillery had ended the era of 
massed cavalry charges on the Western Front as early as 1914. However, 
in South Russia the war was waged, as one British officer described, in a 
‘Napoleonic atmosphere’130 ‒ the fire-power of opposing armies was 
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essentially lower than in the battles of the First World War in the West. 
This explains the important role the cavalry played in Denikin’s 
offensive and in the Russian Civil War in general. The bulk of the White 
cavalry and, indeed, large part of the whole AFSR effective manpower 
consisted of Cossack units from the Don and Kuban. These Cossacks 
were still in a sense pre-modern warriors. They still regarded sabre and 
lance as their main weapons and considered the traditional lava semi-
envelopment charge as a decisive manoeuvre in a battle. In the classic 
lava, two sotnias (squadrons) of the Cossack regiment advanced ahead 
extended in line, with three sotnias in close formation in the rear. When 
some two hundred metres from the enemy, the first line divided into two 
sections, which sprang outwards to attack both flanks of the enemy, 
while the rear sotnias engaged the enemy front. On the other hand, the 
Cossacks despised openly fighting on foot with rifles as mounted 
infantry and this was generally not rehearsed in training.
131
 The 
traditional cavalry tactics were indeed effective, as often only the sight 
of a galloping mass of sabre wielding and yelling Cossacks was enough 
to make poorly trained and unmotivated Red infantrymen flee. Such an 
attack was, however, easily repulsed by perhaps only a company of 
determined and properly positioned infantry with a few machine guns.  
 Outdated tactics were not the only problem with the 
Cossacks. The White ideology of restoration of a ‘Holy and Undivided 
Russia’ was not very appealing to an average Cossack. They had 
generally two reasons for fighting: defending their traditional way of life 
in the home stanitsas and the prospect of booty. The Don Cossacks 
proved very unreliable outside their own voisko. General Mamontov did 
not obey instructions during his famous raid and his force turned soon 
into not much more than a band of marauders. According to General 
Holman’s opinion, the most important cavalry leader of the Civil War 
was not Wrangel or any of the Whites but the developer of the Red 
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Cavalry, Semen Budenny. This ex-Imperial Army NCO appeared 
capable to Holman and to have understood the potential of cavalry in a 
wider context ‒ also as a highly mobile mounted infantry ‒ and above 
all, seemed to have followed the orders of his superiors more frequently 
than his White counterparts.
132
 Budenny himself criticized his enemy for 
sticking blindly to the book and for his inability to evolve his cavalry 
tactics to the conditions of the Civil War.
133
 
 The quality of infantry in Denikin’s army varied greatly from 
excellent but small Volunteer Army units, like the Kornilov, the Markov 
and the Drozdovskii Regiments, which were composed largely of 
officers and military cadets, to far more numerous low-quality 
formations of peasant conscripts. Since the summer of 1919, the bulk of 
manpower on both sides of the frontline was these peasants lacking both 
enthusiasm and training. Denikin’s unit commanders regarded these 
peasants literally as gun-fodder and their training usually consisted of 
nothing more than a simple parade-ground drill. White officers were 
generally sure of the peasant’s inability to perform any but the simplest 
manoeuvre on the field. As in the battles of the Imperial Army during 
the World War, the troops were herded into massed formations and 
simply made to walk forward, their platoon officers in front and 
sergeants behind ready to shoot any man who left his place.  
 Morale in peasant infantry formations was indeed very low. 
These men could hardly consider ‒ obviously far less than the Cossacks 
‒ the White cause worth risking their lives. In addition, Denikin’s staff 
had paid very little attention to winning the loyalty of the peasants. 
There was no Red Army-style propaganda machine in Denikin’s Army. 
It was alien to the Russian officers’ tradition and mentality to explain the 
purpose of the war and reason for fighting to the men.
134
 The Russian 
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peasant has also been described as a natural pacifist and accordingly the 
Civil War was widely condemned by them as fratricide.
135
 
 The British observers noted that the peasant conscripts had no 
interest in keeping their weapons in order and were generally bad shots. 
The main weapon of the Civil War, used by both armies, was the 
Russian Moisin Nagant M91 service rifle. Although a powerful and 
accurate design, it is definitely not an ideal weapon for an untrained and 
unmotivated conscript. Also machine guns lost their effectiveness, 
despite their considerable number in the frontline units. A British 
machine gun instructor noted that the Russians were in most cases 
unaware of basic tactics. They considered machine gun merely as a 
static defensive weapon. Indirect support-fire over the heads of their 
own attacking troops, which was a routine task of machine gunners in 
the Western Front, was out of the question because of the high 
probability that the reckless gunners would just slaughter their own men. 
Lack of maintenance also caused technical problems and a considerable 
number of the machine guns of the units were often not serviceable.
136
 A 
further problem was the enormous consumption of ammunition of this 
automatic weapon firing 500 rounds per minute. Trigger-happy machine 
gunners rattling away with their numerous guns were apparently the 
main reason for the chronic lack of small arms ammunition (the Russian 
version of Maxim machine gun  and M91 rifle took the same 7.62 mm 
cartridge) in both the White and Red armies during the Civil War. 
 Artillery was rarely a decisive arm in the Russian Civil War. 
‘No roar of artillery, only two batteries firing here and there,’ was one 
British officer’s description of the battlefield on the Don Front.137 The 
British noted that the Russians were generally very conservative in their 
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views on artillery tactics. As during the World War, there was no real 
co-operation between artillery and infantry, but both were fighting their 
own battles and artillery was not giving attacking or defending infantry 
continuous fire-support. The batteries were placed unconcealed in the 
open and in full view of the enemy and were thus vulnerable to its 
artillery and machine guns. The reason for this was the fact that the 
Russians still mainly observed their fire directly from the batteries, and 
indirect fire or shooting from the map was disregarded as ‘unsuitable for 
Russian conditions’ or considered inaccurate and dangerous for their 
own troops. The Russians did not usually have any fire plans, and they 
were completely ignorant of modern tactics such as creeping barrages 
and predicted and concentrated ‘hurricane’ bombardments, although 
these were the tactics that the Germans had used successfully also on the 
Eastern Front and led to enormous casualties for the Russian Army.
138
 
Despite having a sufficient number of guns in their use, the artillery 
commanders were afraid of concentrating too many batteries on the 
same area.  This actually prevented them, together with primitive tactics, 
from achieving any decisive results. In addition, horse-drawn gun teams 
‒ not to mention ammunition supplies ‒ had extreme difficulties to keep 
up with fast-moving cavalry and infantry formations, and similarly 
during the retreat they were unable to extricate their guns. The moral 
effect of artillery fire was often, however, important. A few even 
harmlessly distant explosions of shells were sometimes enough to 
disperse badly-trained troops.
139
  
 The misuse of the artillery appears to be one of the fatal 
mistakes of the White Army. Later events revealed that fire-power 
provided by the artillery proved decisive also in the Civil War 
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conditions. It was the properly delivered ‘drum-fire’ of the Polish 
artillery that stopped the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw in July 1920. 
The same tactics used by the Reds broke the White defences in the 
Crimea in November of the same year.
140
 Apparently, the artillery tactics 
used in these two battles were rather crude compared to those of British 
or German artillery of 1918, but in both cases enough batteries were 
concentrated in a critical area and there was a plan for allocating the fire 
of these batteries. 
 A comparison of two, White and British, reports of a typical 
battle at the Don Front illustrates well the nature of warfare in South 
Russia. The official 1st Don Corps’s report describes ‘the fierce but 
victorious battle’ as follows: ‘the enemy advanced in strength from the 
direction of Ushanovka village, north-west from Tsaritsyn. The attack 
was, however, repulsed and heavy casualties were inflicted by the 
accurate fire of our artillery and machine guns.’ The report from a 
British instructor, who witnessed the battle, appears quite different:  
The White battery (equipped with British 18-pounders) opens up 
with maximum elevation after the fire control team has sighted a 
small enemy group on the steppe in the distance of 7,000 yards. A 
4.5” howitzer battery joins in, firing rounds here and there without 
any recognisable targets in sight. A Bolshevik battery returns with 
a couple of rounds, which explode harmlessly over 1,000 yards 
before the White trenches. White artillery stops firing after about 
30 minutes. 
Afterwards the British observer, Major Williamson, enquired from the 
corps commander what was the reason for such wastage of ammunition. 
The uneasy Cossack general explained that the morale of the infantry 
was so low that it would have started to retreat after the first sight of the 
enemy if the artillery had not immediately opened fire. The general 
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added that for the same reason the machine guns opened up at a distance 
of 2,000 metres. When asked question, ‘how on earth was the fire 
control team cooking their breakfast on an open fire at their observation 
post?’, he declined to answer.141 
 British observers were generally not impressed by the 
operations of Denikin’s troops. Decisive victories where large enemy 
formations were destroyed were seldom achieved. A typical battle ended 
as one of the opposing armies retreated. Moreover, there was hardly ever 
a serious attempt to pursue the enemy. It was always more important to 
loot the conquered city and celebrate the ‘victory’. The actual battle 
casualties in this kind of warfare remained naturally low. There were 
usually more cases of ‘missing in action’ in the opposing armies, which 
usually meant desertion or defection. The Russian Civil War was a very 
bloody war, but not because of its battles. Many more people died 
because of the Red and White terror in mass executions of captured 
soldiers or civilians in the conquered areas.
142
  
 This is not to say that large-scale and fierce battles never 
occurred during the civil war in South Russia. The largest battle in the 
South Russia and perhaps in the whole Civil War was the battle of 
Tsaritsyn in June-July 1919. This battle followed vaguely the script of 
the battles of the First World War with massed infantry and cavalry 
attacks on fixed defences. Wrangel proved to be a very traditional 
Russian general during this operation, as he ordered again and again his 
troops without effective supporting fire to charge the enemy field 
fortifications. The best units of his Caucasian Army were in Wrangel’s 
words ‘bled white’ in these attacks against the hail of Red machine gun 
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and artillery fire. Wrangel naturally accused Denikin of not providing 
him with enough artillery for preliminary bombardment, but he never 
questioned his unimaginative and outdated infantry tactics. The Red 
defensive line was eventually penetrated with the help of British tanks 
and aircraft. 
 The fighting became fierce and bloody sometimes when elite 
units from both sides met in the battlefield. This was the case, for 
example, when Denikin’s advance was finally blocked at Orel, and the 
spearhead of the Volunteer Army was broken by the flank attack of the 
striking force composed of the Lettish Rifle Regiment ‒ Lenin’s 
praetorian guard ‒ and of the Red Army kurshanty (military cadets). The 
British observers well admitted the courage and even fanatism on both 
sides. They also often mention, however, the ‘cult of death’ among the 
Volunteer Army. The idealization of the ultimate personal sacrifice for 
the White cause was sadly popular in the best units.
143
 This, together 
with unhealthy images of courage, often led to numerous unnecessary 
casualties, which Denikin’s Army could hardly have afforded. In 
addition to almost suicidal offensive tactics, it was common for the elite 
units not to dig proper defensive positions as this was considered 
cowardice and trenches would not be needed to repulse the loathsome 
Bolsheviks. A British captain who served with the Kornilov Infantry 
Regiment during the autumn of 1919 described how the kornilovchy did 
not lie down or even kneel to fire their rifles at attacking Bolsheviks 
although the air was thick with machine gun-bullets and shell-
splinters.
144
 The Volunteer Army had indeed lost ‒ because of these 
heroic antics ‒ many of its most competent officers already during the 
Kuban and North-Caucasus campaigns in 1918 and early 1919, 
including generals Markov and Drozdovskii. Also Wrangel lost many of 
his regimental and battalion commanders during the battle for Tsaritsyn. 
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Even Denikin himself was not entirely free from this Volunteer spirit. 
General Briggs met Denikin at the Manych front in May 1919 only 
1,000 yards behind the firing line, shells passing continuously over and 
bursting nearby. Yet Denikin ‘was merry as a sand boy’ and told Briggs 
that he was enjoying himself away from the office and political 
worries.
145
 
 The military defects in Denikin’s army were numerous. These 
problems were sharply detected and often pointed out to Denikin’s staff. 
It was, however, impossible to make fundamental improvements in the 
chaotic conditions of the civil war. The White officers were, in addition, 
generally suspicious of the modernization of warfare, especially when 
suggested by foreign advisers. The White Army was indeed led by the 
conservative wing of the Imperial officer corps. These men had been, as 
Norman Stone stated, more or less guilty of failing to develop the 
Imperial Russian Army during the World War. Tactical innovations 
were neglected despite huge losses. Russia’s defeat in the war was 
explained by the corruption of the Home Front and by the treachery of 
the Bolsheviks. The new group of junior officers and general staff men 
that was emerging after the defeats of 1916 never got much authority in 
the Imperial Army ‒ nor in Denikin’s army. Their more radical thinking 
was however exploited in full by the Bolsheviks in the later stages of the 
Civil War.
146
 The British observers evaluated that it was not just the 
superiority of numbers (generally two to one or more) but Red Army’s 
ability to develop their use of firepower that brought them victory on the 
battlefield. It was the combined use of machine guns and artillery that 
broke the White attacks in the battles of autumn 1919. The development 
of the Red units’ was so astonishing that the British suspected the 
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Bolsheviks of having hired German officers to train and lead their 
troops.
147
 
 However, in summer 1919 Denikin’s army was fighting 
against an even weaker opponent. The offensive of the Armed Forces of 
South Russia seemed unstoppable despite all its defects. 
 
5.3. Concentrating on Denikin 
 Churchill received the news of Denikin’s success 
enthusiastically in London. In June and July 1919, however, different 
kinds of reports arrived from other parts Russia. The Bolsheviks had 
routed Kolchak at the battle of Cheliabinsk in the Urals, and the 
remnants of his armies were now disorderly retreating eastwards. It 
gradually became clear that Kolchak’s army no longer existed as a 
serious fighting force. Meanwhile, in North Russia, some of the Russian 
troops serving in General Ironside’s ‘British-Slavo-Legion’ had 
mutinied and after murdering their British officers defected to the 
Bolsheviks. The plan to build a White army in the North and to advance 
south-east to join forces with Kolchak had to be abandoned. The War 
Cabinet made the final decision to evacuate the British troops from both 
Siberia and North Russia before the coming winter. It had already been 
decided in March to withdraw the troops from Transcaucasia and the 
evacuation was completed by 28 August 1919. 
 Following Kolchak’s setbacks Churchill became even more 
convinced of Denikin’s central role in the White movement. The first 
shipments of military supplies that had arrived Novorossiisk in March 
1919 had enabled Denikin to launch his offensive and, thus, showed the 
positive results immediately. On the other hand, Kolchak’s army had 
been defeated despite receiving an enormous amount of matériel. In fact, 
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the Reds had captured many of Kolchak’s supply depots full of British 
supplies, and whole Bolshevik regiments were now fighting in full 
British kit. ‘Thanks to Lloyd George!’, shouted a Bolshevik commissar 
to an astonished captured British soldier in Baku.
148
  
 The Chief of Imperial General Staff, General Wilson, 
supported Churchill’s views: Denikin’s victory was the only chance the 
Whites would have, and supporting him would be the most important 
point of the British government’s Russian policy. Accordingly, the War 
Office concentrated aid on Denikin’s army. Supplies, originally routed 
to Vladivostok, were diverted to South Russia. These shipments 
included arms and equipment for a further 225,000 men. In addition, it 
was decided that any possible financial aid would be diverted from 
Kolchak to Denikin.
149
 
 In the Baltic, General Iudenich did not appear much more 
successful than Kolchak. The Bolsheviks repelled his North-Eastern 
Army’s attack on Petrograd in May. Finland was not ready to join 
Iudenich’s operation without full support from the Allies, and more 
importantly, without recognition of her sovereignty by the Whites. The 
small Baltic nations were even more suspicious of Iudenich’s plans, and 
had actually started secretly to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. Hence, the 
British War Office planned to ship the whole 20,000-strong army of 
Iudenich to South Russia. It was thought to be more useful there under 
Denikin’s command.150 However, this plan was never executed, as 
Iudenich started his final attack on Petrograd in October 1919, which led 
eventually to defeat and destruction of the whole army little more than a 
month later. Evan Mawdsley has argued that if the Allies had intended 
‘a serious and general anti-Soviet campaign the Petrograd Province 
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would have been an ideal theatre’. He points out rightly the short line of 
communications, the moral significance of the old capital, and relatively 
short distance to Moscow.
151
 However, perhaps the most important 
component for a serious campaign against the Bolsheviks was a 
sufficiently strong White force that was considered worth supporting by 
the Allies, and exactly this was missing in the Baltic. Not even Churchill 
considered that an offensive against Moscow would be solely executed 
by Allied (i.e. British) troops, as would evidently have been the case in 
the Petrograd theatre. There was no Volunteer Army or Cossacks in the 
Baltic and Iudenich was not Denikin. 
 The tanks sent to Denikin had proved to be especially 
effective and Churchill tried hard to fulfil Military Mission’s urgent 
request for more of these vehicles. The Army on the Rhine had had the 
priority on the General Staff’s supply list, but Churchill bluntly 
informed his subordinates that tanks would be much more useful in 
South Russia. He also decided that tanks would not be sent to Siberia 
anymore. The General Staff succeeded eventually in collecting 56 heavy 
Mark V and 18 light Whippet tanks from depots in Britain and France, 
and these were shipped to Novorossiisk.
152
  
 Churchill worked hard in the Cabinet to gain support for 
Denikin. On 4 July he gave the Cabinet an eloquent and colourful 
account of the events in South Russia pointing out all the victories of the 
Whites and the names of the numerous liberated cities. According to his 
over-optimistic calculations, Denikin’s Armed Forces of South Russia 
had increased in strength to 600,000 (in reality it numbered no more 
than 150,000 at the time). Churchill also tried to convince his colleagues 
that the reports of atrocities committed by the White troops were 
absolutely false. Unlike his Bolshevik enemies, Denikin was fighting an 
honourable and humane war. The position of the Whites was especially 
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favourable and Churchill urged the Cabinet to define the British policy 
accordingly. The northern coast of the Black Sea would soon be in 
Denikin’s hands, and Britain should immediately start commerce in the 
area. This would be a very effective way to support Denikin as the 
people in the areas liberated from the Bolshevism would be able to buy 
all kind of consumer goods. This would be good for the British economy 
too. Churchill suggested a press announcement on the issue and that the 
Board of Trade should begin to encourage companies to start business in 
South Russia. Yet, the Cabinet did not reach any decision on the 
question of South Russia.
153
  
 At the end of July, the Cabinet discussed Denikin again and 
Churchill suggested that a clear policy of assistance, both military and 
economic should be designed. This support programme would be 
defined for example for six months, a point which the Russians should 
be made aware of. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer were strongly against such a commitment. According to 
them, it was impossible for Britain to support Denikin economically to 
any great extent. Firstly, Britain had no resources and, secondly, the 
situation in Russia was too unstable. The Cabinet decided that the War 
Office could continue to support Denikin as before, but the matériel 
given should mainly consist of supplies that the British armed forces 
were not able to use themselves ‒ Churchill had succeeded in 
convincing Lloyd George that it was actually cheaper to ship this 
ordnance material to Russia than to store it for indefinite periods. In 
addition, the War Office was authorised to use a sum of £100,000 to 
purchase supplies not found in depots.
154
 
 While Denikin continued his advance towards Moscow, 
conquering city after city, Churchill continued his own battle at 
Whitehall. Opinions in the Cabinet started, however, to turn 
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unfavourable towards his cause. Gradually he lost almost all support 
outside of his own ministry. The situation had become very complicated 
as Denikin’s success actually had made other ministers cautious. The 
benefits of the White victory did not convince everybody in the Cabinet. 
The White generals were considered reactionary and the possibility of a 
military dictatorship of one of these generals was thought to be the most 
probable result of Denikin’s victory ‒ not a democratic Russia and free 
election of the Constitutional Assembly. Moreover, it was to be 
expected that the Whites would turn against the Border States in the 
Caucasus and the Baltic area immediately after their victory over the 
Bolsheviks. 
 Churchill’s most ardent and also influential opponent after the 
Prime Minister Lloyd George was the Foreign Secretary Curzon. 
Curzon’s hatred for the Bolsheviks was almost as great as Churchill’s, 
but his affection for the White cause much smaller. He was not eager to 
spend millions to help Denikin, who after overthrowing the Bolsheviks, 
would simply return to the South and conquer the Caucasian republics. 
This would only mean, according to Curzon, who had made his career in 
India, the return of the perennial Russian threat against the British 
Empire in India and Persia. On the other hand, Lloyd George, who had 
been lukewarm towards Churchill’s Russian policy right from the start, 
did not appear really to have believed in Denikin’s chances and 
considered the Bolsheviks de facto rulers of Russia. He told his 
ministers that if ‘Denikin really had the people behind him, the 
Bolsheviks could never overcome him; but he must help himself, not 
expect endless help from Britain.’ He also still entertained the idea of a 
peaceful settlement in Russia. The Cabinet concluded that the War 
Office should prepare ‘a final contribution’ to send to Denikin, and to 
send a political commissioner to South Russia to observe the 
situation.
155
 Military Mission’s problems relating to the complex 
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political situation in South Russia were thus taken into account by the 
Cabinet, but Lloyd George and Curzon obviously also wanted 
information from Russia which did not come via Churchill’s War 
Office. 
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  6.  ARMING THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION 
 
6.1. Supplying the White Army with British Weapons and    
Equipment 
 The amount of matériel supplied by Britain to the Armed 
Forces of South Russia was enormous. It included full British army kit 
for half a million men, 1,200 field guns with almost two million rounds 
of ammunition, 6,100 machine guns, 200,000 rifles with 500 million 
rounds of ammunition, 629 lorries and motorcars, 279 motorcycles, 74 
tanks, six armoured cars, 200 aircraft, twelve 500-bed hospitals, 25 field 
hospitals and a vast amount of signal and engineer equipment.
156
 All this 
was sufficient for an army of 250,000 men and it was actually much 
more than Denikin was ever able to use, as the combat strength of his 
army never exceeded 150,000 men.
157
 
 The first five ships arrived at Novorossiisk in March 1919 
bringing 13,000 tons of these dearly needed supplies to Denikin’s 
exhausted Army. This first ‘packet’ included several batteries of 
artillery, 12 tanks, thousands of small arms, 7,500 tons of ammunition, 
and 5,000 tons of general stores (e.g. uniforms).
158
 Despite the victory at 
the North Caucasus the military situation was most alarming. The Don 
Army was on the verge of collapse and the Bolsheviks were rapidly 
advancing into the Voisko. The morale of the Volunteers was not much 
better following the tremendous casualties suffered during the recent 
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fierce fighting. The pressure on the AFSR had decreased, however, as 
Kolchak had started his spring offensive in Western Siberia on 1 March 
and the Bolsheviks had to transport many of their divisions to halt the 
White forces already threatening Kazan. This gave Denikin time to 
reorganize his army and to begin to issue the troops with the new 
matériel supplied by the British. Denikin succeeded in regaining 
momentum. As described in the previous chapter, the Whites cleared the 
Bolsheviks out of the Donetz Basin and the Don and conquered 
Tsaritsyn. The offensive was entirely dependent on the arrival of British 
aid. Denikin’s army had lacked everything from field guns to boots and 
in April the White troops were firing their last rounds. The effect on 
morale that came with the new weapons and equipment was almost as 
important as their pure material value.
159
 
 Transportation and the issue of the matériel to the troops was 
not a simple task. Between Novorossiisk and the Front was the 
enormous chaos of Russia ravaged by the years of war and revolution. 
The original agreement between Denikin’s HQ and the British Mission 
stipulated that the matériel became Russian property immediately up on 
arrival in Novorossiisk harbour, and, in effect, the British had no real 
control over its distribution to the forces. It soon became obvious that 
the supply service of Denikin’s Army was not capable of executing the 
task. Consequently, arms, ammunition and equipment started to 
accumulate at the Novorossiisk docks during the spring and early 
summer, and shiploads of invaluable supplies either rotted or rusted 
beyond repair.
160
 
 The original Russian plan had been to transport the supplies 
to depots behind the Front where they were to be issued to the troops. If 
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supplies ever arrived through the abysmal railway network, they tended, 
again, to accumulate at these depots. In addition, Russian ordnance 
officers were very bad bookkeepers. Depot commanders usually had no 
detailed records of the matériel in their possession, and army HQs had 
no knowledge about what was stored and where. The protection of these 
depots was also seriously neglected, although the Red or Green partisans 
regularly attacked them. The worst incident was Makhno’s attack at 
Berdiansk where his band looted and destroyed an ammunition depot of 
62,000 artillery rounds and 65 million rounds of small arms 
ammunition.
161
 Also Budenny, the Red cavalry commander, claimed to 
have captured an important part of his supplies, including British 
uniforms, from the raids to Don Army depots.
162
 
 The British soon noticed that the numerous rear echelon 
troops were often much better clothed than the men in the frontline. It 
was very fashionable to wear a military uniform even amongst the civil 
service of Denikin’s government ‒ this kit was usually a British khaki. 
Corrupted ordnance officers sold thousands of sets of uniforms to the 
civilians. A made-over British nurse’s uniform was also reported to be a 
common outfit of the Novorossiisk prostitutes. Hospital beds and sheets 
often ended up not in hospitals but in the private homes of military and 
civilian officials.
163
 But, not only Russians were to blame for 
profiteering;  British officers and NCOs were sometimes caught selling 
military supplies to civilians and also holding currency exchange rackets 
in cities.
164
  
 In addition to this general chaos with supply services, 
Denikin was accused of favouring his loyal Volunteer Army at the 
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expense of the Don and the Caucasus Armies.  The Volunteer units 
fighting in the Donetz Basin along the Taganrog-Kharkov railway line 
were, indeed, generally well supplied with the British arms and 
equipment towards the end of May. The effect on morale was enormous 
when the men of the ‘Iron Brigade’ went to battle wearing brand new 
British khaki and steel helmets.
165
 However, the first British arms did 
not reach the Don Army units until the end of June 1919. Not a single 
British uniform had reached the front, but the Cossacks were wearing a 
ragged mixture of old Imperial Army uniforms and peasant clothes. A 
third of the men were without boots and to the astonishment of a British 
observer some Cossacks even wore captured German pickelhäube as 
headgear.
166
  General Sidorin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Don 
Army, put the blame also on the British, complaining regularly that they 
were supplying only the Volunteers as his Cossacks received next to 
nothing and when something arrived it was rubbish. Records of the 
British supply base at Novorossiisk prove indeed that the amount of 
matériel distributed to the Don Army was much smaller than the amount 
received by the Volunteers ‒ despite the fact that the nominal strength of 
the Don Army was almost twice as large.
167
 Sidorin’s bitterness is 
understandable. The British role in subordinating the operational 
command of the Don Army under Denikin and General Poole’s 
behaviour was well remembered at the Don. At time, however, the 
distribution of aid was still decided by Denikin’s HQ, not by the British 
Mission.  
 The War Office was not satisfied with the slow progress and 
the limited effectiveness of the aid. It was considered necessary to 
replace General Briggs with a more competent quartermaster officer and 
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if possible with someone who had a better knowledge of Russian affairs. 
 The third commander of the Military Mission was to be General-Major 
H.C. Holman, the former quartermaster-general of General Rawlinson’s 
4th Army. Holman had served as a military attaché in the Russian Army 
during the Russo-Japanese war and was thus more familiar with the 
Russian Army. He was also fluent in Russian. After meticulous study of 
the Russian situation, Holman wrote a memorandum to Churchill in 
which he explained his plan to improve the performance of the Military 
Mission. Holman recognised the support of Denikin’s army in its battle 
to conquer Bolshevism as the ultimate task of the British Mission. 
Firstly, it was absolutely necessary to reorganize the Russian supply 
service. In effect, the British should take charge, because the Russians 
were evidently incapable of handling the situation. Naturally, it was not 
possible to nominate British officers to commanding posts in Denikin’s 
army, but rather they should operate ‘behind the curtains’. It was most 
important that only the most capable officers were chosen for this 
demanding task. Holman was actually not satisfied with the quality of 
the British officers serving in South Russia at the time, and clearly 
viewed their incompetence as a partial explanation for the unsatisfactory 
situation.
168
  Churchill approved Holman’s rather blunt memorandum. 
Holman’s policy meant an improvement in the Mission’s work but it 
also meant far deeper involvement in Denikin’s cause. 
 Holman started to execute his plan immediately after 
receiving the command of the Mission from General Briggs on 12 June 
1919. First, he established a base in Novorossiisk to supervise the 
unloading and sorting of the supplies, and in order to secure authority 
over the Russians he commissioned a brigadier as a base commandant. 
Secondly, he inaugurated a daily congress at the Mission headquarters, 
in order to improve co-operation between different branches of the 
Mission.
169
 According to his plan, he also started to send home officers 
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who were considered incapable in their duties and to replace them with 
volunteers he had personally selected. Both the British and the Russians 
generally welcomed the new energetic commander enthusiastically.
 170
 
 In spite of these improvements the supply organization still 
did not operate satisfactorily. An inspection carried out by Holman’s 
officers revealed that only a quarter of the matériel supplied by the 
British had reached the frontline troops by the end of July 1919. Holman 
wrote an unambiguous memorandum to Denikin. The Commander-in-
Chief called a conference of the heads of his administrative services and 
gave orders according to Holman’s suggestions. However, Denikin’s 
generals did not receive Holman’s open criticism as calmly as their 
Commander in Chief. All the senior generals first wanted to resign but 
they were, however, persuaded by Denikin to attend the conference. In 
the negotiations that lasted for several days Holman succeeded in 
convincing Denikin and his generals and they finally approved his 
policy on 6 September 1919. From this date on, when a ship arrived at 
Novorossiisk its cargo was received by the British base commandant. 
The supplies were then loaded, according to orders from the Mission 
headquarters, into a special train supervised by a British transport 
officer. In its destination the trainload was received, again by British 
officers who distributed the arms and equipment to the troops. The 
reorganization had an immediate effect on the supply system.  In the best 
case full equipment was issued to 15,000 men only five days after the 
matériel had arrived in Novorossiisk.
171
 The British Mission had gained 
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total control over supplies of the matériel. On the other hand the Mission 
had become an integral part of the organisation of Denikin’s Army. 
 
6.2. Training 
Training the Armed Forces of South Russia in the use of the new 
weapons was an integral part of the British aid. The disappointing 
effects of the vast British aid conferred on the Russians during the 
World War had proved that training was essential for any results. Not 
only were most of the types of British weapons technically new to 
Russians but the British instructors also discovered, as explained in the 
previous chapter, that their tactical use of artillery and machine guns was 
primitive. Denikin’s army had no functioning training organization with 
troops being rushed to the front after just a brief drill. Very few Russians 
had ever seen a tank and also Denikin’s air corps was in a deplorable 
state when the British arrived. The task of training the White forces was 
no less complicated than supplying them. 
 A small group of British artillery officers and NCOs began 
their work in the two artillery schools of the AFSR in May 1919.  One of 
them, the Volunteer Gunnery School, worked in Armavir on the site of 
the central artillery park of the Volunteer Army, and the other school, 
for the Don Army, was in Novocherkassk. The actual training was 
arranged by the Russians and only supervised by the few British. The 
British instructors also received strict orders from the Military Mission 
Command ‘not to interfere with the work of the Russians and not to hurt 
their feelings’.172 
 General Holman made an extensive tour of the military 
schools and batteries supplied with British guns after his arrival in South 
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Russia. He found the situation most unsatisfactory. In Holman’s own 
words, ‘much of the training was eye-wash’. The training given at the 
Russian schools had been far more theoretical than practical. For 
example, officers knew exactly how many yards of steel tape was used 
in the manufacture of an 18-pounder field gun, but they did not know 
how to remedy the most trivial defects and were generally ignorant of 
the maintenance this weapon required. The 18-pounder (being the main 
weapon of the Royal Artillery during the War, most of the guns supplied 
to Denikin were of this type) proved eventually to be technically too 
sophisticated a weapon in the hands of inexperienced Russian gunners. 
Holman soon discovered that training was generally chaotic. In some 
cases the personnel of complete batteries went through the training in 
the schools, but usually only a few officers and men actually arrived. 
Some batteries remained in the schools for several months, evidently 
avoiding combat service, but usually they were rushed to the front after 
a superficial instruction of only a few days.
173
 
 The careless and, on the other hand, conservative attitude of 
the Russian officers was a serious problem in the front line units. The 
Russians seemed not to be familiar with modern methods of fire control, 
but merely estimated the range and the bearing to the target. They were 
generally not interested in studying or applying the effective methods 
the Royal Artillery had developed during the last years of the war on the 
Western Front. During the battles the batteries usually fired 
uninterruptedly and consumed enormous quantities of ammunition on 
worthless targets, but afterwards little attention was paid to the 
maintenance of weapons and consequently the guns were rapidly made 
useless. The weapons were also often issued without the necessary spare 
parts.
174
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 As regards the machine guns supplied by the British, the 
situation was equally unacceptable. There was hardly any training 
organized at all and the guns were often delivered directly to the front. 
In spite of its similar appearance, the heavy Vickers machine gun was 
technically a more complicated weapon than the Russian Maxim. The 
usage of a light machine gun as a close support weapon for the infantry 
was totally new for the Russians. Their attitude towards the Lewis gun 
was at first very suspicious, although this weapon proved later most 
suitable for the fast moving type of warfare waged in South Russia.
175
 In 
conclusion, neither artillery nor machine guns at the front were effective 
and the maintenance of weapons generally deplorable. Training and 
supply were simply not properly coordinated. 
 Holman explained to Denikin and his staff in a series of 
negotiations the necessity for a radical change. White command finally 
approved his plan at the end of August 1919. A special training branch 
was founded at the General staff of the Mission to supervise and 
coordinate the training. The focus of the artillery training was moved 
from the schools to the front. In September more instructors arrived 
from Britain and commenced their work in the batteries effectively 
supervising the use of weapons in field conditions. The performance of 
Denikin’s artillery improved significantly after this reorganization.176 
 The machine gun training was reorganized by establishing 
special training companies in the divisions of the AFSR. After 
completing their course, these companies were sent to the front as 
complete units. The British also began to train Russian officers as 
instructors familiar with British weaponry. Altogether the British trained 
over 9,000 Russians in the use of Vickers and Lewis guns. The machine 
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gun companies trained and equipped by the British fought exceptionally 
well and retained their discipline even during the White collapse and 
general retreat towards the South.
177
 
 
6.3. Churchill’s Private Warriors 
 When the Imperial War Cabinet made the decision to send a 
military mission to South Russia, in defining the task of the mission, it 
clearly banned any involvement in combat operations. According to the 
official policy of March 1919, no fighting troops were to be sent to 
Russia; the British military personnel in Russia were only to train and 
supply the loyal Allies of the Great War.
178
 The intention of the Cabinet 
was to keep a low profile in its interventionist policies because of the 
domestic unpopularity of the operations in Russia. However, the reality 
in South Russia was very different from the official policy in London. 
The instructions from Churchill’s War Office contradicted the general 
policy. Individual officers and in some cases whole units of the Military 
Mission began to take part in combat operations to support the White 
army. 
 The White generals were very enthusiastic about the first 
twelve tanks that arrived at Novorossiisk in April 1919.  A special ‘Tank 
Detachment’ was founded by the Mission to train the Russians to use 
these war machines. Both technically and tactically, however, the tank 
was a totally new weapon in Russia and the training of Russian tank 
crews was far from complete when Denikin started his spring offensive 
in May 1919. Notwithstanding this lack he was determined to use his 
tanks in combat. The problem was solved by sending the British 
instructors to the front. In effect, the officers of the Royal Tank Corps 
started to act as tactical commanders of Denikin’s armoured corps and 
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also to take part in fighting as vehicle commanders and crew-
members.
179
 This was to be a common practice until the final evacuation 
of the Mission in March 1920. 
 After several successful engagements at the Donetz front the 
tanks were sent to support the Army of Caucasus, commanded by 
General P.N. Wrangel, when it launched its second attack against 
Tsaritsyn. The new weapon was dearly needed as the exhausted Kuban 
Cossacks proved unable to penetrate the multiple rings of trenches and 
barbed wire surrounding the city. The carefully planned operation, 
supported by aerial reconnaissance, was successful beyond all 
expectations. The tanks overcame the defence system with ease and their 
attack was a total surprise to the Bolsheviks. Five armoured trains 
surrendered when the tanks cut off their retreat to Tsaritsyn, one more 
was knocked out and in many cases the Bolshevik infantry fled at the 
first sight of these steel monsters. A British tank crew constantly 
manned the leading vehicle. The captain who was commanding this tank 
was actually severely wounded by a shell and Major Bruce, the C.O. of 
Military Mission’s tank detachment, took his place. These six tanks 
played an important role in the capture of Tsaritsyn and it was Major 
Bruce’s tank that led the White troops into the city.180 The famous 
tactician and military historian, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, later described the 
battle of Tsaritsyn as one of the finest feats of the Royal Tank Corps.
181
  
 As their colleagues in the tank arm, the artillery and machine 
gun instructors who served in the various units of the Armed Forces of 
South Russia took part in the fighting. The British officers often found 
the original non-combatant role frustrating and even humiliating. These 
men were very keen to show the effective use of weapons in practice to 
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the Russians. Major Williamson, an artillery supervisor attached to the 
Don Army, regularly demonstrated his fire control skills when visiting 
Cossack batteries in the front line, on one occasion damaging a Red 
armoured train and forcing it to retreat with his accurate fire. The same 
major also took part ‘out of pure interest’ in several cavalry charges of 
the Don Cossacks. His application to join General Mamontov in his 
notorious raid behind the Bolshevik lines was, however, turned down by 
General Holman.
182
 Another young officer, Captain Boustead, who 
served as a machine gun instructor in a Don infantry brigade also saw 
action regularly. According to his own account, he once saved the day 
by taking command of two Cossack companies. All the White officers 
had been killed and disorderly Cossacks were about to be slaughtered by 
a superior force of Red cavalry. Boustead actually repulsed one charge 
by firing a Lewis gun over the saddle of his horse and then organized the 
remnant of the Don companies to retreat.
183
 
 The command of the Mission was fully aware of the actions 
of its subordinates. In order to improve the training and effectiveness of 
the batteries, General Holman sent an assistant liaison officer to every 
major artillery unit ‘to assist and advise Russian battery commanders on 
any points that arose in action.’184 The General himself was no less 
active than his men and his example definitely did not encourage them 
to obey orders. According to some senior British officers, Holman 
apparently found office work and endless negotiations with Denikin’s 
generals frustrating and boring and started to visit the front more and 
more frequently. He rather recklessly boarded a RAF DH9 bomber 
several times ‘to throw some bombs on the Bolsheviks’ and even took 
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part in fighting near Kharkov in a tank.
185
 The possible death or capture 
of General Holman by the Bolsheviks would, no doubt, have been a 
severe embarrassment to the Cabinet. 
 On the other side of the front-line the members of the British 
Mission were clearly treated as combatants and participants in the Civil 
War when they arrived in Russia. Bolshevik propaganda tried to 
demoralize the British by promising certain torture and execution in the 
event of capture. British pilots, according to one leaflet, were instructed 
to be crucified. These promises came sadly true when Captain 
Frecheville and Lieutenant Couche, machine gun instructors in the Don 
Army, were captured by the Bolsheviks at Rostov in December 1919. 
They were stripped of their uniforms and beaten to death with sticks in a 
market square and their bodies were drawn after horses along the streets 
of Rostov.
186
 The five officers who went missing north of Tsaritsyn, and 
were never heard of again, obviously suffered similar fates. In a ruthless 
atmosphere such as this it must have been hard to maintain the role of 
outside observer or instructor. 
 Regardless of the original assignment by the Cabinet, combat 
missions became a natural part of the work of the Military Mission. 
Commanding generals, especially Holman, tried to support Denikin as 
best they could. The active role in operations played by the RAF and the 
Tank Corps was reported to the War Office, which was consequently 
fully aware of these actions.  The feats in South Russia did not, indeed, 
go unnoticed at Whitehall, as several officers of the Mission received 
high decorations for their service. 
                                            
185
 War Diary of ‘A-Detachment’, Summary of Events, December 1919, AIR I/1960, 
NA, de Wolff, unpublished ‘Memoirs’, de Wolff Papers, IMW, Lt-Col Lister, Diary 
entry 20 Dec 1919, Liddell Hart Centre, King’s College London. 
186
 Report by Capt. Anderson, AIR I, 1958/204/260/12, NA, and Report on Fate of 
Capt. Frecheville (undated), Lancaster Papers, IWM. 
   
 
119 
 Churchill paid a great deal of attention to the work of the 
Mission and, no doubt, he was satisfied. However, publicly he had to 
keep to the official policy line and declare that the support given to 
Denikin was only material and that the British worked only as observers 
and instructors. He was helped in this by the fact that casualties of the 
Mission stayed mercifully low in summer 1919. When the opponents of 
intervention enquired of Churchill about the work of the Mission at the 
Parliament he flatly denied that any British officers were being attached 
to Denikin’s combat units. At Cabinet meetings in July and August 
1919, he explained only slightly more openly that the members of the 
Mission had not taken part in combat operations, but some of them 
might have been involved in a coincidental fighting during their visits to 
the front.
187
 Later, in October at the peak of Denikin’s advance towards 
Moscow, when Churchill was again questioned about the intervention at 
a Cabinet meeting, he informed his government colleagues that only one 
officer had been slightly wounded and this was a proof of the non-
combatant role of the Mission. The wounded officer was apparently 
Captain Walsh of the Tank Corps, whose action and wounding during 
the battle of Tsaritsyn had been reported in British newspapers. 
However, at the time Churchill made this statement, two pilot officers 
had already been killed and several other members of the Mission 
wounded. The final casualty figure of the Mission, reported to the 
Cabinet by General Holman, was four killed, ten wounded and five 
missing who were later declared dead.
188
  
 The overall number of British casualties is difficult to count 
but it was definitely considerably higher than General Holman stated in 
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his final report. Military Mission’s war diary mention soldiers killed and 
wounded by the Red and Green partisans behind the front line, but these 
are not mentioned in Holman’s final report. The British war memorial at 
the Haidar Pasha cemetery in Istambul tells its own story. The memorial 
stone contains the names of 41 servicemen of the Military Mission, 13 
of the RAF and 18 of the Royal Navy who were killed in South Russia 
in 1918-1920.
189
 
 
6.4.   47th SQUADRON  RAF 
 The role played by the Royal Air Force in South Russia was 
the most obvious contradiction of official British policy in Russia. The 
original instructions of the Cabinet for the Royal Air Force detachment 
were to train Denikin’s aviation corps and supply it with British aircraft. 
Like the other members of the Military mission the airmen were not 
officially allowed to take part in combat operations. However, it soon 
became evident that it was impossible to develop Denikin’s air arm into 
an effective fighting force and it did not take long before the British 
instructor pilots started the operative flights themselves. Interestingly, 
the 47th Squadron that arrived together with the RAF training unit in 
Novorossiisk from Salonika in May 1919, was organizationally a normal 
combat unit of the Royal Air Force. Moreover, during the following 
summer the Squadron was reinforced with several fighter ‘aces’ that had 
volunteered to fight in Russia. Evidently, the Air Ministry ‒ also led by 
Churchill ‒ sent this unit not so much to train Russians but to provide 
direct air support for Denikin’s forces. 
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 The very first combat sorties were indeed executed as part of 
training. British pilot officers led the Russian manned planes on 
reconnaissance and bombing missions as a part of advanced training. 
The arrival of 47th Squadron coincided with Denikin’s spring offensive, 
and the command of the Military Mission decided to take more drastic 
measures to support the White forces. The ‘C’ Flight of the Squadron, 
equipped with DH9 light bombers, was ordered to Gniloaksaiskaia, one 
hundred kilometres south of Tsaritsyn. The flight was placed under the 
direct command of General Wrangel. The order defined clearly the task 
of the flight ‒ bombing and reconnaissance. However, the commanding 
officer was ordered to ascertain that all the men going to the front were 
volunteers.
190
 
 Like the tanks, the ‘C’ Flight played an important part in the 
Battle of Tsaritsyn. The British planes bombed and strafed the Red 
positions and lines of communication on a daily basis. The Flight also 
made dozens of reconnaissance sorties, photographing the Bolshevik 
defences and movements thus greatly helping Wrangel and his generals 
to plan the attack. The few planes of the Red air force could not prevent 
these operations and many of them were actually shot down or destroyed 
on the ground by the British. On the 20th July the commander of the 
Flight received a secret order from Wrangel’s headquarters. A spy had 
informed that an important meeting of Bolshevik commanders, 
including perhaps even Trotsky, was to take place in Tsaritsyn. A ‘C’ 
Flight DH9 completed the mission by completely destroying the house 
where the meeting was in progress with a single 112 lb bomb. Eighty 
Bolshevik commanders and commissars were later reported to have been 
killed, and there were rumours that Trotsky had left the building only 
half an hour before the attack. After the capture of Tsaritsyn several 
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British aviators were awarded with both the St. Vladimir’s and the St. 
George’s Crosses.191 
 The fighting did not end with the capture of Tsaritsyn. The 
Bolsheviks immediately launched a series of operations to retake this 
important city on the Volga. The original plan had been to move the 
British Squadron to the main front to support the Volunteer Army in its 
advance towards Moscow. However, Denikin decided to keep the planes 
for the defence of Tsaritsyn. The Squadron base was moved to 
Beketovka closer to the city, to give more effective range to the DH9’s. 
 In September the ‘C’ flight was strengthened with the ‘B’ 
Flight equipped with Sopwith Camel fighters. Probably the best fighters 
of the time flown by experienced ‘ace’ pilots were a most welcome 
supplement to Denikin’s air arm. At first, these fighters were needed to 
protect the bombers against dangerously increasing Bolshevik air 
activity. The Camels engaged in fierce air battles with Bolshevik 
Albatrosses and Fokkers possibly flown by German mercenaries. ‘They 
were far too good to be Bolshies,’ reported one pilot. Even though there 
were a few German pilots in the Red air force, the Royal Air Force won 
the battle and continued to dominate the skies of southeast Russia. The 
Camel fighters were also more suitable for ground strafing than DH9’s 
because of their greater speed and agility. The fighter attacks against 
cavalry formations caught on the open steppe were devastating. Patrols 
of only two planes destroyed in several cases whole squadrons of Red 
cavalry. The aircraft was an especially effective weapon for locating and 
destroying the Red cavalry patrols which had broken in behind the 
White lines. The most important of these operations was the one in 
which Major Kinkead’s Camels dispersed General Dumenko’s Red 
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Cavalry Corps which was enveloping the left wing of the Caucasus 
Army and thus helped to save Tsaritsyn.
192
 
 The Bolsheviks were determined to retake Tsaritsyn. Their 
operations not only stopped any attempt by Wrangel to advance to the 
north along the Volga, but also threatened the White existence in the city 
itself. The Bolsheviks concentrated a strong river flotilla on the Volga. 
The riverboats armed with guns as heavy as 9.2 inches bombarded the 
Whites beyond the range of their own artillery. The morale of Wrangel’s 
troops was about to break in September when a flotilla of over 40 of 
these vessels started its attack. ‘B’ and ‘C’ Flights were ordered to attack 
the Bolshevik flotilla. The British planes made over 20 sorties during 
three days, sinking 15 of the boats and damaging several of them. The 
Bolshevik operation was called off, Tsaritsyn was saved once more and 
British aviators were again lavishly decorated by General Wrangel.
193
 
 Naturally it was impossible to keep the operations of the 47th 
Squadron a secret from the British public. Hundreds of combat sorties, 
continuous flow of decorations published in the London Gazette, British 
planes shot down, pilots killed and wounded could not be ascribed to 
training and equipping of the Whites. The opponents of intervention in 
Parliament demanded that the Cabinet withdraw the Squadron from the 
front immediately. So, under growing pressure, the War Office informed 
Parliament of the disbandment of the 47th Squadron in October.
194
 This 
declaration was, however, a bluff. The Squadron was not withdrawn, but 
continued to operate as usual under the name of ‘A Detachment’. All the 
members of the unit were given the opportunity to resign and travel 
home. Some of the ground crew NCOs and men ‒ all of them conscripts 
from the Balkan front ‒ readily took the opportunity. But, in effect, the 
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size of the Squadron increased as more volunteers from Britain arrived 
in South Russia. And in October a third flight, the ‘A’ Flight, was ready 
to be sent to the front.
195
 
 In order to exploit the full potential of the Squadron, an 
audacious plan was worked out at the headquarters of the Military 
Mission in Taganrog: the RAF was to bomb Moscow. A secret ‘Z’ 
Flight was set up to execute this operation. The men and RE8 
reconnaissance bombers of the flight travelled to the front in a special 
train. The distance from the farthest point of Denikin’s advance, Orel, 
was, however, too long for the RE8’s. So, according to the daring plan, 
some of the planes were to carry petrol to a secret refuelling point 
behind the Red lines and the bombers were supposed to land and refuel 
on their way to Moscow and back. The Royal Air Force did never bomb 
Moscow. Churchill cancelled the operation at the last moment, as there 
was ‘no military value in this operation’.196 The real reason behind 
Churchill’s decision must, however, have been more political than 
military. A bombing raid executed by an officially non-existent flight of 
the RAF against Moscow, would have been difficult to explain to the 
Prime Minister, and even more so to Parliament. 
 The operations of the 47th Squadron, continuing until the end 
of March 1920 and the end of Denikin’s army, to a great extent 
supported the White war effort. Before the British arrived the role of the 
air arm in the civil war was almost non-existent. The effectiveness of 
this relatively small unit, about 50 planes, was an unpleasant surprise to 
the Bolsheviks. Their own air force, aviadarm, was still under 
construction and consisted of a few vintage planes and even fewer 
properly trained pilots. Petrol too was in short supply after the loss of 
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the Caucasian oil fields.
197
  Aviadarm was no match, even if reinforced 
with German mercenaries, for the British veteran pilots. During the 
summer of 1919 the skies of South Russia were effectively cleared of 
Red planes. In addition to actual losses suffered by the Bolsheviks, the 
air raids had a devastating effect on morale. The low flying, strafing 
fighters horrified the Bolshevik infantry and cavalrymen. ‘The 
aeroplanes make warfare impossible, one can hardly surrender to a plane 
to,’ one Red prisoner confessed.198 Indeed, the 47th Squadron of the 
RAF was also a particularly visible sign of British support for the White 
troops. 
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7. AWKWARD BROTHERS IN ARMS 
 
7.1. The Adventurers, the Businessmen and the Professionals 
 The Cabinet decision in March 1919 stated that all military 
personnel serving in Russia should be volunteers.
199
 However, most of 
the troops sent to Russia during the final stages of the World War were 
conscripts. Many of the NCOs and men of the original British Military 
Mission to South Russia had not volunteered for service in Russia but 
were simply sent there from their units in the Middle East. This was 
especially the case with the personnel of the 47 Squadron of the RAF 
that had been shipped to Novorossiisk directly from Salonica without 
any reorganization. The War Office realised the contradiction and the 
conscripts were gradually replaced with volunteers. The War Office also 
started a recruiting campaign for volunteers to help the Whites in 
Russia. The immediate plan was to raise two 4,000 strong brigades for 
the North Russian Front and 2,000 officers and other ranks were needed 
for service in South Russia. There was indeed no difficulty to find 
volunteers from amongst the men of the vast army that was being 
demobilized.
200
 But who actually were these officers and NCOs who 
volunteered for service in Russia after the end of the World War, and 
what were their motives? 
 The British volunteers joining the Military Mission in South 
Russia were ‘a mixed lot’, as one officer described his colleagues.201 It 
is, however, possible to divide the volunteers into three groups 
according to their backgrounds and motives for volunteering. First there 
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were regular officers and NCOs for whom service in Russia simply 
offered an opportunity to gain further experience in their profession and 
thus advance in their careers. Junior officers were often promoted 
temporarily to higher ranks in Russia and service abroad was generally 
considered to help, for example, when applying to the Staff College. 
Some of these officers needed this experience as they had ‘missed their 
war’, spending long times in POW camps or in hospitals. For others, 
volunteering just provided escape from the boredom of peacetime 
soldiering in garrisons. The majority of the British servicemen in South 
Russia were regulars, and many of them continued their service 
normally in the armed forces after the intervention.
202
 Not a few of these 
officers in fact rose later into high positions in the Army and the Royal 
Air Force, most successful being perhaps colonels Maund and 
Collishaw, who both reached the rank of Air Marshall during the Second 
World War. 
 The second largest group consisted of men who held 
temporary commissions in the British army. Many of these young men 
had gone to the war straight from the school bench and thus had no other 
work experience than that of a soldier; they volunteered simply to avoid 
unemployment after demobilization. For many of these volunteers it had 
also been generally difficult to fit back into civilian society after their 
war experience. The idea of becoming a bank clerk again might have felt 
rather difficult after fighting as a platoon commander in Flanders. 
Richard Holmes and Niall Ferguson have studied men’s motives for 
fighting during the First World War and they argue that quite a few men 
actually enjoyed combat.
203
 This was clearly the case with some of the 
war veterans who wanted to continue their military service and 
volunteered to go to Russia. The young captain, Hugh Boustead (later 
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Colonel Sir), who became a machine gun instructor of the Don Army, 
had been a sniper for three years at the Western Front. He admitted 
openly that he went to Russia simply to fight. And fight Boustead 
certainly did, constantly taking part, against orders from his superiors, in 
combat alongside the Don Cossacks he was supposed to instruct in the 
use of machine guns.
204
 The case was often very similar with to that of 
the RAF pilots who wanted to continue flying combat sorties.  
 Thirdly, there were a small group of men who were recruited 
because of their language skills and their supposed knowledge of the 
general conditions and the political situation in Russia. These men had 
usually been employed in international companies in Russia before and 
during the war and they were in many cases partly Russian by origin. On 
the other hand, their knowledge of military matters was usually very 
limited and service with the British Military Mission provided them 
merely with an opportunity to continue their business in Russia. 
 Many of the British officers also mention ideological motives 
at least as a partial reason for volunteering. ‘A crusade mentality’ and 
ideas about defending western civilization and Christianity against 
Bolshevism were common. The Russian Civil War was also considered 
to be a continuation of the struggle against Germany and the British saw 
themselves indebted to help their loyal Russian allies. The Bolsheviks 
were seen as merely German hirelings and the victory over the Central 
Powers might be lost if the Bolsheviks were not beaten. The White 
struggle easily provided ‘a just cause’ for the British volunteers. The 
Civil War was understood as a fight of ‘good against evil’ perhaps more 
easily than the war against the Germans.
205
 From the summer 1918 
British newspapers had included detailed accounts of Bolshevik 
atrocities. Perhaps the single most influential incident was the murder of 
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the Tsar ‒ King George V’s cousin and look-alike ‒ and his family.  
Another widely publicised case was the sacking of the British Embassy 
and the murder of naval attaché Captain Cromie in Petrograd in August 
1918. The newspaper articles, especially in the Times, became 
increasingly gory as the Cheka’s terror was launched during the autumn 
of 1918. An average British volunteer’s image of the Bolsheviks could 
fairly be summed up in Churchill’s words describing them as ‘the most 
grisly of all  the Kaiser’s weapons’, and comparing Lenin to a plague 
bacillus transported in a sealed truck  to Russia by the Germans.
206
 
 The War Office fostered these anti-Bolshevik images. 
Applicants for the service in South Russia were handed a pamphlet 
providing background information on Bolshevism.
207
 It stated that 
Lenin’s government was ‘aiming to end Christian civilisation, and to 
eradicate the ideas of nationality and family’. The Bolsheviks had 
founded ‘the Commissariat of Free Love’ to promote the socialization of 
women. Also, all children over five were to be nationalized, announced 
the General Staff’s booklet and finally reminded the reader that ‘another 
kind of Bolshevism was preached abroad, but this is what it is in 
practice’. On the other hand, the volunteers were enlightened about the 
history of the White movement. ‘Their cause is a great one’ the 
pamphlet stated, and that ‘it is undoubtedly in the interests of the whole 
world that the Bolshevik tyranny should be destroyed’. The General 
Staff advised the applicants that ‘men should not volunteer if not 
prepared to work whole-heartedly for the cause the Armed Forces of 
South Russia are fighting’. 
 The idealism ‒ if not the anti-Bolshevik feelings ‒ of the 
volunteers often faded away, however, soon after their arrival in South 
Russia. The realities of service were a grave disappointment for many of 
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them. Instructions from London clearly banned combat duties ‒ unlike 
for example in North Russia, where the two ‘Relief Brigades’ were 
engaged in fierce battles against the Red Army.
208
 Instead of the 
excitement of combat most of the British volunteers were involved in 
tedious and frustrating supply or training duties in the chaotic conditions 
of the war-ridden Russia. The Mission itself was at first rather 
disorganized and there was a chronic shortage of able personnel. In 
addition, the instructions both from London and from the Mission HQ in 
Ekaterinodar (and later Taganrog) were often confusing. Co-operation 
with the Russians was not easy either. 
 When General Holman arrived in South Russia in June 1919 
he was very dissatisfied with the Mission’s work and the professional 
quality of his subordinates. He immediately started to send home 
officers whom he considered unsuitable to carry out the demanding 
duties with the Mission. Holman asked for new volunteers and pointed 
out that the selection process should be much more rigorous. According 
to Holman, there were too many completely incapable or even harmful 
persons serving in South Russia. He described the ex-POWs as 
generally useless as having been in the most cases totally alienated from 
the military profession because of the long periods of time spent in 
captivity. For the previously wounded and not completely fit men the 
South Russian climate was, according to Holman, too harsh with its 
extremely cold winters and almost tropical summers. Holman had also 
detected ‘businessmen’ amongst his subordinates who avoided their 
duties and took advantage of the chaotic economic situation in Russia 
and engaged in profiteering. It had been actually discovered that British 
officers were involved in selling military supplies to the civilians and 
also held currency exchange rackets in many towns.
209
 Interestingly, 
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Holman seemed to be more satisfied with the other ranks of the Mission. 
He reported that the NCOs and men usually adapted to the Russian 
conditions better than their officers. Other ranks often made more 
personal contacts with the Russians and thus also learned the language 
better (Holman himself was fluent in Russian). Regular NCOs also 
generally distinguished themselves in training duties. The only 
exception to the high standards was, according to Holman, ‘the 
completely useless drivers of the Royal Army Service Corps’. 
 
7.2. Relations with the Russians 
 Relations between allies in a war are often difficult and the 
situation in South Russia between the members of the British Military 
Mission and the Whites was no exception to the rule. The British 
government’s inability to define and state its Russian policy clearly 
made the Mission’s work difficult right from the beginning. The 
Russians were disappointed as the much-awaited British divisions never 
arrived. The Prinkipo affair also made the Whites very suspicious and 
the contradictory policy of supporting the Transcaucasian states hostile 
to Denikin did not help either. At the Don the British became entangled 
in another political problem - the strained relations between Denikin and 
the Cossacks. The Cossacks remembered well how General Poole had 
pressured Krasnov to submit the Don Army under Denikin’s command, 
and even longed for the times when Germans had driven the Bolsheviks 
out from the voisko and helped Krasnov to reorganize and arm the Don 
Army. The British were also regularly accused of favouring the 
Volunteers and the Caucasian Army at the expense of the Don Cossacks 
in the share of supplies.  
 In addition to political difficulties, there was a wide cultural 
gap between the officers of the post-Great War British Army and 
Denikin’s Volunteer Army and the Cossacks. The war in South Russia 
was very different from anything the British had experienced or could 
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expect. In their evaluations, the British officers did not generally give 
very high marks to Denikin’s Army. The problem was not only the 
obsolete and unimaginative tactical thinking of the Russians examined 
above, but also the whole ethos of Russian military culture.  
 What usually struck the British officers first was the general 
apathy and lack of interest in work among the Russian officers. Even the 
gravest situation at the front did not seem to affect the way of life in the 
bases and cities in the rear. The British soon discovered that it was often 
possible to work only for a few hours in the mornings at the depots and 
training centres, because the Russians did not return to their jobs after 
lunch. ‘Rabota ne medved ‒ work is not a bear. It will not run away to 
the woods, but will be there tomorrow,’ answered one general to a 
frustrated British machine gun instructor who complained about the 
absence of his students and the Russian instructors.
210
 These flexible 
working hours and casual attitudes were a most serious problem when 
training the pilots for the White air force. Not many Russians actually 
passed the tightly-scheduled training programme that was based on the 
RAF standards. The main reason for this failure was that the Russians 
assigned to pilot training simply did not attend classes. Lack of 
discipline and neglect of instructions also led to regular accidents. 
Perhaps the worst incident took place in August 1919 when within a few 
days four Russian manned RE8’s crashed and their crews were killed.211 
The Russians’ casual attitudes towards service caused much animosity 
among the members of the British Mission. It appeared to many of the 
British officers and NCOs that they ended up doing all the work 
themselves instead of giving advice and supervising the Russians. The 
situation was certainly not made easier by the common habit of even 
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high-ranking Russian officers to make comments such as ‘Isn’t it 
wonderful to see the British doing all the work for us’.212 
 Another serious problem, observed by the members of the 
British Mission, was the attitude of Russian officers towards their 
subordinates. This attitude, originating from and resembling the 
traditional relationship between gentry and serfs, was very hard for the 
British officers to understand. The obsolete ideas of leadership, 
demanding blind obedience and relying on brutal discipline were 
regarded by the British as one of the fundamental reasons for the 
collapse of the White Army. The Russian officers often seemed to treat 
their horses better than their men, and it was not uncommon for an 
officer or NCO to beat their men for a minor lapse in discipline as, for 
instance not saluting properly. Many of the worst traditions of the 
Imperial Army were, indeed, restored in Denikin’s Army when it 
transformed from a small volunteer force of hand-picked officers and 
military cadets into a mass army of peasant conscripts. Even the old 
signs, ‘No dogs, no (private) soldiers’ that had been torn down in 1917, 
were returned in the parks of major cities. When an officer boarded a 
tram in Rostov, he might order the NCOs and privates to get out of the 
vehicle. At the front alike, the officers often seemed to disregard 
completely the welfare of their men. They tried to live as comfortably as 
possible in their railway cars, as the soldiers camped on the steppe 
without tents or even blankets. Most units of the AFSR did not have an 
organized food supply, but battalion headquarters were supposed to 
purchase food locally. However, the funds provided for buying food 
were often used for the private purposes of the commanding officers, or 
perhaps simply lost in a card game. Thus, in many cases the troops did 
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not have any other option than to rob the local peasants.
213
 All this 
hardly improved the morale of the White Army. 
 The Russian officers’ habit of treating their subordinates as 
an inferior class of people influenced their behaviour towards their 
Allies. British NCOs and privates were often treated very badly by the 
Russians. They had to taste sometimes the nagaika (Cossack whip) 
after, for example, failing to salute a Russian officer. The commanding 
officers of the British units had to write formal complaints about the 
treatment of their men on several occasions. The Russians were 
generally very sensitive about rank, and it was, for example, very 
difficult for a British officer to advise a Russian colleague if he 
happened to be of senior rank. In addition, the Russians did not 
appreciate the rather informal and friendly relations which especially 
younger British officers had with their men. British officers often had to 
take part in manual tasks alongside their men out of pure necessity. But, 
‘giving hand’ was also seen, according to the new leadership philosophy 
of the British Army, as a way to win the trust and respect of the men and 
build up group cohesion in the unit. These were totally alien ideas 
amongst the White officers. They considered the British as sometimes 
not much better than the Bolsheviks when they witnessed, for example, 
British captains and lieutenants cooking their own food and polishing 
their own boots or perhaps playing football with their men. The artillery 
commander of the Don Army and other Russian generals could not 
believe his eyes when General Holman demonstrated his proficiency as 
an artilleryman and quickly corrected a malfunctioning breechblock of a 
4.5” howitzer during an inspection of a Cossack battery.214  
 British attitudes towards the Russians appear somewhat 
ambivalent. Officers who openly despised the White officers for their 
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laziness or cruelty seemed to be enchanted by the heroic elements of the 
White movement. This was especially the case with the instructors in the 
frontline units who also took part in combat. The men who were looking 
for adventure in Russia seemed to have found it. In their diaries and 
letters, many of these officers clearly identified themselves with the 
White cause. They admired commitment and personal courage of 
especially the younger Russian officers in contrast to the disillusioned 
staff officers of the headquarters and depots.
215
 Taking part in actual 
battles ‒ instead of seeing only the chaos and corruption of the rear ‒ 
seemed to have offered a return to the old world of personal fighting 
from the mechanised carnage of modern warfare they had 
disappointedly experienced at the Western Front. Many of the senior 
officers, including all three commanders of the Mission, could not 
escape the enchantment either. They supported the White cause as 
wholeheartedly as the General Staff pamphlet cited above demanded. 
Generals Poole, Briggs and Holman were accused of being so deeply 
integrated in Denikin’s army that they even forgot their duties to HM 
Government. General Milne, the commander of the British forces at the 
Black Sea and the Mediterranean at one point described the officers of 
the Mission as being ‘more Russians than the Russians themselves’.216 
 Conduct of the members of the Mission was, of course, not 
always perfect either. On arrival in Russia, British officers had been 
instructed to behave tactfully and ‘not to hurt the feelings’ of the 
Russians. This was not, however, always the case. Cultural prejudices 
were strong. Some of the officers were clearly overconfident of their 
superior knowledge in military science and behaved arrogantly towards 
the Russians. Others might have seen long service in the Colonial 
Forces, and did not quite understand that South Russia was not another 
British colony. Moreover, many of the officers who had served in India 
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seemed to regard the Russians as Britain’s traditional enemy. This was 
especially the case with the units of the Indian Army that occupied Baku 
and the rest of Azerbaizhan in late 1918
217
. 
 The records of the Mission also tell about serious disciplinary 
problems. Many of the British officers proved to be no less enthusiastic 
drinkers than their Russian colleagues. This often led to trouble. 
Especially the officers and men of the RAF were constantly having 
drunken brawls with the Russians. In October 1919 the airforcemen 
were finally banned from visiting any restaurants or cabarets after a 
fistfight between a British pilot officer and a Russian general in a 
Tsaritsyn restaurant. Another drunken pilot was tragically shot dead by a 
sentry when crawling under the accommodation train of the Squadron 
and failing to respond to the repeated challenges of the sentry.
218
 
 The British also came into contact with the Russian civilian 
population. The members of the Mission were generally received very 
well in the cities under White rule. They were often treated as ‘national 
heroes’ and hugged on the streets and handed flowers. The British 
officers seemed to have been especially popular among the Russian 
women. One major described how ‘the upper class ladies literally flung 
themselves at our officers’, and continued rather cynically how every 
British officer appeared extremely rich ‒ because of the ridiculous 
exchange rate of the pound to the rouble, and how the Russian women 
were ready for almost anything to leave their miserable country.
219
 Some 
of these romances developed, however, into marriages; even Colonel 
Stokes, who became the British Commissioner of Transcaucasia after 
the withdrawal of British troops from the area, married a Russian 
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woman. This success enjoyed by the British, on the other hand, must 
have caused animosity among the Russian officers and was not an 
uncommon reason for the brawls mentioned above.  
 The reception in the countryside was often different. The 
peasants in the villages were usually more reserved with the foreigners 
and sometimes even hostile towards the British, no doubt associating 
them with the White troops. The peasants in more backward areas 
seemed to have been fairly ignorant of the whole intervention; a British 
captain was astounded when a village elder asked him what he, a 
Japanese soldier, was doing in his village and what he wanted from 
them. The worst was the situation in the Northern Caucasus, where the 
British were often treated with equal hostility as the White troops by the 
mountain tribes. In the Petrovsk area for example, it was very dangerous 
to go out from the base as ‘the locals were frequently taking pot shots at 
them’.220  
  Interestingly, the Bolsheviks seemed to be well aware of the 
somewhat strained relations between the British and the Whites. 
Bolshevik propaganda was quick to take advantage of the situation. 
Leaflets told the British how Denikin was using them in his unjust and 
brutal war against the Russian people.  British NCOs and men were also 
urged ‘to form soldiers’ councils, to demand to be sent home and to 
refuse to shoot their fellow workers’.221 This does not seem to have had 
much effect on the British, who were merely amused by ‘news from 
reliable sources’ stating how committees of soldiers and workers had 
seized power in London and George V was imprisoned in the Tower. 
However, Bolshevik propaganda aimed at the Whites seemed to have 
been more effective. Soldiers and civilians were informed of British 
imperialistic plans to plunder the natural resources of South Russia. The 
British were greatly embarrassed to find out that many Russians really 
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believed, for example, claims that Germany had won the war in Europe 
and Britain was now seeking compensation from Russia.
222
 The 
Bolsheviks also used agents provocateurs to build up tension between 
the Whites and the British. Agents dressed as Volunteer and Cossack 
officers were reported to have insulted the British and to have started 
fights in restaurants in Odessa and Rostov.
223
 
 The Whites praised their British ‘friends’ in their speeches 
and organized lavish banquets in honour of them. British officers and 
men received a vast amount of Russian decorations as a symbol of their 
gratitude.
224
 No doubt, many of the Russian officers, most importantly 
Denikin, understood the value and honestly appreciated the work of the 
British Mission. However, relations between the allies remained fairly 
strained during the whole period of the intervention. Mutual mistrust, 
cultural and communicational difficulties hindered considerably the 
work of the British Mission. Many of the British officers became 
frustrated, and it was not uncommon to speak about ‘backing the wrong 
horse’. On the other hand, many Russians must have found the growing 
importance of the British role in Denikin’s command, especially after 
Holman introduced his radical supply policy, deeply embarrassing. 
 
7.3. The Country of Murder and Loot 
225
 
 ‘Both sides are equally barbarous. Torture commonly applied 
to the prisoners. Too inhuman to be described... I have no soul in their 
business, and dislike the Volunteers for their lives and their habits quite 
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as much as I do the Bolsheviks for theirs.’ Thus one British officer 
described the situation in a letter to his father.
226
 The British had indeed 
expected the Bolsheviks to commit atrocities; the newspapers at home 
had written about the Red terror extensively since August 1918, and on 
their arrival in Russia they were told more stories, and as a part of the 
White propaganda, they were shown pictures of the Bolshevik atrocities. 
However, to discover that the Whites were not much different from their 
enemies shocked the British. Almost every diary and numerous letters, 
written by these officers and men, mention appalling atrocities 
committed rather equally by the Bolsheviks and the Whites. The 
brutality of the White troops also appears as an important factor 
alienating the British from the White cause and undermining their 
morale and motivation.  
 The Russian Civil war was an extremely brutal conflict. 
Generally inhuman treatment and executions of the prisoners was more a 
rule than an exception on both sides of the front. Both the Reds and the 
Whites started the atrocities right from the beginning of the conflict in 
the South in early 1918. This was partly purposeful terror policy and 
acts of vengeance but sometimes executions were carried out of pure 
necessity ‒ because of a lack of means to feed, accommodate or 
transport the prisoners. Private soldiers usually saved their lives if they 
surrendered, or rather defected, en masse as a complete unit and joined 
their former enemies often first murdering their officers. However, 
officers’ and NCOs’ life expectancy was not very long in the case of 
capture. General Wrangel writes rather shamelessly in his memoirs 
about how he guaranteed the loyalty of two defected Bolshevik 
regiments by having all of their 370 officers and NCOs shot.
227
  
                                            
226
 Lt. Goldsmith’s letter to his father, 4 April 1919, Goldsmith papers, PLA. 
Goldsmith’s letters are particularly interesting, as they contain unusually detailed 
information. Perhaps this young naval officer, serving on the cruiser HMS Montrose, 
did not have to take censorship into account as the recipient of the letters, his father, 
was an admiral in the Royal Navy.  
227
 Wrangel, Muistelmat, pp.77-78. 
   
 
140 
 Evaluations of British officers support William Chamberlin’s 
estimation that more people were killed in the atrocities by the Cheka 
and the White executioners than in the Civil War battles.
228
 Moreover 
the War Office was well aware of these atrocities right from the 
beginning of the intervention. General Briggs was instructed as early as 
in February 1919 to urge Denikin to stop the wholesale shooting of 
prisoners as the executions ‘only assist  the Bolshevik propaganda in the 
West’. The White policy to execute rather summarily almost all captured 
ex-Imperial officers who had served in the Red Army ‒ no matter how 
voluntarily ‒ was considered especially unwise by the British, as it no 
doubt hindered many of these officers from defecting to the Whites.
 
Perhaps the most famous victim of this policy was Captain A. Brusilov, 
the son of General Brusilov.
229
  
 Most of the histories of the Russian Revolution and the Civil 
War mention torture as an institutional part of the Red terror and 
describe in graphic details the gruesome methods applied by the Cheka 
and the Red Army soldiers. The Bolsheviks did not however have a 
monopoly on torture of captured or suspected enemies.
230
 British 
sources clearly dispel the myth of the Whites as more civilized soldiers 
in this respect. Captured Red officers and especially commissars were 
indeed often tortured to death. Many of the diaries and reports written by 
British officers serving with the White frontline units describe this as a 
widespread phenomenon. Prisoners were often mutilated before the 
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execution; for example, red stars were carved on the bodies of captured 
commissars. Advisors in the Don Army witnessed several times how the 
Cossacks tied their victims behind their horses and galloped along the 
streets with revolting results. Impalement was not an outdated form of 
execution either.
231
 Torture seems not to have taken as sophisticated and 
institutional forms in the White Army as amongst the Reds. The acts of 
cruelty were committed in more or less haphazard manner, but they 
were, however, clearly used on a large scale to take revenge and to 
terrorize the enemy. 
 Soldiers on both sides of the frontline expected to be tortured 
if caught alive by their enemies. It was, in fact, very common, also with 
the British serving at the Front, to carry poison capsules or an extra 
hand-grenade to commit suicide rather than to be captured.  Once, a 
Volunteer general casually told a British officer after a successful attack 
at the Kerch Peninsula how his troops counted among the dead enemy 
over a hundred cases of suicide.
232
 
 Apart from the treatment of enemy soldiers by the Whites, the 
British were equally appalled when they witnessed how Denikin’s 
troops behaved towards the civilian population in the areas captured 
from the Bolsheviks. It is striking that the White command actually 
spoke about conquered, not for example liberated, areas in its orders and 
proclamations. For the average Russian peasant who definitely had not 
enjoyed the Bolshevik rule of conscription and food requisition, the 
White regime hardly seemed more appealing. It did not mean the return 
of peace and order. Men were continued to be dragged into the ranks of 
another army alien to the peasants. Looting was also soon started by the 
new masters. In addition, the White frontline troops were often followed 
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by the civil servants of the old regime and perhaps landlords reclaiming 
their land and avenging the peasant revolution of 1917. 
 Looting was endemic in the White Army. Denikin was never 
able to take serious measures to prevent looting. This would probably 
have been impossible, as not only the rank-and-file Cossacks, but also 
many of his high-ranking generals were involved in the systematic 
robbery of private property in the conquered areas. The prospect of good 
loot was in fact an important motivator for fighting in all armies during 
the Russian Civil War. A general of the Don Army confessed to a 
British officer that his Cossacks would not ride a verst (about 1.1 km) 
outside of their voisko, if they were prohibited from looting
233
. For the 
Volunteer Army, it did not take long to decline from Dobr’armiia 
(Dobrovolcheskaia armiia), a highly motivated and efficient fighting 
force to Grab’armiia, or the Robbing Army, as the peasants started to 
call it
234
. 
 A loss of the support of the civilian population and the 
general deterioration of the morale of the White troops were not the only 
problems caused by the looting. Perhaps the most famous incident is the 
raid of general Mamontov and his Don Cossacks, which lost all 
operational significance as the cavalry striking force turned to huge train 
of wagons full of loot struggling back to the Don. Denikin’s 
headquarters had actually no exact information on the whereabouts of 
Mamontov’s forces, but the Cossacks had to be searched by the RAF 
reconnaissance planes.
235
 The British transport officers also discovered 
that the chronic shortage of rolling stock was partially caused by the fact 
that a large number of railway cars were in the private use of the Russian 
officers for transporting the looted property from the front to the rear. 
This had most serious consequences during the retreat of the White 
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Army in the winter of 1919-20. When Denikin’s headquarters in 
Taganrog, was hastily evacuated, a huge amount of material, including 
several tanks and aircraft, were lost due to the lack of transport. The B-
Flight of the 47th Squadron had to destroy all its planes and its men 
were nearly captured by the Bolsheviks as they had to march away to the 
South. At the same time hundreds of freight cars carried ‘private 
property’ of Russian officers to the Kuban.236 
 Clearly the most disturbing case of misconduct for which the 
White Army was responsible was the pogroms. Pogroms had a long 
history in Russia and during the Civil War all the armies involved were 
responsible for at least some anti-Jewish violence. Because of the 
generally chaotic conditions of the civil war it is impossible to establish 
the exact number of the victims, but cases of murder, rape and theft must 
have numbered in the hundreds of thousands. However, Denikin’s 
AFSR was responsible for the most organized actions against the Jewish 
population and consequently also responsible for the largest number of 
victims. It has been estimated that about half of the murdered Jews fell 
victim to the soldiers of the AFSR. Anti-Semitism was indeed an 
integral phenomenon of the White regime.
237
 Attitudes towards the 
pogroms within the British Military Mission were somewhat 
controversial. 
 Anti-Semitism seems also to have been relatively common 
among the members of the British Mission. This is not surprising as the 
prejudices against the Jews were not a strange phenomenon in the 
British society of the time.
238
 Beliefs about immense Jewish political 
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and economic influence were common, especially among the upper 
classes, which provided many of the officers serving in Russia. Also in 
Britain the Jews were widely believed to have instigated and led the 
Bolshevik revolution. The link between Bolshevism and Jews was 
described in numerous articles in certain newspapers, most influentially 
in The Times. The person largely responsible for this was the paper’s 
openly anti-Semitic Petrograd correspondent George Dobson. Dobson 
wrote how the Jews had ‘very considerably helped to deform and 
disfigure the Russian Revolution’ and also pointed out that it was a ‘Jew 
commissary and his Jewish assistants’ who had raided and ransacked the 
British Embassy in Petrograd and murdered Captain Cromie in August 
1918.
239
 Even the ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion’; the notorious 
document of Tsarist secret police origin which described the 
international Jewish conspiracy, was translated and published in Britain 
in early 1920. It received some publicity and the conspiracy theories 
were discussed in newspapers. The ‘Protocols’ was, however, exposed 
as a forgery a year after its publication.
240
 Although anti-Semitism in 
Britain never developed to the level it did in central Europe, the myth 
about international Jewish conspiracy persisted. 
 General Holman tended to follow very closely the official 
policy of Denikin’s government which was to deny any involvement in 
pogroms and generally to blame these brutalities on Petliura and 
Ukrainian partisans
241
. Holman reported repeatedly to London that the 
pogroms were vastly exaggerated and reports of mass murders were 
‘false Zionist propaganda’; his claim was supported by his visits to 
Poltava and Kharkov. He also explained to the War Office that some 
Jews had been actually massacred, but this was done by retreating 
Bolsheviks or Makhno’s bandits, not by the Volunteers. According to 
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Holman, Denikin had effectively prevented ‘natural and inevitable 
revenge against the Jews despite all the monstrosities of the Jewish 
commissars’. Furthermore, Denikin had paid a high price for his 
humanitarianism as rumours were spreading that the Jews had bought 
him off, and the commander of the Volunteer Army, General Mai-
Maevskii, was now called ‘the little father of the Yids’.242 In addition to 
his reports, Holman instructed his officers and men to avoid the 
company of Jews. There were actually a few British officers of Jewish 
origin serving in South Russia, but Holman rapidly corrected ‘this 
serious blunder of the General staff‘ and sent these men home ‘in order 
to avoid embarrassing our Russian Allies’.243 
 General Holman and many of his subordinates, in addition to 
their general beliefs and possible prejudices, seemed to have been 
influenced by White propaganda and the general mood in South Russia 
and to have believed in the collective responsibility of the Jews for the 
Russian upheaval. In their diaries and letters, British officers wrote 
commonly about ‘the Jewish brains and money’ behind the whole 
Bolshevik revolution. A British military agent attached to Wrangel’s 
Russian Army in the Crimea even tried to advise a Russian general on 
how ‘to tackle the Jewish question’ along the lines of  the ‘White 
Australian policy’, referring to the brutal treatment of the Aboriginals.244 
However, most of the notes written by the young British officers could 
be considered rather light-hearted and hardly approving of the hideous 
massacres of civilian population. Many of the officers, even those very 
same who had written before about the Jews as ‘the most loathsome type 
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of humanity’ and ‘the curse of Russia’, were appalled when they actually 
witnessed some of the worst pogroms in the autumn of 1919.
245
  
 News of large-scale atrocities towards the Jewish population 
in the Ukraine and South Russia soon reached London. Jews in England 
were outraged by the anti-Semitism of the Whites to whom Britain was 
giving large-scale military support. Churchill was attacked constantly at 
the Cabinet and the House of Commons by the anti-interventionists who 
were now using the pogroms as the final proof of reactionary and 
repressive nature of Denikin’s regime. Churchill was, however, 
determined to stand with the White cause also on this question. In his 
defence, Churchill relied basically on Holman’s reports and blamed 
Petliurists and other Ukranian partisans for the pogroms. After reading 
some frightful reports on massacres, Lloyd George asked Churchill to 
make enquiries about the treatment of the Jews by ‘his friends’. 
Churchill explained, again citing the Military Mission reports, that the 
anti-Jewish violence and popular vengeance did have a cause as ‘the 
Jews had certainly played a leading part in Bolshevik atrocities’.246 
 Whatever Churchill’s personal view on the connection 
between the Jews and Bolshevism was, he clearly understood how the 
anti-Jewish violence was damaging the public image of the Whites in 
the West. He sent several personal telegrams to Denikin explaining that 
the Jews were very powerful in England and urged him to take 
determinate action to prevent the White troops taking part in the 
pogroms.
247
 Denikin promised to do his utmost to prevent pogroms, as 
he too was fully aware of the results. In the same telegram Denikin also 
asked, however, why the international Jewish community had not made 
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any attempt to use its influence against the terrible atrocities committed 
by the Jewish commissars.
248
  
 This exchange of telegrams had very little results. Churchill 
did not in fact institute the measure that might have forced Denikin to 
take firmer action ‒ threatening to withhold the British aid as was done 
during Denikin’s conflict with Georgia. It is doubtful whether even this 
kind of threat would have had any effect. After all, Denikin did not have 
such authority over his Army had he wished to prevent the anti-Jewish 
violence. The pogroms continued to the end of the White struggle. 
These atrocities were most often conducted by the Cossacks and the real 
motive seems to have been looting and not any kind of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in the style of the following decades. The pogroms in the 
Ukraine and South Russia were made possible because of the sad 
tradition of anti-Semitism in Russian society. As a conclusion, more 
than an intentional ideological manifesto of Denikin’s regime, the 
pogroms were another sign of the decay of the White army as an 
effective fighting force. The general conduct of White troops and 
especially atrocities committed by the Armed Forces of South Russia 
also strongly question the regime’s capabilities as a possible 
regenerating force of Russia. 
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8.  END OF THE INTERVENTION 
 
8.1. Turn of the Tide 
 In early October 1919 Denikin’s Army’s offensive reached its 
zenith. The Volunteer Army captured Orel and the Don Cossacks took 
Voronezh. The Whites stood only 180 kilometres from the most 
important Bolshevik armoury, Tula, and only 300 kilometres from 
Moscow. At the time Denikin ruled ‒ at least in theory ‒ an enormous 
part of Russia including the third and fourth largest cities of the country 
and over forty million people. The Whites were convinced of their 
victory. The troops prepared themselves for the final push, and Denikin 
boasted that he would celebrate Christmas in Moscow. The British 
Military Mission indeed reported to London that Moscow would most 
probably be captured within ten weeks. The British estimated that 
difficult weather might prolong the operation for another two weeks, but 
on the other hand, a sudden collapse in Bolshevik morale might hasten 
their defeat.
249
 Accordingly, Churchill was able to declare to the Cabinet 
that the Bolsheviks would soon be finished
250
. 
 The Bolsheviks did not, however, collapse, but their 
resistance stiffened the closer the Whites got to Moscow. The campaign 
on the Southern Front was clearly understood as a life and death struggle 
in Moscow in the summer when Lenin wrote his famous ‘All out for the 
Fight against Denikin’ ‒ declaration.251 The Central Committee of the 
Party gave orders that the Moscow-Tula sector should have priority over 
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all other fronts, and troops and supplies were transferred for the defence 
of the capital.  
 This concentration of force was possible as the Red Army 
was not acutely threatened elsewhere at the time. Kolchak was still 
fighting a sporadic retreating battle in Siberia but his army’s final 
collapse was only a question of time. The British had already evacuated 
their troops from North Russia, and General Miller’s small army was 
virtually under siege in the harbours of Archangel and Murmansk. The 
only major incident outside of South Russia to take place was in October 
when the North-western Army of General Iudenich made a surprise 
attack against Petrograd and indeed advanced into the southern outskirts 
of the city. Iudenich’s operation was, however, doomed from the 
beginning and the Bolsheviks were able to defeat his small and rather 
badly-equipped army of 16,000 men. Iudenich’s attack caused some 
initial panic in Moscow as it coincided with Denikin’s advance, but the 
Bolshevik leaders sighed with relief as the Finns and Estonians ‒ 
mistrusting the Whites ‒ chose not to join in the operation. Iudenich was 
eventually defeated without considerably weakening the main front. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Bolsheviks were able to negotiate a secret 
truce with the Poles. This was a serious blow to Denikin, who had hoped 
that the Polish Army would coordinate its operations with the Whites. 
Instead, the Bolsheviks were now free to transfer 43,000 more troops to 
fight against Denikin. Pilsudski, the Polish Chief of State, apparently 
considered the Whites as a bigger obstacle to his plans for a Greater 
Poland than the Bolsheviks.
252
 
 The Red Army commander-in-chief, Colonel S.S. Kamenev, 
had built up reserves for an operation against Denikin since September, 
and the Bolsheviks now had double the manpower of the Whites on the 
Southern Front. The Bolsheviks had also managed to organize their 
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armaments industry, and had considerable superiority in numbers of 
machine guns and artillery over the Whites despite all the aid these 
received from the Allies.
253
 Kamenev concentrated his best troops to the 
northwest of Orel against the advancing Volunteer Army, which he 
considered the most dangerous of Denikin’s armies. This shock-group 
was formed of the Lettish Riflemen, Red Army Cadets and other elite 
units usually not seen outside of Moscow. They were to attack the White 
flank and cut their line of communications while regular Red Army units 
would tie the Volunteer Army spearhead with a series of the usual 
frontal attacks of massed infantry.
254
  
 Kamenev’s counter-offensive started on 20 October. As 
planned, the Red shock-group drove a deep wedge in the right flank of 
the Volunteers. Only four days later the Volunteer Army had to abandon 
Orel and retreat southwards to Kursk to avoid being encircled. The 
situation worsened as Budenny’s newly formed I Cavalry Army 
simultaneously attacked the Don Cossacks at Voronezh and captured the 
city. Budenny’s attack aimed to separate the Volunteer and the Don 
Armies. This was completed by the capture of Kastornoe, a railway 
junction between Orel and Voronezh linking the two White armies. The 
battle raged for several weeks around Kursk. Denikin mustered all the 
reserves he could and tried to restart the offensive, but also the 
Bolsheviks poured more and more men and material into the battle and 
gradually gained the upper hand from the Whites. Kursk was lost on 17 
November, and the Red victory over the city formed a final turning point 
for the whole Civil War. Towards the end of November 1919 Denikin’s 
Army lost its fighting spirit and started a disorderly retreat to the 
south.
255
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 Kamenev’s successful strategy was not the only factor in 
Denikin’s setback. The White advance, formulated in Denikin’s 
‘Moscow Directive’ had been, as feared, too fast. The rear had not been 
secured and proper administration had not been organized. General 
anarchy and lawless acts by the White troops had soon turned the 
population against Denikin after the initial relief experienced when freed 
from the Bolshevik rule. As stated above, the return of old Tsarist 
bureaucrats and vengeful landlords did not ease the situation. For the 
majority of the people, the peasants, the Whites seemed to be fighting 
not only against the Bolsheviks, but also against the revolution in 
general and for the restoration of the old order ‒ or even something 
worse, as the Red propaganda cleverly stated. Denikin ‘liberated’ and 
ruled nominally a population of over forty million people, but he was 
never able to build a mass army described in the optimistic estimations 
conveyed to the Allies. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, were much 
more successful in this respect. The peasant mistrust and hatred of the 
Bolsheviks appeared eventually not as strong as the fear of losing their 
lands in the case of a White victory. Indeed, thousands of peasants 
rallied to the Red Army when Denikin threatened Moscow. Deserters 
returned to their units and there was no shortage of recruits.
256
 It was 
eventually these peasant conscripts herded to attack the Whites in one 
human wave after another at Orel and Kursk that broke Denikin’s 
advance on the Bolshevik capital.  
 There was also another form of peasant opposition, which 
confronted the Whites, especially in the Ukraine. The same loosely 
organized partisan groups that had harassed the Skoropadskii’s rada and 
the German’s, the French, the Bolsheviks (or any regime trying to 
conquer and rule the Ukrainian countryside) had turned their attention 
towards Denikin’s troops. Most dangerous and harmful of these groups 
was Nestor Makhno’s. Makhno had co-operated with the Bolsheviks for 
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a while during the summer of 1919 but he had been forced to disband 
his group temporarily when the Volunteer Army advanced into the 
Ukraine. During the early autumn, however, he regrouped his partisans 
in the White’s rear. Makhno preached about confused anarchistic utopia, 
but in reality his movement concentrated on rather well-organized 
marauding in the area between Ekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) and 
Mariupol. The Volunteer Army’s lines of communication were seriously 
threatened by Makhno’s constant attacks. Interestingly, the British 
officers attached to Denikin’s frontline units reported that Makhno’s 
partisan groups had organization and tactics very similar to the 
Germans’ small but heavily armed Sturm Abteilung battle units. This 
clearly started when a number of German deserters and ex-POW’s 
joined the Ukrainian partisans, and Makhno was even rumoured to have 
a few German colonels and majors in his staff.
257
 In October the fast-
moving partisans surprised the Whites by attacking Taganrog, Denikin’s 
HQ city. All available troops, including the British instructors and 
mechanics of the Volunteer armoured school with their tanks were 
mustered to repel Makhno.
258
 The Whites were eventually able to 
contain Makhno’s operations, but these anti-partisan operations tied 
several dearly-needed regiments exactly at the time of the crucial battles 
of Orel and Kursk.  
 Denikin tried hard to regroup his army to block the Bolshevik 
offensive. In early December he changed his strategy and tried to 
transfer most of the troops between the Dnepr and Don rivers. He 
reorganized the army by concentrating most of the White cavalry into a 
single corps ‒ according to Budenny’s example ‒ and attached it to the 
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Volunteer Army. Changes in the command were also necessary; General 
Mai-Maevskii had now succumbed completely to alcoholism, and he 
was replaced by Wrangel as the commander of the Volunteer Army. 
Denikin was hoping to regain the initiative as the Red Army in its turn 
was now bogged down in the morass of the Ukrainian partisan war. All 
these hopes were, however, in vain. There was not going to be a new 
‘March to Moscow’, and the White troops continued their retreat to the 
south without fighting. Having assumed his new post Wrangel sent a 
wire to Denikin from the front: ‘This is the bitter truth; the Volunteer 
Army has ceased to exist as a fighting force.’259 Despite his popularity, 
Wrangel was perhaps not the best choice as the new commander. In 
view of the battle lost, he seemed to have concentrated more on 
criticising Denikin and intriguing against this than continuing the 
struggle. His actions seem to have further undermined the already low 
morale of the White troops.
260
 
 The Armed Forces of South Russia had never been a cohesive 
army, and after the defeats of November and December of 1919 tension 
between the ex-Imperial officer dominated Volunteer Army and the 
Cossack armies increased close to breaking point. Budenny’s Cavalry 
Army had separated by its strike the Don Army from the Volunteers, and 
the Bolsheviks were again threatening the Don voisko where the 
demoralized Cossacks were retreating. Denikin still hoped that the Don 
Cossacks would once more rally to defend their home stanitsas. The 
situation in the Caucasian Army was even worse. The Kuban units had 
been worn out in the bitter defensive battles at Tsaritsyn, and, in 
addition, they had been stripped of their best cavalry by Denikin’s 
reorganization. The morale of Kuban units, afraid of being encircled and 
lost in their fate in Tsaritsyn, was further undermined by the separatist 
politics of the Kuban Government. The opposition had started to throw 
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doubt on the whole idea of fighting with Denikin. Denikin considered 
this as treason, and he sent the heavy-handed Wrangel to deal with the 
opposition at Ekaterinodar. After a quick court martial, a few of the 
Cossack leaders were hanged and the rest were exiled from Russia. 
Despite the new rada’s pro-Denikin declarations, the Kuban Cossacks 
had lost their spirit and started a disorderly retreat to their home 
stanitsas in the Northern Caucasus. The once mighty Kuban Cossack 
Army and the main ally of the early Volunteer movement had in reality 
ceased to exist. The British considered this as the main factor in the 
rapid collapse of the whole White movement in South Russia.
261
 Now 
the Bolshevik advance was no longer slowed to any great extent by the 
White resistance, but by the peasant partisans and the Red Army’s very 
own supply and transport problems. 
 
8.2. New British Policy Lines 
 During autumn 1919 the majority of the members of the War 
Cabinet had become convinced of the necessity to reformulate British 
policy towards Russia. Churchill, however, was still most enthusiastic in 
his support of the Whites. The reports of Denikin’s constant advance on 
to Moscow had convinced him of a White victory. Churchill kept 
circulating lengthy memoranda on the situation in Russia in the Cabinet 
and tried hard to rally his colleagues in support of Denikin.
262
 The War 
Office remained, however, the lone bastion of the White cause in 
Whitehall, with other ministers remaining lukewarm. Eventually, on 7 
September, the majority of the Cabinet, agreeing with the Prime 
Minister, made the decision to terminate aid to Denikin. Churchill was 
instructed to organize a ‘final packet’ of British aid to Denikin. This 
shipment was to consist of military supplies, drawn mostly from the 
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depots in the Mediterranean, to the value of 15 million pounds. 
Moreover Churchill was to inform Denikin of the final nature of this 
shipment, and also that the British Military Mission would be withdrawn 
from South Russia in the spring of 1920.
263
 This time the Cabinet’s 
instructions were strict and clearly-defined and left Churchill with very 
little room for manoeuvre. 
 When the news of Denikin’s defeat at Orel and Kursk reached 
London, support for Churchill’s intervention policies lost its last faint 
glimmer of hope in the Cabinet. At last, the Prime minister had clear 
evidence in support of his views; the Bolsheviks would win the civil 
war, and Britain had to modify its policy accordingly. Open turncoating 
and overtures towards Lenin’s government were clearly out of question. 
This would have meant a considerable breach in Britain’s international 
credibility. As for the domestic policy, official secession from the White 
movement would apparently have been applauded by the anti-
Interventionist opposition, but the MPs in the House of Commons 
behind Lloyd George's Coalition Government, the Conservative 
majority and many of the Liberals too, would hardly have approved. 
 The Prime Minister publicized his views on the Russian 
question in his speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet in the London 
Guildhall on 8 November. Lloyd George announced once more his 
opinion that ‘Bolshevism could not be suppressed by the sword’. 
Continuation of the intervention was simply too expensive for Britain. 
On the other hand, the Whites, according to the Prime Minister, had 
already been supplied with matériel worth 100 million pounds, and thus 
the ‘debt of honour’ to the wartime Allies had been sufficiently settled. 
Furthermore, the British troops had been mostly evacuated from Russia, 
he stated, and added that he himself was ‘glad of it’. Now Denikin’s 
drive towards Moscow had been checked and the situation had stagnated 
into a ‘prolonged and sanguinary struggle’. Therefore, Lloyd George 
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continued, ‘other methods must finally be resorted to for restoring peace 
and good government in that distressed land’.264 The Prime minister had 
returned to the idea he had entertained earlier the same year of 
negotiating with the Bolsheviks. During the following weeks he 
continued on the same lines in the House of Commons, softening 
opposition to his policy.
265
      
 Churchill did not, however, give in so easily. He still tried to 
convince the Cabinet that Denikin’s setbacks were only temporary in 
nature, and that the Whites would soon restart their offensive. Churchill 
claimed that Denikin would surely pay all his debt to Britain after his 
victory over the Bolsheviks, and that, on the other hand, the military aid 
to the Whites would be transformed to normal arms trade by March 
1920. Churchill seemed to have been very upset, because some of his 
colleagues, obviously Lloyd George and Curzon, had described the 
whole intervention in support of the Whites as ‘highly questionable’ and 
Denikin as an adventurer.
266
 In the House of Commons he argued 
against the alleged enormous costs of the intervention. Churchill 
informed the House, that the total expenditure in Russia had been 94.8 
million pounds, and this included the ‘final packet’ of 15 million to 
Denikin. However, half of the figure consisted of ‘non-marketable 
military stores’, the real value of which according to his advisers was 
only one-tenth.
267
 No doubt, it would have been very difficult to sell the 
hundreds of thousands of shells and millions of cartridges that were 
shipped to Denikin, especially at a time when most countries were 
disarming their armies after the World War. 
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 In the beginning of December Churchill received a highly 
optimistic telegram from General Holman, which described Denikin’s 
plans to renew the offensive. The Volunteer Army, now commanded by 
Wrangel, with its six fresh cavalry divisions would rout the Bolsheviks 
and secure victory.
268
 The telegram told more about the unrealistic hopes 
at Denikin’s HQ than the real situation at the front, and did not even 
convince Churchill. No offensive was coming and the other reports from 
the Military Mission described only how the Bolsheviks captured a city 
after a city. Churchill wrote a long personal letter to Denikin, in which 
he tried to advise and encourage the Russian general. He wrote how a 
large shipment of matériel would soon arrive at Novorossiisk, and these 
arms and supplies would be sufficient for offensive operations of three 
to four months. After this, if necessary, Churchill promised to sell 
Denikin munitions from the British Army depots ‘for a very decent 
price’. Hence, he urged him to inspect any raw materials or products 
which could be exchanged as payment for these supplies. Churchill also 
promised to try to pursue France to support Denikin. Finally he regretted 
Cabinet’s decision to withdraw the Military Mission from South Russia, 
but wrote of having no doubts that many British officers would continue 
their service as volunteers in the ranks of the White Army.
269
  How this 
voluntary service in a foreign army would fit in with the British legal 
system and the Army regulations, not to mention the official foreign 
policy of the government, did not seem to have bothered Churchill. 
 Encouraging telegrams were soon to be the only help 
Churchill was able to provide. Lloyd George’s policy of terminating aid 
to the Whites was confirmed in the inter-Allied conference held in 
London 11 -13 December. The French Prime Minister, Clemenceau, 
sided with Lloyd George on this question and preferred the idea of 
forming a cordon sanitaire or a barrier of independent states to contain 
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the spread of Bolshevism towards Europe. The most important of these 
buffer states would be Poland, which would also eliminate somewhat the 
threat from Germany that Clemenceau seemed to have considered more 
acute than that of Bolshevism. The conference resolved that the Allies 
would not enter into any further commitments to assist, militarily or 
financially, the ‘anti-Bolshevik elements’ in Russia; individual nations 
would, however, be free to leave their political or military missions in 
Russia as long as they wished. The Whites would also still be allowed to 
purchase matériel from the Allied countries. The message was clear; 
Russia would be left to decide her own fate without active intervention 
of the Allies on the White side of the conflict.
270
 This came close to 
acknowledging the Bolsheviks as the de facto winners of the civil war. 
 Churchill gradually had to come to terms with the situation. 
Clemenceau, who ‒ at least in his speeches ‒ had been the greatest 
advocate of a crusade against Bolshevism, and as such had been 
Churchill’s last hope. Clemenceau’s support for a strong independent 
Poland had also crushed his hopes to coax the Poles into co-operation 
with Denikin. Churchill seemed not to have been fully aware of the 
depth of the gap between Pilsudski’s Poland and Denikin’s Whites. He 
had sent General Briggs, the ex-chief of the British Mission to Denikin, 
to negotiate with Pilsudski, but the Polish leader had given only some 
vague promises of an offensive against the Bolsheviks not earlier than 
late spring 1920.
271
 Moreover, the reports from South Russia were most 
discouraging. The Bolsheviks continued their advance to the South and 
Denikin was becoming desperate. He even asked Churchill directly to 
send British troops ‒ ‘only one or two army corpses’ ‒ to save the 
Whites from defeat. Churchill continued publicly to advocate the White 
cause, and his opponents interpreted this as another ‘obsession’ of 
Churchill’s leading to another blunder similar to the Dardannelles 
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operation. This picture and citations of Churchill’s colourful phrases had 
partially been conveyed to the studies on the subject.
272
 As a matter of 
fact, Churchill seemed to have understood the situation in South Russia 
rather soberly. He had already admitted in a personal letter dated 31 
December 1919 to General Wilson that Denikin’s story would end soon. 
Churchill also instructed General Holman to advise Denikin to start 
negotiations for a truce with the Bolsheviks as he no longer considered a 
victory possible.
273
 
 The British intervention policy was gradually drawing to its 
inevitable conclusion. Open negotiations and agreement with the 
Bolsheviks were naturally impossible as Britain had not even recognized 
the Soviet Government. However, Lloyd George had already started in 
November to make secret enquiries about the possibility of re-opening 
trade with the Bolsheviks whom he now considered to be the de facto 
rulers of the country.  Trade with Russia had been most important for the 
British economy before the First World War, but now due to the war and 
revolution, Britain had lost Russia’s huge export markets and her own 
industry suffered severe shortages of raw materials. In his policy to start 
the trade with Soviet Russia, Lloyd George seemed to have been aiming 
at combining British economic interests and his liberalist vision of 
foreign relations. The trade with Britain would gradually improve 
democracy in Russia as the country grew wealthier. Strong economic 
relations would also increase British political influence in Russia and 
thus combat overt German schemes in the country.
274
  
 The British member of the Allied Supreme Economic council, 
E.F. Wise, prepared a memorandum to formulate trade relations with 
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Russia, which fitted perfectly the Prime Minister’s plans. First, the 
blockade of Soviet ports should be lifted. Then, Wise suggested, trade 
would be started with Russian agricultural co-operatives. The central 
organization of these co-operatives, Tsentrosoyuz, had managed, 
according to Wise, to retain a considerable degree of freedom and 
independence from the Soviet government, not to mention the 
organization still having its office in London.
275
 Wise had already 
arranged discussions with co-operative representatives to establish trade 
in the areas not under Bolshevik control, and hoped to extend these 
arrangements to also include the Soviet territory. What Wise was not 
aware of, as Richard Ullman has pointed out, was the fact that the co-
operative organization was tightly controlled by the Bolsheviks, who 
evidently recognized the usefulness of the Tsentrosoyuz opening up 
foreign trade, thus allowing the organization to maintain a formal level 
of autonomy. Lloyd George approved the main points of Wise’s 
memorandum and it thus became government policy, even though some 
of his ministers, such as Curzon and Churchill, strongly disapproved of 
the plan. The prime Minister also successfully introduced the plan to 
other Allied governments in Paris, and a committee, chaired by Wise 
was appointed to develop the idea further.
 276
 Lloyd George’s policy 
based on liberal economic ideas had now conclusively superseded 
Churchill’s interventionist views, which stressed the ideological and 
moral responsibility of Britain and, on the other hand, the need to 
contain the Bolshevik threat to the Europe by assisting the Whites. 
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8.3. Denikin’s Defeat 
 News of the new line of British Russian policy led to severe 
confusion in South Russia. The reaction of the population in the White-
held areas had been a combination of outrage and panic when Lloyd 
George’s Guildhall speech was published in the local newspapers. Many 
of the White officers had hoped that Allied armies would eventually 
come and save the grave situation after the Volunteer Army’s defeats in 
October. Now the British government seemed to desert the common 
struggle and leave the unlucky Russians to their own devices. At this 
desperate moment of defeat, attitudes towards the British turned sour 
and even openly hostile. In particular, the Monarchist faction of the 
White officers boasted openly that the British Government’s 
fundamental intention was to dismember and weaken Russia ‒ not to 
overcome her Bolshevik enemies.
277
 
 Many of the British officers serving in Russia were outraged 
at their government’s policy. In early January 1920 there were rumours 
that the Allied representatives had started secret negotiations with the 
Bolsheviks in Copenhagen. The much anticipated economic assistance 
that was thought to be decisive for the White cause in South Russia 
failed to materialize. Now it was said that the British government was 
about to send a delegation to Moscow to organize trade between Britain 
and Soviet Russia. The commanding officer of the No.1 Liaison Group 
(Daghestan), Colonel Lister, wrote in his diary that he was ashamed to 
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face his Russian colleagues: ‘What a cowardly treachery. Winston is the 
only person who is playing honestly with Denikin.’278 
 Despite the change in the British government’s Russian 
policy the Military Mission continued its work as effectively as 
circumstances would allow. After consulting Churchill, General Holman 
had ordered that the Mission would do its utmost to support Denikin’s 
Army until the final date of 31 March 1920 set by the Cabinet. The War 
Office’s efforts are illustrated by the fact that new officers were sent to 
South Russia all the time and the Mission’s strength was at its largest at 
well over 2,000 men as late as February 1920.
279
 As Denikin’s troops 
continued their disorderly retreat to the south, British freighters carrying 
matériel continued to arrive in Novorossiisk. Holman’s reorganization of 
the whole supply system of the AFSR was working very well, and the 
retreat had, as a matter of fact, shortened considerably supply routes and 
thus made the task of British Liaison Groups distributing the supplies 
much simpler. Ironically, now at the moment of defeat, Denikin’s Army 
was better armed and clothed than ever. ‘It looks to me as if Denikin will 
come to an end before his supply of stores’, wrote Churchill bitterly to 
his private secretary.
280
 
 The sapping of morale and spread of defeatism accelerated 
naturally the decline of Russian command and supply organization. 
Meanwhile, the role of the British became increasingly dominant. 
General Holman and his staff had started to take an active part in the 
operational planning of the AFSR as soon as the great retreat began in 
November 1919. Holman had also made extensive tours of the front 
inspecting the troops and making speeches in Russian and trying to 
encourage the soldiers to keep fighting. His obvious intention was to 
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counterbalance the news and rumours of the British ‘betrayal’. The 
RAF’s ‘A’ Detachment (the former 47th Squadron) kept up their 
bombing and strafing of Bolshevik troops until the end of March 1920. 
It concentrated in November on providing support for the Volunteer 
Corps on the main front in the Kharkov region. However, the rapid 
retreat of the White Army and continuous transfers to new airfields 
together with difficult weather conditions seriously hampered the efforts 
of the British airmen. The squadron was finally transferred to the Crimea 
in January and considerably bolstered the White’s defence of the 
peninsula.
281
 Meanwhile the instructors of the Taganrog tank school 
volunteered for combat service. The plan was to man the tanks supplied 
to the Russians with British crews and show the full potential of this 
weapon. Yet, the decisive counterattack of the Royal Tank Corps at 
Kharkov never materialized, because the demoralized Russian tank 
crews had already abandoned most of their vehicles to the Bolsheviks. 
The operational command of the remaining dozen (out of the original 
74) tanks was taken over by the Military Mission’s senior tank officer 
Colonel Radclyffe, and two of the vehicles were constantly manned by 
British crews.
282
 
 With the White forces retreating, the tactical command of 
those troops still in the fighting line sometimes ended up in the hands of 
British officers. The Russian officers had in many cases deserted their 
units to secure their personal safety or perhaps to transport the looted 
property to the rear. Sometimes they had lost all their authority over 
their units, and at the moment of defeat had more to fear from their own 
soldiers than the enemy. Repeatedly, in the face of the Bolshevik 
advance, local White headquarters hurriedly boarded their trains and left 
their troops, the civilian population connected to the White regime, and 
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also their British advisers in the lurch. Near Kiev the Russian personnel 
of a White air force squadron simply vanished during the night without 
informing their British instructors, and left all its planes and equipment 
at the station.
283
 This was not desertion of single units.  The commander 
of the White forces in the Ukraine, General Shilling, had abandoned 
Kiev and the whole western Ukraine and retired to Odessa. After 
receiving 10,000 rifles, ammunition and a promise of fire support from 
the Royal Navy, Shilling gave his word of honour to Denikin and the 
British Mission that he would stay and defend the city ‒ only to take a 
boat to the Crimea the next day and leave the chief of the British Liaison 
Group to organize the evacuation of the city.
284
 Similarly, in the Don 
capital Novocherkask Cossack generals left the British officers attached 
to the Don Army with a few junior Cossack officers and NCOs to 
organize a rearguard action to enable the mainly pro-White civilian 
population to escape from the city. A few weeks later in Rostov the 
British were again left behind and Captain Frecheville and Lieutenant 
Couche were consequently captured and murdered.
285
 
 The AFSR’s headquarters in Taganrog was evacuated in an 
equally haphazard and chaotic manner. It was very typical for the 
conditions in South Russia during the Civil War that a lavish Christmas 
dinner which Denikin and his generals attended was organized in the 
British Mission headquarters only a few days before the evacuation.
286
 
The Mission was informed ‒ not by the Russians, but by the British 
artillery instructors ‒ only at the last minute that the White troops were 
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leaving their positions and the Bolshevik would soon be in the city. 
Consequently, the Tank School, RAF’s ‘A’ Detachment and the Mission 
headquarters were not able to organize their evacuation properly. Co-
operation with the Russians was most difficult, and the British did not 
receive enough rolling stock for the transport. The Russian general 
responsible for railway transport informed the British that only their 
officers would be taken in the trains, and General Holman’s personal 
intervention was necessary to secure the transport for British NCOs and 
men. In these chaotic conditions, the RAF had to destroy over twenty 
aircraft and a huge amount of spare parts and ammunition, because no 
transport was available. Also railway cars containing artillery and 
several tanks were left standing in the Taganrog station as the engine 
vanished before departure.
 287
 
 General Denikin and his headquarters were now back in 
Ekaterinodar, the Kuban capital and the starting point of his offensive. 
The White generals who had been relatively reluctant to listen to the 
advice of their British colleagues were now urged to change their 
attitude. General Holman and his subordinates, who so far had been 
most tactful and diplomatic in their suggestions, began to change their 
tone considerably. In 22 January, Holman handed a very straightforward 
memorandum to Denikin, in which he criticized the White command. He 
described the conduct of the Russian officers during the evacuation of 
Taganrog as ‘disgraceful’. Consequently, the AFSR had lost a 
considerable part of its striking power. The memorandum also included 
an official protest about the treatment of British military and political 
representatives in South Russia. The worst case had been the hostile 
reception received by the Foreign Office’s High Commissioner Halford 
Mackinder, who had arrived in early January to South Russia to smooth 
relations between the Border States and Denikin. ‘How does your 
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Excellency think this will be interpreted in London?’, Holman inquired, 
and strongly advised Denikin to remind his officers of their behaviour 
towards the British in the daily routine orders of the AFSR.
288
 
 Only ten days later, as the situation at the front deteriorated 
further, Holman wrote another even more plain-speaking memorandum 
to Denikin. Citing rather sarcastically one of Denikin’s declarations, he 
pointed out that the White Army would not be celebrating Easter in 
Moscow. The only feasible choice was to retire to the Crimea, but to 
complete this succesfully, the Russians must awake from their apathy. 
Holman also threatened Denikin directly, that if his officers did not start 
to co-operate with the British ‒ i.e. follow instructions given by the 
British ‒ the British Mission would terminate its aid, which would mean 
certain and quick defeat for the AFSR. Holman confirmed his loyalty to 
the White cause, but by the same token, he reminded Denikin of his 
foremost responsibilities to the British Government. The blunt 
memorandum ended with a strong recommendation to ‘purge the Army 
of traitors, thieves and the incapable’, and a list of persons belonging in 
these categories including, for example, General Shilling who had 
handed Odessa to the Bolsheviks without a fight and General 
Kravtshevich, the chief of the White Air Force, who, according to 
Holman, was mostly interested in ‘wine, women and song’.289 Thus 
Holman intervened directly in the command of the AFSR, and also 
became involved in the intrigue between the rival factions of White 
officers. During a conference he advised Denikin to sack General 
Romanovskii, ‘who was generally considered responsible for the current 
setbacks and rumoured even to be a German spy’. Holman’s goal seems 
to have been to promote General Wrangel’s rapidly fading prestige as he 
urged Denikin to settle the dispute with ‘his most competent 
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commander’. Holman also asked Wrangel to come to Novorossiisk to 
negotiate with Denikin and promised to guarantee his safety.
290
 
 Despite the embarrassing nature of Holman’s advice, Denikin 
had no option but to listen. He understood the vital importance of British 
support and, on the other hand, seems to have respected Holman’s 
honest efforts on behalf of the Whites. There was, however, very little 
Denikin could do, as he had lost his authority over most of the AFSR 
towards the end of January 1920. Now on the eve of defeat Denikin was 
even ready to compromise his fundamental principle of a ‘Holy and 
undivided Russia’. As the British High Commissioner MacKinder had 
advised him, Denikin promised autonomy to the Cossack voiskos and 
recognized the de facto sovereignty of the Transcaucasian nations. He 
also secured the peasants’ right to their lands by a land degree. The 
Special Council and military dictatorship was replaced by a new ‘South 
Russian Government’, which included representatives even from 
socialist parties. It has been described as the most leftist and liberal 
government within the whole anti-Bolshevik movement.
291
 But all this 
was too late. The vast agricultural lands of the Ukraine and Southern 
Russia had been lost already before Christmas, most of the Don had 
already been overrun and the Red Army was now invading the Kuban 
and threatening Ekaterinodar. Finally, at the end of February 1920 
Denikin made the decision to withdraw the remnants of his Army to the 
more defensible Crimea as first Wrangel, and then, Holman had advised. 
The plan was to march the main part of the Army along the Taman 
peninsula and then cross the Kerch straits as it was impossible to ship all 
troops from Novorossiisk.  
 The British Mission had actually started, according to the 
War Office’s instructions, to transfer its functions to Novorossiisk and 
                                            
290
 Lister’s diary 14 February 1920, Lister papers, LHC, and Holman to Wrangel 22 
February 1920, Wrangel Collection 162/28, HIA. 
291
 For Denikin’s reforms see Kenez, Civil War in South Russia, vol II, pp. 227-36. 
   
 
168 
to prepare for evacuation well before Denikin’s decision to evacuate. 
General Holman instructed the unloading of supplies to be stopped at 
Novorossiisk and to transfer as much as possible of the already arrived 
matériel to the Crimea. At the same time the members of the Mission 
were armed and organized to defend their base and the harbour. 
Trenches were dug, machine gun posts and barbed wire were installed in 
the key points of the city. This time the British took over the command 
of the evacuation right from the beginning. The events in Odessa, 
Taganrog and other cities had convinced the British that the White 
troops could not be trusted to obey orders in such circumstances.
292
 
 One of the most trying duties of the British Mission during 
the last months of Denikin’s regime was the evacuation of the White 
civilian population. The British political High Commissioner 
MacKinder, after consulting Holman, had promised Denikin that the 
British would evacuate all the families of the AFSR’s officers. 
MacKinder had clearly no authorization for such promises from the 
British Cabinet or the Foreign Office, but Churchill authorized the 
shipping to be organized for the evacuation. In South Russia it was the 
British Military Mission, not Denikin’s officials, which organized the 
registration of these civilian refugees and their transportation to 
Novorossiisk. All 50,000 registered refugees were indeed shipped to the 
Crimea or Constantinople by 22 March 1920. The same ships which 
carried the refugees transported thousands of wounded White soldiers to 
Allied military hospitals in the Near East.
293
 Despite all the efforts of the 
Mission more and more refugees poured into Novorossiisk. In addition 
to the original registered civilians it was estimated that in March 1920 
there were over half a million refugees, and it was impossible to 
organize transport for all of them in such a short space of time. This 
evacuation has rather cynically been interpreted simply as an attempt to 
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raise the morale of the White troops by guaranteeing the safety of their 
families.
294
 It was, however, also another sign of Holman’s and 
Churchill’s attachment to the White cause and, no doubt, a humanitarian 
act as well. That at least was how Denikin considered the evacuation in 
his memoirs.
295
    
 The British Military Mission started to prepare for the final 
evacuation of the Kuban in the middle of March. The whole personnel 
of the Mission were gradually transported to Novorossiisk and General 
Holman was the last to leave Ekaterinodar on 15 March − two days 
before the city fell to the Bolsheviks. Churchill had actually placed 
Holman under the direct orders of General Milne, the commander of the 
British forces on the Black Sea, in order to relieve him responsibility for 
the withdrawal because of Holman’s ‘strong feelings for the Whites’. 
General Milne at Constantinople considered it necessary to increase 
British prestige in South Russia, and perhaps being somewhat 
suspicious of Holman’s loyalty, sent General Bridges to supervise the 
evacuation. A strong Royal Navy’s fleet of battleships and cruisers 
sailed to support the evacuation and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers was landed at Novorossiisk and it took positions guarding the 
approaches to the harbour. The British tried to boost the morale of both 
the White troops and the civilians by parading all the available soldiers, 
marines and sailors along the streets headed by a band and pipes along 
the streets of Novorossiisk.
296
   
 Together with thousands of civilian refugees, the White 
troops retreated towards Novorossiisk without organized resistance. The 
plan to cross the Kerch Straits to the Crimea was nullified as the 
Bolshevik cavalry occupied Anapa on the coast, thereby cutting the 
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route along the Taman Peninsula. The retreating Whites were harassed 
not only by the Bolsheviks, but also by the local partisans calling 
themselves the ‘Greens’.297 These partisans were originally not different 
from peasant insurrectionist movements in other parts of Russia, but 
here in the Black Sea province they were supplied by the Georgian 
government with arms and money. As Denikin’s army gradually 
dissolved as an organized fighting force, more and more White soldiers 
joined the Greens. In 1920 the partisan groups totalling 5 - 6,000 men 
were virtually controlling the area around Novorossiisk and constantly 
disrupting the connections to the city. The British had also been attacked 
by the Greens several times. Colonel Keyes, the Acting High 
Commissioner, even tried to negotiate a truce with the partisan leaders ‒ 
no doubt without consulting Denikin ‒ but the attacks continued as the 
ex-Volunteer officer proclaiming himself the commander of the 
partisans could hardly control his loosely-organized soldiers.
298
 Sniping 
at the British near Novorossiisk ceased only after drastic retaliation by 
the British. As Keyes had threatened the Greens, the dreadnought HMS 
Benbow with her 13,5 inch guns completely pulverized a village where 
a British sergeant had been severely wounded by a sniper.
299
   
 The evacuation of Novorossiisk was a nightmare. As feared 
by the British, the White troops did not attempt to defend the city, 
instead pouring towards the harbour together with the mass of civilian 
refugees. The commander of the British battalion (2 Royal Scots 
Fusiliers) landed at Novorossiisk, Lieutenant-Colonel Hakewill-Smith, 
estimated that it would have been feasible to defend the city even with a 
small but determined force, because it was surrounded by high wooded 
hills and accessible from land only through a single road and railway in 
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a narrow ravine.
300
 But no troops were to be found for this task. Denikin 
seems to have been unwilling to sacrifice the last remaining veteran 
units of the Volunteer Army, he wanted to use them as a nucleus for the 
new army in the Crimea. The Volunteer Army battalions were rushed 
first to the ships and many of the far more numerous Don Cossacks were 
left behind as there was not enough room in the ships for everyone. On 
the docks the British destroyed tons of supplies which could not have 
been shipped to the Crimea; brand new DH 9 bombers were crushed to 
splinters by a tank which was then left to waddle into the sea. The 
evacuation would have been a complete disaster, had the British not 
been able to maintain order at the harbour and if the continuous gunfire 
of the Allied warships had not kept the Bolsheviks at bay. On 26 March 
the British Mission itself embarked on a steamer in good order ‒ under 
the protection of the bayonets of the Royal Scots. On the same evening 
Denikin and his staff boarded a British destroyer, the last one to leave 
Novorossiisk, as the Bolsheviks entered the city.
301
 The Armed Forces 
of South Russia were no more. 
 
        8.4. Wrangel and the British 
 The evacuation of Novorossiisk and the subsequent 
retirement of Denikin from the command of the White Army have been 
traditionally considered as the terminal point of the British intervention 
in South Russia. Western studies describe how Britain withdrew its aid 
officially from General Wrangel’s regime in the Crimea and started 
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negotiations with Lenin’s Soviet Government.302 The final break with 
the White movement did not happen, however, before arming and 
helping to organize Wrangel’s new White army. It was to cause a serious 
discomfort to the Soviet Government while the Red Army was entangled 
in the Polish campaign. 
 News of the Novorossiisk evacuation reached London and on 
March 31 the Cabinet decided to urge Denikin to give up the struggle 
and to make peace with the Bolsheviks. It was also decided that the 
representatives of the British government would act as intermediaries 
between the Whites and the Soviet Government. At this critical moment 
Churchill was on vacation in France and absent from furious 
disagreement about the decision, which must have been a relief for his 
colleagues. Thus, it was left for Curzon to formulate the Cabinet’s 
decision in to form of an ultimatum, which Admiral de Robeck, the High 
Commissioner in Constantinople, was instructed to hand to Denikin.
303
 
Denikin had already, however, made his decision to retire from the 
command of the White Army, and after consulting his generals 
appointed his old rival, General Wrangel, as his successor. Denikin 
boarded a British destroyer together with General Holman, who had 
been recalled to London ‘to report’, and left Russia forever.  
 The new commander of the White forces received the 
ultimatum from the British Government calmly. In his reply, Wrangel 
admitted the necessity of an immediate armistice and accepted the 
British offer to mediate in the negotiations with the Soviets. He required 
the British Government, however, to take responsibility for all persons 
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who wanted to leave Russia despite the supposed amnesty by the Soviet 
Government, and Wrangel considered necessary an interim period of at 
least two months before the Crimea would be handed over to the Soviet 
authorities. The Allies should also supply the military and civilian 
population in the Crimea.
304
 Wrangel was apparently playing for time. 
He did not have any illusions about Bolshevik goodwill. The Whites 
needed breathing space to reorganize their army and Wrangel did not 
want to disrupt relations with the Allies. Wrangel seems to have hoped, 
as Denikin had done, that the Bolsheviks would eventually succumb to a 
popular uprising. At that moment the Crimea would serve as a base for 
the recovery of White Russia. 
 The British Government did not reply directly to Wrangel’s 
message. The requirement to accommodate all the refugees and to 
supply the population of the Crimea for a lengthy period was considered 
inconvenient. The Cabinet, however, instructed Curzon to contact the 
Soviet Government directly. The negotiations between Curzon and the 
Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, were executed through 
wireless messages, which no doubt complicated the situation, and they 
eventually proved fruitless. Chicherin made demands for the 
unconditional surrender of Wrangel’s forces, while the British 
threatened the Soviet Government with the use of a naval force in 
support of Wrangel. This exchange of messages coincided with the start 
of the Polish offensive, which weakened the Soviet position also on the 
Crimean front. The British Government had wanted to secure trade 
negotiations and thus end the Civil War in Russia, and the Soviet 
Government, in addition, naturally wanted to pacify the southern front to 
be able to concentrate its forces against the Poles. The British even 
appointed a political agent to organize negotiations in the Crimea, but 
these were never to occur as the renewal of Soviet-Polish conflict had 
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strengthened Wrangel’s position considerably. It is doubtful whether he 
ever seriously planned any negotiations with the Bolsheviks.
305
 
 Meanwhile Wrangel had not wasted time. He had started to 
reorganize the army, which he renamed the Russian Army, and 
administration in the Crimea. In this he was greatly helped, right from 
the beginning, by the British Military Mission, which had transferred its 
functions to Feodosia and Sevastopol. The Mission, commanded by 
Brigadier General Percy, had a strength of no less than 171 officers and 
458 other ranks. All these men had volunteered to continue their service 
in Russia.
306
 Despite the policy of the British Government the Mission 
continued its efforts to support the Whites, and the British serving in the 
Crimea remained sympathetic to the White cause and seemed to have 
disapproved the decisions of the Cabinet to withdraw the aid from the 
Whites.
307
 The Military Mission’s continued presence and work in the 
Crimea was naturally authorised by Churchill who was greatly angered 
by the Cabinet’s detente policy towards the Bolsheviks. He was 
determined to give Wrangel the full support of the British Mission, 
although General Wilson had asked permission to withdraw the 
Mission. Apparently respecting the Cabinet policy Churchill did not, 
however, enter into direct communication with Wrangel, as he had done 
with Denikin.
308
 
 The support Wrangel received from the Royal Navy’s Black 
Sea Fleet, commanded by Admiral de Robeck, was no less important. 
British warships had conducted the evacuation of Novorossiisk and they 
also made possible the very defence of the Crimean peninsula at the 
initial stages of Wrangel’s regime. The Red high command has been 
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criticised for failing to pursue the Whites across the Kerch Strait and 
over the Perekop Isthmus to the Crimea and delivering the coup de 
grâce.
309
 This kind of operation would have been, however, quite 
disastrous, as the gunfire of the British battleships and cruisers there 
would have easily destroyed any landing force the Bolsheviks would 
have been able to muster.
310
 The Bolshevik strategists must have 
remembered how the British naval gunfire had proved so costly to all 
their attempts to oust the Volunteers from their Crimean bridgehead at 
Kerch and made crossing the Kerch Strait to Kuban unthinkable in the 
spring and summer of 1919. The Cabinet instructed Admiral de Robeck 
to give protection to Wrangel’s Army on 18 April, because of the 
unsuccessful negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The only restriction was 
that no troops should be landed.
311
 In addition to naval fire support, de 
Robeck sent a seaplane carrier HMS Pegasus to the Sea of Azov where 
British aircraft reconnoitred and bombed the Bolsheviks. The moral 
effect of the very presence of the British warships at the Crimean coast 
was also most important for the revival of the White army. Admiral de 
Robeck proved to be no less sympathetic to the White struggle than his 
colleagues in the British Army.   
 Wrangel did not to raise his ‘Russian Army’ from almost 
nothing, as it has indeed been described in some studies on the topic.
312
 
Nor had the catastrophe at Novorossiisk been as total as first appeared. 
The Allied and few Russian ships evacuated approximately 34,000 
White troops during the last days of March and some 15,000 more, 
mostly Kuban Cossacks, were shipped to the Crimea from Tuapse and 
Sochi during April. Although over 400 tons of stores were lost in 
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Novorossiisk, the British Military Mission had managed to ship, for 
example, most of the artillery and machine guns, to the Crimea and, as 
mentioned above, other shipments from Constantinople had been 
diverted to the Crimea since February.
313
 
 The British bases started their work immediately. Wrangel’s 
troops were issued over 202 artillery pieces, 25 tanks, 97 mortars, 863 
machine guns, 38.400 rifles and 71 million rounds of small arms 
ammunition.
314
 Also the remaining 40 aircraft (mostly DH 9’s) of the 
RAF mission which were evacuated to the Crimea in April were handed 
over to Wrangel’s army. Altogether Wrangel received 29 shiploads of 
matériel, fuel and food from the British during the period from 27 March 
to 25 June 1920. The Mission continued to train the Russians in the use 
of British weapons, and machine gun schools were established both in 
Sevastopol and in Theodosia. In addition, General Percy’s policy was to 
help Wrangel organize his supply system to operate independently and 
not to rely solely on the British advisors, as had happened in Denikin’s 
army.
315
 
 Wrangel launched his attack out from the Crimean Peninsula 
on 7 June. This led to his final break with the British government. The 
majority of the Cabinet, excluding Churchill, did not want the Crimean 
episode to disrupt the trade negotiations with the Soviet Government. 
Paradoxically, at the same time as Lloyd George started the trade 
negotiations with the Soviet envoy Krasin in London, the British 
Mission had armed and trained Wrangel’s army and thus facilitated its 
offensive against the Bolsheviks. Most of the White soldiers not only 
carried British weapons, but also wore British uniforms. In his memoirs 
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Wrangel did not acknowledge the importance of British aid in the re-
creation of the White army in the Crimea, perhaps due to his 
understandable bitterness regarding the policy of the British 
Government. He admits the sympathetic attitude of the British 
representatives, naming especially Admiral de Robeck and General 
Percy, but does not mention the material aid. The plain numbers are 
confirmed, however, in the supply records of Wrangel’s Russian 
Army.
316
 
 The British intervention in South Russia eventually came to 
an end in June 1920. A few days after the start of Wrangel’s offensive, 
the Cabinet sent telegrams to both General Milne and Admiral de 
Robeck ordering the prompt withdrawal of the Military Mission and 
denial of all naval support to Wrangel. Nor would Wrangel receive any 
British diplomatic assistance: he would have to make his own terms with 
the Bolsheviks.
317
 The Cabinet’s orders were quickly put into effect. The 
Military Mission handed all the remaining matériel over to the Russians 
and General Percy started to organize the evacuation of his men. So 
strong, however, was the affection of the frontline instructors for the 
White cause that Percy feared they might disobey the order to leave their 
units. Percy had to lure these officers from the front by inviting them to 
a conference in Sevastopol. On their arrival at the Mission headquarters 
the officers were surrounded by the Royal Marines military police, 
stripped of their revolvers and marched straight to a waiting ship. The 
Mission left Sevastopol on 27 June leaving only four officers and eight 
other ranks as observers in the Crimea. At the same time the ships of the 
Royal Navy, which had supported Wrangel after the beginning of his 
offensive, were withdrawn to Turkish waters. The Royal Navy 
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maintained, however, the blockade of Soviet Black Sea ports throughout 
the summer and autumn of 1920.
318
  
 Wrangel was now alone. Despite the change of policy in 
April 1920, Britain had been the only substantial supporter of the Whites 
in the Crimea. The French government urged Wrangel to continue his 
struggle against the Bolsheviks in order to support its policy in Poland. 
The French even recognized Wrangel’s government in August but did 
not furnish him with any substantial amount of supplies. Wrangel was 
able to defend the territories he had conquered in his June offensive for 
a while, but an invasion in the Kuban to raise a new Cossack army 
proved a failure. As soon as the Soviet-Polish war ended in October, the 
Red army diverted their main forces against Wrangel. The end came in a 
few weeks. This time the Whites were prepared for the evacuation, and 
ships carried 146,000 people from the Crimea into exile. There were no 
British ships to assist the evacuation. The Cabinet had decided, despite 
Churchill’s sole disapproval, not to give Wrangel assistance of any 
kind.
319
 The British government’s break with the White movement, 
following Wrangel’s June offensive, was absolute.  
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 9.  CONCLUSION  
 
 When the Great War ended in Europe the British Government 
found itself deeply enmeshed in the Russian Civil War. In this situation 
the British Cabinet, as well as the other Allied governments, proved 
eventually unable to formulate a clear policy on the Russian conflict. 
Support for the anti-Bolshevik forces, which had begun almost 
immediately after the Bolshevik coup in 1917, was continued. The 
Allies did not, however, take a clear stand against the Bolsheviks. In the 
case of Britain, Cabinet’s decisions leading to this confusing situation 
were not based on a policy with a clearly defined goal. As Richard 
Ullman has pointed out, these initial post-Armistice decisions were 
completely lacking any overriding principle: the Cabinet simply 
authorized a series of piecemeal operations in several parts of the former 
Russian Empire.
320
 Britain was not to commit her forces in an all-out 
campaign to conquer the Bolsheviks. The Cabinet would not accept the 
Bolsheviks as the new rulers of Russia either. The British post-Armistice 
Russian policy appears to have been an attempt to steer a middle course 
between these two lines. The Cabinet’s decisions contained a serious 
contradiction: Britain began to support the Border States seeking 
sovereignty from Russia and, on the other hand, the Whites, such as 
Kolchak and Denikin, who were fundamentally against ‘dismembering’ 
the Russian Empire. 
 The cause of this incoherence in the British policy towards 
Russia during the whole period of the intervention seems to lie in the 
complicated and very fluid political situation and in the wartime system 
of political decision-making, which was centralized almost completely 
in the hands of the War Cabinet. During 1918 the War Cabinet had 
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naturally concentrated on winning the war on the Western Front. 
Similarly, after the Armistice, it was preoccupied with the peace with 
Germany and reconstructing the strained economy of the country. The 
War Cabinet continued to operate until the autumn of 1919 and the 
wartime process of decision-making thus had a crucial role in the 
intervention politics.  
 The wartime necessities for speedy political resolutions had, 
on the other hand, relegated much of the decision-making normally 
requiring Cabinet’s or Parliament’s approval to the heads of the 
departments of state. The World War had strengthened the position of 
the War Office in particular because of the obvious importance of the 
Army in the Continental War, whereas the role of the Foreign Office as 
a designer of British foreign policy had greatly diminished during the 
war. In the case of the British intervention in Russia, the War Cabinet’s 
vague and partially contradictory decisions indeed resulted in the 
relegation of the decision-making to the War Office and the War 
Cabinet did not directly authorize many of the actual military operations 
conducted in Russia. 
 British intervention in the Russian Civil War was presented in 
the Press as ‘Mr Churchill’s Private War’. War Secretary Winston 
Churchill’s role was certainly crucial in the moulding of the British 
policy that was actually implemented, for example, in South Russia. 
Churchill became utterly frustrated because of the lack of a clear 
Cabinet policy in the Russian question and the lack of support for his 
own views on the seriousness of the threat that Bolshevism presented to 
the British Empire ‒ and for that matter to the rest of Western 
civilization. The main obstacle to Churchill in the Cabinet was the all-
powerful Prime Minister Lloyd George, who was searching for a 
diplomatic solution to the crisis. As a result, Churchill began to pursue 
his own Russian policy: defeating the Bolsheviks by supplying the 
White Armies with matériel and supporting them directly with units of 
volunteers and military advisers. Cabinet’s vague decisions from 1918 
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to support any anti-Bolshevik force in Russia could be interpreted as an 
authorization of his plans for massive material aid to Kolchak and 
Denikin, and in the case of sending volunteers to Russia Churchill could 
extract the authorization from the Cabinet on grounds of  ‘utmost 
military urgency’. The British policy actually implemented on the 
ground during 1919 and early 1920 was orchestrated essentially from 
the War Office and in many cases it contradicted official British foreign 
policy. 
 It is more or less this official British Russian policy of Lloyd 
George and perhaps that of the Foreign Office that previous Western 
studies on the topic have described as proof of the marginal influence of 
Britain in the Russian Civil War. The most influential of these studies 
has, no doubt, been Ullman’s Anglo-Soviet Relations. In his three 
volumes Ullman formulated a comprehensive explanation of the British 
intervention which has been widely accepted in the studies of the 
intervention and the Russian Civil War. According to Ullman, there was 
no consistent British policy to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. The 
basic aim of British policy was to weaken Russia, and thus to prevent 
the re-emergence of the old rivalry between the two empires. This was 
indeed the official line of policy. But the War Office and Churchill, its 
Secretary of State, certainly had a policy to counter Bolshevism and this 
plan was conducted in a most determined manner in South Russia. After 
all, what really made the difference in the course of the Civil War was 
not Lloyd George’ attempts to bring the participants into negotiations, 
but the shiploads of arms and equipment the White’s received from 
Britain. When the British government finally entered into negotiations 
with the Soviets in the spring of 1920, the Whites had already 
effectively lost the war.  
 Without the British intervention on the White side, the 
superiority of numbers in manpower and weaponry of the Bolsheviks 
would have overwhelmed their opponents probably early in the year 
1919. The whole picture of the Civil War would have been very 
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different in that the large-scale field operations between the Whites and 
the Reds would not have taken place. Neither of the two most important 
White commanders, Kolchak nor Denikin, would have been able to 
build up their armies and to launch their offensives without Allied war 
supplies in 1919. Denikin’s small Volunteer Army would have most 
probably been defeated in the battles of North Caucasus and Kuban in 
the winter 1918-19. Indeed the war would have been more or less 
confined to the Bolsheviks fighting against bands of peasant guerrillas, 
as was the case in the vast Russian countryside nominally under 
Bolshevik control and as the civil war continued after the defeat of the 
Whites. 
   *  *  * 
 The British Government sent its first military envoys to South 
Russia in late 1918 and, having evaluated the situation, started to 
provide General Denikin’s army with ample supplies. British support 
was also instrumental in Denikin’s success in claiming the operational 
command of all the various anti-Bolshevik forces, most importantly the 
Cossacks of the Don and Kuban, and combining these as the Armed 
Forces of South Russia. The War Office became convinced that 
Denikin’s army was the most capable of all the White armies in the 
whole of Russia and eventually the only force capable of conquering the 
Bolsheviks. 
 The amount of arms, ammunition and equipment sent to 
Denikin’s army was enormous. In fact, the Whites received more 
matériel than they were ever able to use. The extent of the British aid 
could be illustrated by a comparison with the equipment of the Finnish 
Army during the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40.
321
 Denikin’s 
army was much better supplied than the Finns who successfully fought 
to a standstill the invasion of the Soviet Army of a quite different quality 
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and size than its Civil War predecessor. The Finnish Army had roughly 
the same numerical strength of 200,000 as Denikin’s AFSR. The Finnish 
infantry was mostly equipped with weaponry from the First World War 
era and in many cases with identical types, including the ex-Imperial 
Russian rifles and machine guns, as Denikin’s army. The Finns suffered, 
however, above all from a serious shortage of artillery and shells. The 
artillery that the British supplied the Whites with was mostly even more 
modern and certainly far more numerous than what Finns had against 
the much stronger and heavier Soviet artillery twenty years later. The 
same applies with the millions of shells and small arms ammunition the 
Whites received from Britain.
322
 The reason for Denikin’s defeat was 
definitely not insufficient material aid from the Allies. 
 The British military mission, about 2,000 strong, also 
organized the training of Russian troops. Training the White troops in 
the use of the new British weapons was an integral part of the aid. The 
disappointing effects of the vast British aid conferred on the Russians 
during the World War had proved that proper training was essential for 
any results, as most of the types of the British weapons and their 
technical and tactical use were new to the Russians. The British Mission 
also organized and managed an effective supply system to distribute the 
materiel to the front-line units. Without this supply system, the effect of 
the aid would have been considerably smaller. Without British military 
support, Denikin would have been unable to build up his humble 
Volunteer Army into a fighting force of 200,000 men, let alone to launch 
his operation against Moscow. 
 When the Cabinet authorized the War Office to send a 
military mission to South Russia, it clearly banned any involvement in 
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combat operations. According to the official policy of March 1919, no 
fighting troops were to be sent to Russia; the British military personnel 
in Russia were only to train and supply the loyal Allies of the Great War. 
The instructions from Churchill’s War Office, however, contradicted the 
general policy. Individual officers and in some cases whole units of the 
Military Mission began to take part in combat operations to support the 
White army. 
 The involvement of British instructors in combat was 
partially a result of the problems in introducing the modern arms 
technology to the Russians. It proved especially difficult to train the 
Russian crews in the use of tanks and aeroplanes in the tight schedule 
dictated by the critical situation at the Front. As a result, the British 
instructors drove the tanks to the battle themselves, and although the 
Russian crews gradually mastered the use of this weapon, the tactical 
command of Denikin’s armoured corps remained in British hands. The 
effect of the tanks was out of proportion to their relatively small number. 
The presence of a handful of these vehicles often proved decisive in the 
battles, as the Bolsheviks had no effective means to combat them and as 
their infantry usually fled in panic at the first sight of tanks. British 
artillery and machine-guns instructors were also assigned to the White 
front-line units, and thus took part in the battles, sometimes taking the 
command of the unit they were supposed to supervise. 
 The case of the 47th Squadron of the Royal Air Force is 
somewhat different as it was sent to South Russia clearly as a combat 
unit to provide air support to Denikin’s Army. The operations of the 
squadron, continuing until the end of March 1920, extent supported to a 
great the White war effort. Before the British arrived, the role of the air 
arm in the Civil War was almost non-existent. The effectiveness of this 
relatively small unit, about 50 planes, was an unpleasant surprise to the 
Red Army, whose own air force had not yet been developed and 
consisted of a small number of vintage planes and even fewer pilots. 
During the summer of 1919 the skies of South Russia were effectively 
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cleared of Red planes. In addition to the actual losses suffered by the 
Bolsheviks, the air raids had a devastating effect on morale. The low 
flying, strafing fighters horrified the Bolshevik infantry and cavalrymen. 
The planes of the 47th Squadron of the RAF, together with the British 
tanks and the warships of the Royal Navy were also a particularly visible 
sign of British support for the White troops. 
 Co-operation between the British and the Russians often 
proved difficult. The British government’s inability to define its Russian 
policy clearly made the Military Mission’s work difficult right from the 
beginning. The Russians were disappointed as the much-awaited British 
divisions never arrived. The Prinkipo affair and the contradictory policy 
of supporting the Border States also made the Whites very suspicious of 
the ultimate aims of the British. Within the Armed Forces of South 
Russia the British were accused of favouring the Volunteer Army at the 
expense of the far more numerous Cossacks. In addition to the political 
difficulties, there was a wide cultural gap between the officers of the 
post-Great War British Army and Denikin’s Volunteer Army and the 
Cossacks. The war in South Russia was very different from anything the 
British had experienced or could expect. The problem was not only the 
obsolete and unimaginative military thinking of the Russians, but the 
whole ethos of Russian military culture. It also appears that not a few of 
the members of the British Mission were poorly qualified for their 
demanding tasks. Mutual mistrust, cultural and communication 
difficulties hindered considerably the work of the British Mission. Many 
of the British officers became frustrated, and it was not uncommon to 
speak about ‘backing the wrong horse’. On the other hand, many 
Russians must have found the growing importance of the British role in 
Denikin’s command deeply embarrassing, especially after Holman 
introduced his radical policy and the British took control of Denikin’s 
Armys’s supply system.  
 The Russian Civil War was an extremely brutal conflict. 
Generally inhuman treatment and executions of the prisoners was more a 
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rule than an exception on the both sides of the front. However, to find 
out that the Whites were not much different from their enemies shocked 
the British. Almost every diary and the numerous letters written by these 
officers and men mention appalling atrocities committed in equal 
measure by the Bolsheviks and the Whites. The brutality of the White 
troops also appears as an important factor alienating the British from the 
White cause and undermining their morale and motivation. These 
atrocities that were committed not only against the enemy troops but 
also against the civilian population heightening in the pogroms were 
another sign of the dubious quality of the White Army in its assumed 
task of defeating the Bolsheviks and the regenerating Russia. 
     *  *  * 
 It is also possible to draw some general conclusions on the 
White movement and the reasons for their defeat from the study of the 
British intervention. The private opinions of the British Military Mission 
are different from the picture in studies based on White sources which 
traditionally describe the Whites as superior soldiers to their Bolshevik 
counterparts.
323
 The military defects in Denikin’s army were numerous. 
The personal courage of many White front-line soldiers was not enough, 
since most of their commanders were unimaginative and their military 
thinking was obsolete. Furthermore, Denikin’s army was incapable of 
organizing its logistics. Rear echelon troops were numerous, but they 
were more interested in looting and profiteering than in administering 
the liberated areas and supplying the front-line units. These problems 
were sharply detected and often pointed to Denikin’s staff. It was, 
however, impossible to make fundamental improvements in the chaotic 
conditions of the Civil War.  
 When Denikin’s Army is analyzed as a fighting force, 
fundamental defects can be detected in the morale of the White troops. 
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According to studies written on the armies of the World War I, military 
units’s morale on the battlefield (narrowly defined as the ‘will to fight’) 
was based on negative and positive factors ‒ ‘sticks and carrots’.324 The 
negative factors include discipline. As with the Imperial Russian Army 
before, the White army counted on discipline as a decisive factor, and 
required blind obedience from the troops ‒ with variable results. 
Training was neglected. It consisted mainly of the parade ground drill, 
again, to improve discipline. On the positive side, there is a promise of 
reward, which in the form of loot was definitely an important factor in 
the White Army. The problem was that the prospect of loot did not 
increase the efficiency of the White troops, but became a goal itself. The 
most important factor affecting the morale of a unit, according to studies 
by Richard Holmes and Niall Ferguson, is group cohesion. In the early 
Volunteer Army this was certainly a decisive element behind the 
miraculous success of this minuscule force. Later, however, when 
Denikin’s army became a mass army of unwilling peasant conscripts, 
such values rarely existed.   
 The White officers were generally suspicious of the 
modernization of warfare, especially when suggested by foreign 
advisers. The White Army was led by the conservative wing of the 
Imperial officer corps. These men had been, as Norman Stone has stated, 
more or less guilty of the failure to develop the Russian Army during the 
World War.
325
 Tactical innovations were neglected despite huge losses. 
The new group of junior officers and general staff men that was 
emerging after the defeats of 1916 never held much authority in the 
Imperial Army ‒ nor in Denikin’s. Their more radical military thinking 
was, however, exploited in full by the Bolsheviks in the later stages of 
the Civil War.  
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 Stone’s analysis of the Russian commanders of the Imperial 
Army partially explains the inadequate amount of British aid claimed in 
many of the White memoirs such as Wrangel’s and Lukomskii’s. This 
myth of the Allies leaving the Whites in the lurch, which has also been 
given as an explanation for the White defeat, has been indeed 
maintained in many studies on the topic.
326
 During the World War the 
traditional explanation of the Russian generals for the constantly 
unsuccessful offensives was the infamous ‘shell shortage’, i.e. the 
claimed inability of the Russian industry or the Allies to provide 
sufficient ammunition to support the operations. The Russian 
commanders refused to consider, however, the possibility that faulty 
strategies and dated tactics had been the reason for the defeats and 
enormous casualties. Similarly, no matter how many shiploads of guns 
and shells the British poured to Novorossiisk, there was never enough 
for Denikin’s generals, who had gradually returned to the methods of the 
Imperial Army when the Armed Forces of South Russia were organized 
and enlargened into a conscript army. 
 There is also a Soviet myth about the Allied intervention in 
the Civil War. According to Soviet historiography, the Allies first 
planned to send their armies to crush the young Soviet state in order to 
fulfil their imperialistic plans in Russia. This proved unsuccessful as the 
Allied troops did not want to fight their fellow workers and peasants in 
Russia but mutinied. Thus the Allies founded the White armies of 
Kolchak, Iudenich and Denikin as an instrument for their policy, and 
supplied these ‘hirelings’ with plentiful supplies of arms, equipment and 
advisors and also planned their operations and commanded them.
327
 In 
the light of both British and White sources this is quite incorrect. There 
was never a real plan to send a whole army to Russia from any of the 
Allied countries. The Allies certainly supported, for example, the 
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Volunteer movement right from the beginning, but they did not found it. 
It is also unfair to define Denikin merely as a mercenary or a puppet of 
the Allies. Although in the spring of 1920 the British influence at his 
headquarters increased, it was definitely Denikin and his staff who 
planned and executed the Moscow offensive. At this stage the British 
could not really influence the White strategy, although they considered it 
very risky and also pointed this out to Denikin. The Soviet legend of the 
Civil War and the intervention comes close to the truth only in the 
matter of the importance of the British material aid to the Whites. The 
Whites indeed fought their war with British guns and even in British 
uniforms. 
 In addition to all the political mistakes of Denikin’s regime 
and a general inability to adjust to the complex situation in revolutionary 
Russia, the Whites suffered a clear military defeat. In purely material 
terms, the British aid placed Denikin’s Army in a far more favourable 
position than the Bolsheviks in 1919 and it would have enabled them to 
win the military struggle. The Whites were defeated in South Russia not 
because of the lack of British aid but rather in spite of it. If the British 
had sent the divisions the Whites requested to South Russia in the spring 
of 1919, they would most probably have soon marched to Moscow. 
Despite all later Soviet claims, the Red Army of the Civil War stood no 
chance against modern army units. This was proved, for example, in the 
fighting against the British in Northern Russia in the summer of 1919. 
But what would have happened after toppling Lenin’s regime? Denikin 
had soon proved unable to govern even the Kuban and the Don let alone 
the Ukraine. Accordingly, a White ‘victory’ would probably have 
increased chaos as the Whites would have been enmeshed in yet another 
civil war against the various peasant movements of the vast Russian 
countryside. The Whites were after all unfit for the task of regenerating 
Russia following the chaos of the Revolution and the Civil War. 
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Appendix 1 
General Holman's order to the British Military Mission, July 1919 
 
Source: Lancaster papers, IWM.
   
 
191 
Appendix 2 
British matériel issued to the White forces in South Russia  
 Denikin,  
 April 1919 -  
March 1920 
Wrangel,  
April 1920 - 
June 1920 
Total 
Artillery    
18-pdr field guns 
Ammunition 
491 
1.463,210 
143 
215,000 
634 
1.678,210 
4.5” howitzers 
Ammunition 
181 
261,861 
59 
- 
240 
261,861 
60-pdr medium guns 
Ammunition 
60 
97,934 
- 
8,010 
60 
105,944 
6” howitzers 
Ammunition 
61 
70,490 
- 
- 
61 
70,490 
8” howitzers 
Ammmunition 
8 
8,455 
- 
- 
8 
8,455 
3” Stokes mortars 
Ammunition 
106 
16,142 
97 
48,150 
203 
64,292 
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Tanks    
Mark V Heavy tanks  
Ammunition  for 6-pdr tank guns 
56 
20,000 
- 
- 
56 
20,000 
Whippet light tanks 18 - 18 
Rolls Royce armoured cars 6 - 6 
Aircraft    
RE8 and DH9 reconnaissance 
bombers 
196 22 218 
Machine guns    
Vickers heavy machine guns 1,913 333 2,246 
Lewis light machine guns 4,264 530 4,794 
Rifles    
Russian 7.62, SMLE, Ross 
Ammunition 
198,015 
 500 million 
38,365 
72 million 
236,380 
572 million 
Hand-guns, swords etc.    
Webley revolvers 
Ammunition 
1,257 
154,480 
_ 
_ 
1,257 
1,257 
Bayonets 70,524 _ 70,524 
Cavalry swords 13,094 - 13,094 
Cavalry lances 2,500 - 2,500 
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Uniforms etc.    
Complete sets of British uniforms 520,000 58,000 578,000 
Boots 662,408 105,999 768,407 
Steel helmets 103,378 - 103,378 
Transport vehicles    
Lorries 402 - 402 
Touring cars 227 - 227 
Motorcycles 279 - 279 
Medical equipment    
General hospitals for 500 beds 12 - 12 
Field hospitals  25 - 25 
Ambulances 174 6 180 
Field dressings 800,000 72,000 872,000 
 
Sources: Maj.-Gen. Sir H.C. Holman’s Final Report of the Military 
Mission, South Russia. WO 33/971, PRO. ‘Resume of work by the 
RAOC with the British Military Mission in South Russia’, by Lt-Col. 
Symons, Symons’ Papers, PLA.‘Nekatoraia perepiskaia po vaprosam´ 
snabzheniia Armii v Krymu s maia po oktiabr´1920 g.’, Kusonskii 
Collection, Box 2 file 2, HIA.   
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Map: Russia 1919 
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